On responsibility
in The ethics of researching war
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Rafael Nieto-Navia explained that, before reaching a verdict, he had expected 'the Trial Chamber to confirm whether such an offence existed as a form of liability under international customary law, attracting individual criminal responsibility under that body of law. The simple suggestion is that ethics has been permanently suspended in favour of obligation, of obligation without ethics, of responsibility without reason, of justice without law. The recognition that there is a fundamental lack of clarity in the space between victim and perpetrator leads to an appreciation of the inadequacy of both ethics and the legal frameworks which are said to embody them. For Soren Kierkegaard, the law must be suspended so that faith can enter in. There is no faith under the law or within the teleology of the ethical.

The ethics of researching war

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