Rumsfeld’s exit strategy
in Leaders in conflict
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This chapter covers Iraq policy from June 2004 until mid-2006 from the standpoint of security and of politics, analyzing Bush and Rumsfeld’s conceptions of what was necessary and the conflict between these two visions. Paradoxically, Bush and Rumsfeld’s worldviews led them to very different conclusions as to what was required, but their styles meant that they did not have a direct debate about these differences. The puzzling U.S. behavior during this period – describing Iraq as central to the war on terror and the spread of democracy, yet simultaneously drawing down forces and planning to leave – is revealed here as a product of the conflict between the visions of Bush and Rumsfeld.

Leaders in conflict

Bush and Rumsfeld in Iraq

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