The United States and the crisis of the Six Day War (May 14–June 5, 1967)
in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
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The Johnson administration was surprised by the mid-May crisis. Israel, far less surprised, expected the US to honour the promises it made in 1957. However, when the chips were down in 1967 the Sixth Fleet failed to prevent the Arab aggression However, Washington did nothing to stop the inevitable deterioration, since any movement in Israel's favour meaning opening a new front in the cold war, while the Vietnam war was at its height, and the German problem was still a hot issue in the cold war. The visit of foreign minister Abba Eban and General Meir Amit, head of the Mossad, to the US to warn the administration about the danger of war did not move Johnson, Rusk and McNamara. Johnson's policy was that 'Israel will not be alone unless it decided to be alone'. No green light was given to Israeli decision-makers, who had no choice but to treat Nasser's challenges as casus belli..

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