Holding senior bankers to account
in Holding bankers to account
Abstract only
Log-in for full text

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

manchesterhive requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals - to see content that you/your institution should have access to, please log in through your library system or with your personal username and password.

If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/extracts and download selected front and end matter. 

Institutions can purchase access to individual titles; please contact manchesterhive@manchester.ac.uk for pricing options.


If you have an access token for this content, you can redeem this via the link below:

Redeem token

This concluding chapter addresses the question of why so few senior bankers have borne the consequences of market manipulation carried out by their subordinates. It argues that the huge fines imposed on banks have failed, both in terms of justice and in terms of bringing about changes in culture and behaviour. Tracing the changes in the senior management regime from the 1990s to the present, it weighs up the possible means of ensuring that senior figures are held responsible in the future.

Holding bankers to account

A decade of market manipulation, regulatory failures and regulatory reforms


All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 94 31 2
Full Text Views 40 10 0
PDF Downloads 19 4 0