This book has been a long time in the development, and as
such it would be impossible to thank everyone who has inspired, encouraged,
advised or otherwise played a part in its fashioning. There are several
people whose contribution stands out, however, and whom I would particularly
like to thank here. As my PhD supervisor, Chris Baldick read more drafts
than he probably cares to count, and the value of his erudition, criticism
and advice has been incalculable throughout. Special thanks are also due to
Emma McEvoy, whose honest and perceptive criticism has also helped shape
this work, and who has contributed an immeasurable amount to the finished
manuscript by way of intellectual discussion and exchange. I would also
especially like to thank David Punter and Aileen Ribeiro for providing
encouragement and constructive criticism. Many others read all or part of
the manuscript at different stages of its development or offered practical
advice and support, and here I would like to thank Justine Baillie, Helen
Carr, Debbie Challis, Harriet Darcel, the team at Manchester University
Press, Alex Goody, Sam Greasley, Trevor Holmes, Sarah Martin, Helen Minchin,
Flora Nuttgens, Eddie Robson, Andrew Teverson and Jason Whittaker. For
assistance in locating picture ownership or obscure information and
material, thanks to Flora Bathurst, Sheron Burton, Jane Desmarais, Kayte
Ellis, Jonathan Evans and David Rose. I am grateful to the AHRB for enabling
me to begin this project by awarding me funding for PhD research, to
Goldsmiths College for contributing to conference expenses, and to Falmouth
College of Arts Research Unit for providing word-processing software.
Finally, last but not least, thanks to all the students at Goldsmiths
College and Falmouth College of Arts who contributed to the lively ongoing
debate of the material contained herein.
A shorter version of Chapter 5,
‘Cosmo-Goxhic: The Double and the Single Woman’
previously appeared in Women: A Cultural Review 12: 3 (Winter 2001)
The Washington summit was useful to Lyndon B. Johnson mainly because it allowed him to impress upon the British the need for them to retain their traditional 'great power' role and also to allow him to bring the multilateral force (MLF) to a conclusion. Harold Wilson accepted the American view that Britain should preserve its current position in defence, telling the Cabinet on 11 December that 'the most encouraging fact about the conference was America's emphasis on Britain's world wide role'. Johnson not only wanted Wilson to maintain Britain's defence commitments, but to extend them into South Vietnam. After Wilson's visit to Washington, most observers, including the President, anticipated that he would face a serious challenge in explaining what he had agreed to in Washington to the House of Commons in the foreign affairs debate scheduled for 16-17 December.
From January to April 1965 the character of the Harold Wilson-Lyndon B. Johnson relationship traversed the spectrum from discord to cordiality. Discord erupted over the Vietnam War when Wilson telephoned Washington in the early hours of 11 February to suggest to Johnson an urgent visit to the White House. Wilson agreed to the US initiative, even though the visit might have caused a political storm in Britain had it become public knowledge - it would appear that the United States was dictating British economic measures. Wilson noted that unlike the December summit and the telephone conversation in February, Johnson did not make 'any suggestion of our committing troops to Vietnam nor even any reference to police, medical teams, or teams to handle the flow of refugees'. On 10 April, Patrick Dean advised that to help strengthen the Anglo-American relationship, Britain should provide more support for the United States in Vietnam.