Aaron Edwards
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Soldiering the peace
Combating terrorism in Northern Ireland
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A considerable amount of myth and misunderstanding has grown up around security force operations in the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’. As this chapter demonstrates, like all good myths, these ones lack firm foundation in empirical fact. Thus, the misapplication of colonial policing techniques had led inexorably to the alienation of the Catholic population in the early 1970s. Moreover, that Kitson transmuted his vast wealth of knowledge on colonial policing to his troops when he was Commander of 39 Infantry Brigade was a moot point because, in Northern Ireland at least, the lessons from Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden were irrelevant. Finally, the Army's counter-insurgency campaign lasted for only for five years between 1971 and 1976; thereafter, the military instrument was firmly subordinated to a civilian-led policing strategy. As this chapter reveals for the first time, Margaret Thatcher risked much politically by continuing with a policy concocted by her Labour government predecessors, even if it did eventually lay the foundations for future strategic success against the Provisional IRA.

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Defending the realm?

The politics of Britain’s small wars since 1945

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