Paul R. Pillar
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Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq
in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq
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The most serious problem with US intelligence is that its relationship with the policymaking process is broken and badly needs repair. Public discussion of prewar intelligence on Iraq has focused on the errors made in assessing Saddam Hussein's unconventional weapons programs. The intelligence community limits its judgments to what is happening or what might happen overseas, avoiding policy judgments about what the United States should do in response. The George H. W. Bush administration deviated from the professional standard not only in using policy to drive intelligence, but also in aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war. In its report on prewar intelligence concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said it found no evidence that analysts had altered or shaped their judgments in response to political pressure.

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