This chapter explores the securitisation of UK development aid from the pre-2010 Labour Government to the post-2010 Conservative-led Government. It does so by examining official policy discourse in Department for International Development (DFID) aid programming in five sub-Saharan African countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. It finds that, in line with the development discourse, aid securitisation as conceptualised here progressed in the five case-study countries gradually between 2002 and 2015. The most notable change from Labour to the Coalition Government in this regard was the higher preference to channel ‘securitised’ aid to countries of more strategic importance to the UK. A closer look at three examples of ‘securitised’ aid projects implemented by Conservative-led DFID unfortunately demonstrates that such projects are not likely to contribute to one of the key aims of securitised aid provision: the sustainable reduction of conflict and instability in the recipient countries.
This introductory chapter discusses the theme of this volume, which is about the connection between the United Nations' (UN) evolving approach to intra-state conflicts and the value system of the international community. This study takes issue with the relatively reductionist explanations of what the UN is and how it relates to peace and security. It explores the interest-norm complexes within which the cases in the Congo, Cyprus, Angola, and Cambodia were handled by the UN. This volume shows how relevant actors' normative preferences were resolved in specific peacekeeping environments where the UN was especially active in addressing intra-state conflicts.