Firmness abroad, consensus at home, 1977–1978
in A precarious equilibrium
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Once at the White House, Carter moved swiftly to give human rights high priority in America’s foreign policy. The chapter recognizes that Carter’s human rights campaign was almost global but it focuses on its impact on bipolar détente. It argues that Carter conceived human rights and détente as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Conscious that the American public’s attitude towards détente represented a major obstacle to bipolar dialogue, the White House hoped to build a domestic consensus on détente through a firm stance on Soviet violations of human rights. At the same time, through the continuation of détente, it tried both to ideologically challenge the Soviet Union and to promote human rights there.

A precarious equilibrium

Human rights and détente in Jimmy Carter’s Soviet policy

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