Lorena De Vita
Search for other papers by Lorena De Vita in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
Crises
in Israelpolitik
Abstract only
Log-in for full text

The second part of the book commences with the Suez Crisis, and explores how the German–German and Arab–Israeli power struggles played out in the second half of the 1950s. Chapter 4 builds upon minutes of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) meetings, analyses of the West German intelligence services (BND), and assessments of the US National Security Council. These documents show that, as domestic and international crises developed in the second half of the 1950s, each Germany found itself increasingly at odds with its respective superpower patron. This deeply influenced German policy-makers and their perceptions of each Germany’s international role. On the one hand, the consequences of the Suez Crisis spread insecurity among the West German political elite regarding the extent of the American readiness to protect the interests of its Western European partners. On the other hand, East German leader Walter Ulbricht became increasingly intolerant of the Soviet constraints on East German overtures to Middle Eastern partners. Thus, the GDR intensified its international propaganda campaign against West Germany, focusing especially on the West German–Israeli entente to woo Arab audiences, with mixed results.

  • Collapse
  • Expand

Israelpolitik

German–Israeli relations, 1949–69

Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 94 17 0
Full Text Views 11 1 1
PDF Downloads 17 2 2