James D. Fry
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Natasha Pushkarna
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Patterns of authority in international organizations’ constitutions
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This chapter illustrates the quantitative links from the first chapters by using the standard tools of legal analysis. In particular, it shows how references to other principles shade any legal or practical definition of authority in these international organizations. For example, the African Export Import Bank’s constitution describes how the Bank’s autonomy from its member states helps to ensure the Bank staff’s authority. The constitutions of the Caribbean Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank also show how some constitutions use recommendations to appoint staff, while in other cases staff make recommendations to member states. Depending on the international organization, the principle of making recommendations serves different ends. In some cases, autonomy helps provide the authority to make these recommendations. In cases like the United Nations, the recommendations themselves carry authority, and the authority vested in the United Nations gives authority to these recommendations. However, the law (and particularly the subsidiary and regulatory law) behind these nuanced concepts of these legal principles remains almost completely undefined.

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