Humanitarian intervention
in The Norman Geras Reader
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The principle of humanitarian intervention stands not only at the origin of the offence of crimes against humanity, but also on the other side of its arriving at maturity, so to say, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The question of humanitarian intervention is posed when crimes against humanity, crimes according to jus cogens norms are being widely committed. In this chapter, Geras addresses two questions pertaining to the existence of a scale threshold for humanitarian intervention. The first of them tests whether such a threshold is relevant in every instance, and suggests that sometimes, for atypical cases, it may not be. The second question asks whether, even in the case that a scale threshold is relevant, it needs to be set as high as it conventionally is. There are a number of requirements standardly held to constrain the would-be intervening power or coalition of powers.

The Norman Geras Reader

‘What’s there is there’

Editors: Ben Cohen and Eve Garrard

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