Government, public and total war (1940–45)
in Supreme emergency
Abstract only
Log-in for full text

There was protracted and serious discussion within the British War Cabinet and RAF high command about the strategic bombing campaign and its legitimacy, a discussion which continues to this day. This chapter considers the impact of concerns about public opinion on that discussion and resulting strategy; it concludes that there was a concerted effort to maximise damage to areas of German cities, including industrial and residential areas, but that the public presentation of this policy was adapted to appear to show an aspiration to employ precision bombing against industrial facilities only, which must cause unavoidable casualties amongst non-combatants. This ambivalent position, a distinct aversion to public acknowledgement of the willingness to inflict non-combatant casualties, was inherited by those responsible for the early development of British nuclear strategy.

  • Collapse
  • Expand
  • Top

Supreme emergency

How Britain lives with the Bomb

Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 6 6 3
Full Text Views 0 0 0
PDF Downloads 0 0 0