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Explaining military corruption
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This chapter asks why military corruption persists in democratic Latin America and what the drivers of this corruption are by looking at the governance of the military from a comparative perspective in two very different cases: Chile and Guatemala. It argues that the institutional autonomy and corresponding prerogatives of the military, dating back to authoritarianism in Chile and civil war in Guatemala, are crucial to understanding the ongoing reproduction of corruption. The chapter focuses on how institutional privileges promoted or at least provided a fertile ground for corruption to take place. It gives insights into how the institutional design and position of the armed forces in post-authoritarian societies facilitates military corruption. While Chile and Guatemala show significant variation in democratic consolidation, transparency, and corruption perception, their military corruption cases are strikingly similar. In both countries, the authors find evidence of corrupt endeavours in all branches of the military: clandestine networks of officers embezzling funds for private gain; informal networks that seek to channel funds for illicit use; and complex webs of dependencies between the armed forces and private business, military industry, politics, and organised crime. The cases of Chile and Guatemala suggest that the third wave of democratisation has not erased corrupt practices in the military – an institution regarded as the carrier of modernisation during the Cold War period.

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Governing the military

The armed forces under democracy in Chile

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