Marwa Maziad
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The Turkey–Qatar alliance
Through the Gulf and into the Horn of Africa
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Following the Arab uprisings, the Turkey–Qatar alliance pursued Islamist foreign policy into the Horn of Africa in order to challenge the strategic interests of other regional rivals, namely Egypt with its own African roots and strategic depth into the Nile Valley; Israel with its investments and presence in Ethiopia; the United Arab Emirates with its economic and military training projects in Eritrea; and both Saudi Arabia and Iran with their rivaling attempts to pierce into the same East African region. In fact, Turkey and Qatar made their presence known in the Horn region, triggering, in turn, responses from all the other regional powers. Eventually, however, regime change in Sudan from Islamist to more pro-Egypt/UAE, and Sudan’s normalization deal with Israel, translated into a major set-back for the Turkey–Qatar pan-Islamist doctrine in the Horn. Three-and-a-half years after the Arab Quartet (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) boycott of Qatar – primarily due to its pan-Islamist expansionist alliance with Turkey – both Turkey and Qatar cut their losses, recalibrated, withdrew much of their visible support for Islamists, and sought normalization with their rivals. This chapter traces developments that marked the rise and fall of the Turkey–Qatar alliance’s pan-Islamism into the Horn and elsewhere.

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The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa

Interests, influences and instability

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