David Hine
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Gillian Peele
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Regulation at the centre of government
The Ministerial Code
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The chapter examines the Ministerial Code and its antecedents, and explores recent efforts to shift aspects of the Code away from the Prime Minister’s exclusive hands: towards Parliament for content, and towards an independent adviser, for cases of alleged Ministerial impropriety. The role of the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Ministerial Interests has not, in practice, developed significantly towards meaningful independence, and clearly - given majority discipline in a parliamentary legislature - it suits governments to retain accountability on these matters under Parliament’s usually supportive majority. The chapter concludes, from the cases which have arisen to date, that the political implications of more independent regulation of all but the most serious cases of alleged Ministerial impropriety would probably make independent regulation unworkable, however desirable it might be.

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