New, documentary based interpretations of the Anglo-American relationship underlining the unifying impact of culture and sentiment are less common than those emphasising shared political interests, periodic crises and frequent compromise - what Alex Danchev calls the 'functionalist' model. He points out that the British have been inclined to 'sentimentalise' and 'mytholigise' Anglo-American bonds for reasons of self-interest. A 1968 State Department analysis reflected that Britain and the United States were linked 'in an unparalleled of spheres - nuclear strategy, disarmament, multilateral alliance, weapons technology, intelligence, and arms sales and purchases'. The release in recent years of British and American government documents has enabled primary research on the Anglo-American relationship under Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson. Finally, this chapter presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book.
This introductory chapter discusses Germany's security policy and strategic culture. It shows that strategic culture is concerned with the domestic sources of security policy and tries to determine how the past affects and shapes modern policy behaviour. It also addresses the idea of German strategic culture and German policy-makers. The final part of this chapter presents a brief outline of the succeeding chapters.
This study takes the Middle East to be constituted around an Arab core, with a shared identity but fragmented into multiple territorial states; the core is flanked by a periphery of non-Arab states—Turkey, Iran and Israel—which are an intimate part of the region's conflicts and an integral part of its balance of power. This chapter argues that the Middle East is the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world's most protracted conflicts. It also argues that that the roots of conflict and much state behaviour are found in the peculiar historical construction of the regional system.
Justifications of the EU's foreign policy have two addressees: the first is internal to the EU and consists of the member states and their citizens; the second is external and consists of non-member states and their citizens. This chapter focuses on the EU's attempts to validate its foreign policy externally. It considers the EU's policy on enlargement as foreign policy. The chapter presents analytically distinct approaches for examining the basis of legitimacy for foreign policy in general. There are three analytically distinct ways in which a foreign policy can achieve legitimacy. They are grounded in different logics of action or justification for an individual actor: a logic of consequences, a logic of appropriateness and a logic of moral justification. The chapter analyses how the EU has actually applied membership conditionality and how it has justified its actions.
This chapter focuses on the Kurdish problem and the victory Turkey gained over the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), describing the guerrilla and terror campaigns launched by the PKK after 1984 that forced the Turkish government to declare a state of emergency. It discusses the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 and the organisation's declaration of a unilateral, no preconditions ceasefire in February 2000, and explains that Turkey was able to deal with domestic problems after external circumstances became more favourable.
This chapter assesses the renewed destabilising impact of international attempts to reshape the regional order in an age of unipolarity and globalisation. For much of the world, globalisation is associated with growing interdependence and the spread of ‘zones of peace’. In the Middle East, the decade of globalisation was ushered in by war, was marked by intrusive US hegemony, renewed economic dependency on the core and continuing insecurity, and ended with yet another round of war in 2001. In the latest case, the 11 September events, the particular character of the crisis was shaped by the dominant features of the current international system, namely US hegemony and globalisation. The US response, an intensification of its military intervention in the region, appears likely to exacerbate the problem it seeks to address.
This chapter centres on the German responses to September 11 2001 and the ‘War on Terror’. It examines the post-Cold War transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s and tries to assess the nature and extent of change in German strategic culture. It also shows how strategic culture affects policy behaviour. This chapter determines that in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, the Iraq German security policy became focused on three interconnected matters, namely: the reform of the Bundeswehr, the creation of a practical European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the re-building of relations between Germany and the US.
This chapter discusses the ambivalent relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey and the economic aspects of this, explaining that Turkey's relations with Europe and the EU have covered a multitude of issues including political and ethnic concerns, the democratic process and human rights. It highlights the efforts of the EU to find common ground with Turkey, and analyses the Turkish government's reservations about the amount of change and alterations that it should apply before being acceded to the EU. The chapter also describes the economic condition of Turkey.
This chapter takes a look at the theme of strategic culture and uses it as an approach to security studies. It first examines several existing studies and conceptions of strategic culture, before it discusses a new definition of strategic culture. It then creates a conceptual framework that can be adapted to the case of Germany. This chapter reveals that strategic culture now presents a practical alternative to the more traditional rationalist approaches in security studies.
The period from October 1967 to December 1968 began with the devaluation of sterling and ended with President Lyndon B. Johnson retiring from office, and therefore constituted the last phase of the Harold Wilson-Johnson relationship. Devaluation did not put a great strain on the Anglo-American relationship, though Wilson had worried about its impact on his standing in the eyes of the President. British plans to withdraw from East of Suez by the mid-1970s, announced on 18 July 1967, had distressed Johnson and his colleagues to the degree that they were less inclined even to keep Wilson informed of developments in Vietnam. On 31 March 1968, Johnson, buffeted by domestic dissent and a mounting death toll in Vietnam, announced that he would not seek another term in office, and the Republican contender, Richard Nixon, won the presidential election on 5 November that year.