In this chapter, the author describes Rainer Bauböck's virtues and limitations of three different principles of democratic inclusion. The principles include all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC), and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). Bauböck argues that the three principles complement one another, with each providing legitimation for a different set of democratic institutions and practices. He has many illuminating things to say about these three principles, including the ways in which they are derived from different but compatible conceptions of democracy. Bauböck also explores fundamental questions about what a just global political order would require from a democratic perspective. The primary purpose of democracy is to provide legitimacy to coercive political rule through popular self-government. Lots of people would argue that one can be committed to equality of rights and democratic inclusion without embracing the view of the legal rights of irregular migrants.
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book argues that there is not a single principle of democratic inclusion but several principles, and that it is important to distinguish their different roles in relation to democratic boundaries. It considers the general "circumstances of democracy" that consist in normative background assumptions and general empirical conditions under which democratic self-government is both necessary and possible. The book discusses the principles of including all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). It contextualizes the principle of stakeholder inclusion, which provides the best answer to the question of democratic boundaries of membership, by applying it to polities of different types. The book distinguishes state, local and regional polities and also argues that they differ in their membership character.
This book addresses the major theoretical and practical issues of the forms of citizenship and access to citizenship in different types of polity, and the specification and justification of rights of non-citizen immigrants as well as non-resident citizens. It also addresses the conditions under which norms governing citizenship can legitimately vary. The book discusses the principles of including all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). They complement each other because they serve distinct purposes of democratic inclusion. The book proposes that democratic inclusion principles specify a relation between an individual or group that has an inclusion claim and a political community that aims to achieve democratic legitimacy for its political decisions and institutions. It contextualizes the principle of stakeholder inclusion, which provides the best answer to the question of democratic boundaries of membership, by applying it to polities of different types. The book distinguishes state, local and regional polities and argues that they differ in their membership character. It examines how a principle of stakeholder inclusion applies to polities of different types. The book illustrates the difference between consensual and automatic modes of inclusion by considering the contrast between birthright acquisition of citizenship, which is generally automatic, and naturalization, which requires an application.
Debates in political philosophy on democratic inclusion arose initially in response to the problem of what Michael Walzer called "metics". The case of the metics shows that citizenship is not ultimately about being affected by particular decisions or being subject to particular laws, but about membership in a self-governing society. In this chapter, the authors argue that these cases raise a fundamental challenge to the theories of democratic inclusion, not just about who is included, but also about what it means to be a citizen and how to characterize the underlying moral purposes of citizenship. They also argue that these cases reveal a deep tension within democratic theory between two models of citizenship: membership model and capacity contract. The membership model defines citizenship in terms of social membership and the capacity contract defines citizenship in terms of capacities for particular kinds of political agency.
Rainer Bauböck's work on popular sovereignty, citizenship and the demos problem is an important touchstone for contemporary political, and especially democratic, theory. In this chapter, the author aims to put some pressure on the relationship between populus and demos in Bauböck's account. It is an important strength of Bauböck's argument that his account articulates complementary relations of the all affected interests (AAI) principle, the all subjection to coercion (ASC) principle and the all citizenship stakeholders (ACS) principle. The author focuses on the authorial membership of the demos. He endorses Bauböck's proposal of ASC as the best principle, under contemporary political conditions, for determining access to national citizenship. The author also explains his incorporation of AAI, ASC and ACS into an account of democratic legitimacy.
In this chapter, the author explains how the all subjected principle is seen in terms of a purely protective neo-republicanism, which is distinguished from the democratic republican self-government of citizenship stakeholding. She re-examines the interpretation of the neo-republican non-domination account that Rainer Bauböck associates with the all subjected principle. The connection between non-domination and autonomy leads beyond domination to the kind of self-government among related individuals that Bauböck associates with his citizenship stakeholder account. The author argues that a modified version of the all subjected principle escapes a number of the criticisms levelled at it, and provides a clear basis for membership of the demos. Finally, she offers future continuing subjection as a more defensible basis for birthright citizenship while ensuring the continuity of the democratic political community.
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts discussed in this book. The book focuses on the principles that guide citizens of a democratic polity and their representatives when considering whose interests should count in their political decisions, whom to offer protection, and whom to include in their midst as citizens. The principles are meant to establish democratic legitimacy through inclusion in a world structured by political boundaries. The book proposes that all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS) each address a specific aspect of democratic inclusion, but that only ACS applies to membership issues. It considers the following three ideas: democracy as popular self-government, as government directly accountable to citizens, and as a method for making collectively binding decisions. The book aims to combine these ideas with the corresponding inclusion principles into a comprehensive conception of democratic inclusion for democratic politics.
In this chapter, the author interrogates Rainer Bauböck's stakeholder model as a matter of theory and highlights possibly unsustainable empirical assumptions behind it. The intergenerational qualities of citizenship are central to Bauböck's analysis. Bauböck understands that citizenship persists only where boundaries exist and where populations remain relatively sedentary. The author utilizes the archetypes of diaspora communities to critique his position on citizenship inside and outside the territory of the state. Diaspora communities may be disconnected from the political community of their state of residence even as they maintain a strong intergenerational connection qualifying as stakeholder citizenship in the homeland. Local territorial membership also supplies a useful vehicle for interrogating stakeholder citizenship. The incidence of instrumental citizenship will continue to grow, further undermining the empirical premises of stakeholder citizenship.
Rainer Bauböck has offered a fascinating and wide-ranging analysis of a question that is often now referred to as "the democratic boundary problem". This chapter begins to discuss how a democracy might function, what decision rules it should use, and how it should be constituted. It addresses questions of jurisdiction first, and concludes that, for economic and other reasons, it makes sense to have a single state in the region covered by the state of Israel and the occupied territories. The chapter considers the composition of the citizen body who should govern it, as well as other questions concerning the institutional form that democracy should take in that area. It illustrates how one-state or the two-state solution makes a difference, whether the question is about jurisdiction or about inclusion in the demos.
Often presented as a proto-totalitarian, Rousseau has traditionally been seen as an opponent of constitutionalism, checks and balances, and the separation of powers. Following a brief overview of the history of constitutionalism (from Moses to the French Revolution), this chapter compares Rousseau's political writings with the writings of constitutionalists like James Madison and Baron de Montesquieu. It shows that Rousseau shared the view that checks and balances are necessary for preventing the corruption of power and that he advocated a system of the separation of powers (and spoke highly of the British constitution. Yet, contrary to the other constitutionalists, Rousseau was a democrat. Whereas Montesquieu and Madison wanted the elites to check the elites (through the introduction of second chambers and constitutional courts), Rousseau emphasised that the executive ought to be checked by the people. He thus anticipated the political system that was instated by the American populists (including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson). However, unlike other constitutionalists, Rousseau did not believe that institutions themselves would be sufficient for creating a good polity. He ceaselessly emphasised that political education was necessary for creating a good society.