Introduction, explaining chapters and the author’s questioning of the dominant academic interpretations of UK social enterprise policy development. Initial overview of themes throughout book, including other academic contributions’ undue reliance on North American and mainland European marketised structures, their neglect of previous UK indigenous structures and failure to synchronise voluntary, community and social enterprise developments, the political and economic significance of New Labour’s policy shift from co-operatives to social enterprise, the unreported role of academic and third sector policy entrepreneurs and the reality of social enterprise policy driven by third sector organisations themselves.
The ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ is a self-proclaimed state in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The struggle for an independent Republic of Donetsk has resulted in significant bloodshed, particularly from 2014. Survey data suggests that most of the residents of the region would like their region to become part of Russia and the Donetsk People’s Republic relies heavily on Russian support. This chapter shows how governance decisions intended to achieve internal legitimacy in fact leave residents without a functional citizenship of either Ukraine or Russia. This means that they are effectively stateless, since citizenship of the Donetsk People’s Republic is not recognised beyond Donbas. The chapter traces what this means for individuals living in the region, and how it affects both their decision-making and their understanding of citizenship and identity. The case of the DPR highlights the powerful link between governance, statelessness, and citizenship. For established states, the inability to govern within a particular territory may contribute to statelessness. For self-proclaimed states, governance in pursuit of internal legitimacy may involve manipulation of citizenship policies, which enhances the risk of statelessness.
Contrary to celebrations of China’s ‘rise’ or ‘the rise of the rest’, imperialism of the rich countries is alive and well. China does not threaten the global dominance of the imperialist states and it cannot within the global capitalist system. In contemporary capitalism, domination over the most sophisticated parts within the overall labour process would be the only path to ‘catch up’ with the rich societies. However, imperialist monopoly capital dominates the highest aspects of the labour process, so that other, ‘non-monopoly’ capital must specialise in low-end and ordinary labour. This kernel within the international division of labour leads to the development of two poles – a pole of high-end labour and its opposite, a pole of low-end, ordinary labour. Capitalist producers and countries are divided on this basis into rich, monopoly and poor, non-monopoly capitals and countries. For large non-monopoly societies – that is, large ‘Third World’ states – the path to ‘catch-up’ is closed. The nature of Chinese and other Third World participation in the global division of labour does not prepare them to challenge imperialist monopoly. China’s rapid expansion of production has profoundly reshaped the world economy, however, this does not indicate China is catching up with imperialist countries. China has caught up with the other large Third World economies, like Brazil and Mexico, but these occupy an intermediate position within the international division of labour. They have a high level of development compared to poorer Third World societies, but far below that of the imperialist core societies.
Risks and opportunities for conflict transformation
Many contemporary violent conflicts involve armed non-state actors (ANSAs) as
conflict parties. Governments are often hesitant to enter informal talks and
negotiations with ANSAs, and yet in many violent conflicts such ‘talks’ are
initiated at some point. Engaging with ANSAs is considered risky. Talking
and negotiating usually imply gradual steps of recognising and legitimising
the counterpart. In successful cases, ANSAs can be transformed into
non-violent political parties and their legitimate goals eventually become
incorporated into state policy. But recognition can also backfire by
creating counterproductive precedents and new modes of exclusion in
politics. In unsuccessful cases, armed non-state actors might escalate the
violent struggle. At the same time, mis-recognition, which individuals or
collective actors experience as humiliation, disrespect or false
representations of their identity, can be seen as a major cause of political
resistance and escalation. By conceptualising the (mis-/non-)recognition
of ANSAs, pointing to potential ambivalences and addressing its meaning for
conflict transformation, the introductory chapter provides the broader
analytical frame and contextualisation for the edited volume. It links the
concept of recognition as developed in international political theory to
research on ANSAs in peace and conflict studies. What forms of
(non-/mis-)recognition of armed non-state actors occur in violent conflicts?
Which risks and opportunities arise in processes of conflict transformation
when state actors recognise armed non-state actors or, conversely, deny them
recognition? The theoretical-conceptual considerations presented here draw
on examples from the case studies as discussed in the individual
contributions to the volume.
Lebanese Hezbollah is arguably the most powerful armed non-state actor
currently active. Founded as an Islamic resistance movement against Israeli
occupation in the 1970s and 1980s, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist
organisation by several Western states and, since 2016, by the Arab League
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Since 2015, it is known to have been
involved in several armed conflicts in the Middle East, most importantly as
a supporter of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, but also as a
provider of military training for resistance groups in Iraq and
Yemen. At the same time, however, Hezbollah representatives have been
part of all Lebanese governments since 2011 and they occupy a number of
seats in Parliament. Finally, Hezbollah is also a very active provider of
social and welfare services in the Lebanese South and the Beqaa. For
all of the roles it takes, Hezbollah has often been described as a hybrid
organisation, which escapes established typologies of both Islamism and
terrorism. The chapter, based on the author’s field research in Lebanon,
seeks to explore and map the variety of recognition practices that revolve
around Hezbollah. It analyses what kind of recognition Hezbollah seeks from
different audiences, among them the Lebanese and transnational Shiite
community, the Lebanese people, competing political parties in Lebanon, and
Western and Middle Eastern states, as well as international organisations.
It traces how recognition-granters react to Hezbollah’s claims and what
consequences these parallel processes of recognition, non-recognition and
mis-recognition have on inner-Lebanese and regional conflict dynamics.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the ways in which the Islamic State
generates and upholds its message through what are termed recognition
orders, that is, complex sets of recognition by various actors for various
traits and reasons, as well as complex sets of claims for recognition
towards various actors as to what is to be recognised about the Islamic
State in which way. This means that any act of recognition, non- or
mis-recognition is part of a social relationship between those granting (or
denying) and those the act is directed towards. Consequently, recognition
and its others (non- and mis-recognition) are constituted
reciprocally. Considerations are based on an examination of twenty-three
authoritative statements as well as a few texts and videos wherein the
Islamic State’s ideologues emphasised particular sets of traits the group
aspired to being recognised for as well as sets of actors from which the
group sought recognition. These sets of traits and their variation
correspond to the series of organisational stages the Islamic State
underwent before and after its proclamation as the Caliphate in 2014. The
chapter proposes two different sets of analytical questions, the answers to
which reveal the complex recognition regime of which the Islamic State is
part. The history of the Islamic State and its predecessor organisations is
shown to be highly volatile in terms of the content and scope of the
recognition it demands.
This chapter discusses the revision process of the Maastricht Treaty. It assesses the politics of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996/97 and looks at the extent to which the outcome of the revision process – namely the Treaty of Amsterdam – represents a development of the integration process, or if it is merely a combination of state competences. The chapter studies the Final Report of the Reflection Group, which was structured around three dimensions (efficiency, democracy and flexibility). It also discusses the issues of subsidiarity and transparency, the changes made to simplify European Union decisionmaking, the revisions made to the voting mechanisms in the Council and the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting. The chapter furthermore studies the classification of Community Acts, which came from the European Parliament's Institutional Affairs Committee and the Italian government during the IGCs.
This chapter presents an anatomical comparison of the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, emphasising the remarkable similarity between the two. It focuses on to the responses of Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the respective Chechen and Kosovo problems. The chapter discusses rationales and motives can, in the absence of any convincing Realist interests, best explain NATO's and Russia's decision to go to war. It shows how Chechnya and Kosovo are linked, both by Realpolitik and, perhaps more directly, by each being the focal point of an on-going war of interpretation. The outcome of each of these wars of interpretation may influence the European security landscape more than the 'hot war' in Kosovo. Both the Chechen and the Kosovo conflict are essentially a by-product of the breakdown of the Soviet and Yugoslav ethno-federations.
The development and academic study of the 'Third Way' since the mid-1990s represents the most consistent and durable attempt to develop those overt beliefs on behalf of the 'Centre-Left' in general and New Labour in particular. Five names crop up when communitarian philosophy is cited by Third Way commentators: Alasdair MacIntyre; Michael Sandel; Charles Taylor; Michael Walzer and John Macmurray. These philosophers are the subject of this chapter. The obvious connection between Tony Blair and Macmurray is the importance for both of them of the idea of community. For Macmurray, individualism is an expression of fear, while society is an expression of mutual need, and community an expression of love. Sandel's approach has been seen as epitomising a communitarianism in which justice and community are in conflict. MacIntyre's criticism of liberalism is far broader than Sandel's.
This chapter articulates the idea of one kind of community, pertinent to social and political questions, which is present in many areas of actual human life. It explores a specific conception of community as a collective agency. The chapter suggests that the membership of a collective agency raises important questions about loyalty, allegiance and dissociation. Where an individual is participating in collective action with others, a space must always be left for critical reflection, options of identification with or dissociation from the CA and even actual detachment from a CA. The chapter also suggests that the existence of collective agencies casts doubt on the adequacy of the doctrine of the distinctness of persons. According to the doctrine, it is particularly important to bundle together the desires of a single individual. By contrast, no special importance attaches to a bundle which represents the desires of different individuals for the same end.