Both Russia and America perceived critical events in the 2007-09 period in different ways. President George W. Bush made the Missile Shield proposal in an effort to defend against rogue states that were developing a nuclear capability. Both the Czechs and the Poles were keystones in implementation of that proposal, bud Russian reactions were highly negative. They responded in many ways and threatened to build up defensive capabilities in their enclave of Kaliningrad. However, in fall 2009, President Obama cancelled the U.S. backed proposal and called for a substitution. The Arab Spring of 2011 created more controversy between Russia and America, for American support for revolutionary forces clashed with Russian anxiousness about popular demonstrations in Arab Spring states that were similar to the flower revolutions in former Soviet republics in the 2003-05 time frame. The war against Khadaffy in Libya was an allied engagement that provoked sharp Russian criticism. Further, both the uprising in Egypt and the civil war in Syria pushed Russian and American leaders apart and created misunderstandings that percolated into their future relationship.
This edited collection surveys how non-Western states have responded to the threats of domestic and international terrorism in ways consistent with and reflective of their broad historical, political, cultural and religious traditions. It presents a series of eighteen case studies of counterterrorism theory and practice in the non-Western world, including countries such as China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Brazil. These case studies, written by country experts and drawing on original-language sources, demonstrate the diversity of counterterrorism theory and practice and illustrate that how the world ‘sees’ and responds to terrorism is different from the way that the United States, the United Kingdom and many European governments do. This volume – the first ever comprehensive account of counterterrorism in the non-Western world – will be of interest to students, scholars and policymakers responsible for developing counterterrorism policy.
Contrary to the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’, Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies are neither specific responses to transnational terror networks, nor simply a byproduct of the post-9/11 era. Rather, counterterrorism policies in Indonesia are entangled with historical state reactions to internal security challenges – ranging from social violence to terrorism and secessionism – since the country’s independence in 1945. While these different conflicts varied in nature, they are united as disputes over the basic institutions and boundaries of the state. While the state, in seeking to maintain its territorial integrity and defend its institutions, has responded in a variety of ways to these conflicts, the coercion and repression used under President Suharto contributed to the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its splinter groups and left a legacy of mixed responses to terror. Terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia are rooted within this context of the disputed postcolonial state. While states like the US and UK have committed their militaries abroad in an effort to exterminate foreign militants, Indonesia has crafted responses to various sources of domestic violence – including different secessionist movements and JI – on an ad hoc basis and has utilized different security institutions, from the military to the police.
In the 1990s, Russia’s wars in Chechnya alientated the officials in the Clinton administration, for they deemed the response by the Yeltsin government to be an overreaction to the acts committed by Chechnyan terrorists. However, the Twin Towers attacks in 2001 created a certain common understanding between the two powers. In spite of the contrasting attitudes of the two towards bin Laden and al Qaeda during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, responses to global terrorism put them on the same page in the new century. With the support of NATO’s Article 5, the American decision to invade Afghanstan and dislodge the Taliban met with allied approval and support. However, there was considerable controversy between Moscow and Washington over the Iraq war that America commenced with the Coalition of the Willing in 2003. Russian leaders condemned this invasion as an illustration of an American overreach as well as an inappropriate response to the 9/11 attacks. One commonality in the effort to contain terrorism was considerable administrative centralization within both political systems.
The chapter explores how, despite earlier counterterrorism failures and two bitter wars in Chechnya, terrorism in Russia has declined in the 2010s. The Islamist–separatist terrorism problem that used to dominate national politics has been degraded to a relatively peripheral issue that hovers at a level of low-scale and increasingly fragmented violence, primarily confined to the North Caucasus. The strategy that has worked in Russia has not been ‘war’, but a combination of a policy of Chechenization, shifts in federal security strategy towards smarter suppression and prevention, and massive reconstruction and development assistance. This solution was made possible by an internal split within the insurgency catalysed by its increasing jihadization. While this is no substitute for addressing the underlying structural causes of violent extremism and has involved enormous costs for the nation, these are much lower than the cost of war. This is the key lesson to be gleaned from Russia’s response to terrorism. It also explains why Russia has a interest in ensuring that this degree of stabilization and decline in North Caucasian terrorism is not reversed by destabilizing transnational influences and connections, especially those related to ‘Islamic State’ in the Middle East.
Why did the Russian take-over of Crimea come as a surprise to so many observers in the academic practitioner and global-citizen arenas? The answer presented in this book is a complex one, rooted in late-Cold War dualities but also in the variegated policy patterns of the two powers after 1991. This book highlights the key developmental stages in the evolution of the Russian-American relationship in the post-Cold War world. The 2014 crisis was provoked by conflicting perspectives over the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the expansion of NATO to include former communist allies of Russia as well as three of its former republics, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and the Russian move to invade Georgia in 2008. This book uses a number of key theories in political science to create a framework for analysis and to outline policy options for the future. It is vital that the attentive public confront the questions raised in these pages in order to control the reflexive and knee-jerk reactions to all points of conflict that emerge on a regular basis between America and Russia.Key topics include struggles over the Balkans, the expansion of NATO, the challenges posed by terrorism to both nations, wars fought by both powers in the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflict over missile defence, reactions to post-2011 turmoil in the Middle East, and the mutual interest in establishing priorities in Asia.
This chapter discusses the role of 'terror' and 'terrorism' as an aspect of state policy in Iran during the twentieth century, looking at its historical context both within Qajar Iran and during the French Revolution. It critically assesses the Iranian state’s relationship with the term, as both a perceived victim and a perpetrator, and focuses on the application of political violence against both dissidents and political opponents, where the term 'terror' is used in Persian as a synonym for assassination. The chapter looks at the various justifications for the use of terror and political violence, the legacy of the Rushdie affair and the impact of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ on perceptions within Iran.
Japan is unfortunately no stranger to terrorism. Indeed, since the mid-nineteenth century and the Meiji Restoration, the country has experienced political assassinations, kidnappings of innocent citizens and strikes by apocalyptic millenarian sects. Japanese citizens too have been involved in conducting terrorist attacks, notably in affiliation with Middle Eastern groups. Yet, terrorism and counterterrorism barely feature on academic syllabi within leading Japanese universities. Nor was the term ‘terrorism’ understood as a generic concept in Japan until recently. This chapter seeks to identify historical precedents that have shaped the Japanese perception of terrorism; responses to historical terrorist groups such as the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo; the way the Japanese authorities identify the terrorist threat today, including that emanating from North Korea; the role of the police and the Japan Self-Defense Force in responding to terrorism; and Japan’s response to the ‘global war on terrorism’.
Models of power, systems theory, critical junctures, legacies, realism, and realism revised
James W. Peterson
There are five models that analysts have utilized in efforts to depict accurately the evolution of the Russian-American relationship from the late Cold War through the first part of the twenty-first century. While bipolarity characterized the early days of the Cold War, it yielded to a multipolar model in the last decades of that period. Post-Cold war patterns have centered on early American-centered unipolarity, re-emergence of multipolarity, and at times complex or chaotic patterms. In addition, five theories cast light on many of the details of the relationship. While legacy theory displays how some features of the communist past carry over into the post-communist period, the concept of critical junctures pulls our attention to key transitions in the political life and relationship of both powers. Debates about individual foreign policy decisions by both often center on the dialogue between realists and post- or revised-realist theoreticians.