This chapter explains the epistemological and ontological positions of the
book and clarifies the methodology used for this study. The chapter examines
the linguistic turn in the social sciences and establishes the relation
between reality and language. Influenced by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
it argues that language is constitutive of reality and thus matters for how
we understand the world. Second, the chapter excavates the role of language
in securitisation theory to foreground the central argument about linguistic
practice. Lastly, the chapter introduces three key linguistic aspects that
play an important part in the book: strategic narratives, indirect speech
acts and framing Islam as a non-security issue.
‘I am the least racist person,’ Donald Trump declared. This book unpacks how it
is possible for various American administrations to impose discriminatory
counterterrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) measures on Muslim
communities and yet declare that ‘Islam is peace’ or that ‘Muslims are our
friends’. The book addresses some of the paradoxes of the securitisation by
linking discourses about the role of Muslims in the war on terror in the United
States with covert forms of racism. The book is concerned with a securitisation
that is covertly rather than overtly expressed, which enables securitising
actors like Trump to deny plausibility of racism and claim that they are ‘the
least racist person’. The book offers a critique of the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’
approaches to CT and CVE and advances an alternative way to understand
radicalisation and terrorism by introducing a quantum perspective. Lastly,
drawing on the affective turn, the book adds body to the analysis by theorising
emotions and affect in the securitisation of Islam. The book argues that this
covert securitisation constructs white American subjects as innocent,
unprejudiced and living in a post-racial society averse to racism, whilst
constructing Muslim subjects as potential terrorists and thus as sites of
securitisation. This book is a timely analysis of the securitisation of Islam
since 9/11 and presents an original study that contributes to debates on
Islamophobia, white fragility and white victimhood, which have proliferated
since the rise of far-right (populist) parties in Europe and the US.
This chapter offers an innovative twist to securitisation theory by
introducing the notion of indirect securitisations, which occur when the
speaker resorts to covert language rather than an explicit language of
threats and enmity. This type of securitisation is more likely in societies
where what Tali Mendelberg refers to the ‘norm of racial equality’ prohibits
racist speech. It also speaks to everyday racism by exploring how the
indirect securitisation of Islam in the war on terror constitutes a covert
form of racism. To this end, the first section draws on John Searle’s
indirect speech act theory and unpacks how Bush, Obama and Trump have used
indirect speech acts when speaking about Islam. Because indirect
securitising speech acts allow actors to avoid worst possible outcomes and
‘save face’, this chapter argues that indirect securitising speech acts are
an important tool in elites’ securitising playbook.
This chapter focuses on the value of text, language and how the Good Friday Agreement was constructed. It explores the role of text in creating momentum and interrogates its function as an instrument of persuasion.
The conclusion summarises the key elements that shaped attempts to build peace in Northern Ireland and highlights the value of a common approach to dialogue and negotiation as well as the need for a coherent strategy to support political aspiration and objectives.
The conclusion draws together the main strands of the interview findings and reiterates the key shifts that occurred from the Good Friday Agreement on. It highlights the problems involved in implementing the structures of peace and notes how a shift from ambiguity to clarity as a peace process goes on can create problems of rigidity and intransigence which make the promise of peace harder to achieve and can sour political relations as a result.
This chapter identifies how a consensual approach to negotiations was developed between the Irish and British Governments and how this approach informed understanding about what an agreement would look like.
This chapter explores how the Irish worked to shape the course of Sunningdale, what went wrong, what happened afterwards and how relations developed between Dublin and the British, moving towards the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the increased role of Irish involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland.
This chapter is concerned with how leadership operates in a peace process and examines how decisions were used to reinforce leadership goals and objectives in order to increase the possibilities of agreement