Rejection of assistance from the European Union (EU) and reliance instead on increased Russian connections, by the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych led to the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. As a result, the Russian ethnic group that held majority status in the Crimean Republic pushed for a referendum that led to its detachment from Ukraine and attachment to Russia. Russia held continuing military exercises along its border with Ukraine, and that activity fed the instability in the eastern border region of Ukraine. Western responses included a range of steps that entailed both diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomatic contacts centered on two four-party Minsk Summits that resulted in an agreement called the Minsk Protocol. NATO led the military response that included relocation of western troops from southern Europe to the jeopardized area of northeast Europe. In addition, NATO also created a Spearhead Force of 5,000 troops that could quickly move into any threatened area in the future. Finally, western nations imposed economic sanctions on Russian personnel and institutions in an effort to bring about changed policies.
This chapter explores why the South African Government’s responses to terrorism are confused and ineffective. A significant contributing factor is that the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since the end of apartheid in 1994, is a former liberation movement that was itself labelled ‘terrorist’ by Ronald Reagan’s United States and Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. While in exile, the ANC had forged close ties with other similarly labelled groups and these strong bonds have endured. This historical legacy negatively impacts the formulation and implementation of current counterterrorism policies. What the ANC Government needs to understand is that the nature of the terrorist threat has radically morphed in the past few decades, from terrorist movements pursuing limited political goals to religious terrorist movements with global pretensions and absolutely no possibility of compromise.
The growth of terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, 1999–2016
Jennifer Giroux and Michael Nwankpa
Violence in Nigeria has many forms – from crimes like kidnapping and robbery to political violence, including terrorism and insurgency, to police and military brutality. It's necessary to appreciate how each form relates to specific contextual conditions and to other forms of violence, which are often overlapping. Since Nigeria regained civilian rule in 1999, the term ‘terrorism’ is increasingly part of national discourse. The government refers to countering terrorism within the framework of its national security agenda, and insurgent movements have increasingly used terrorism within their violent campaigns. While terrorism in Nigeria has been growing, analysis tends to consider the phenomenon in isolation and ignore its connections to other forms of violence, and how state responses drive violent non-state groups to adopt new tactics and escalate conflict. To fill this gap, this chapter looks at how terrorism is understood and experienced in Nigeria, and how its conceptualization shapes the practice of counterterrorism. It traces how the conceptualization of terrorism and practice of counterterrorism have changed over time by analysing international and domestic factors – including the impact of 9/11 – and the societal impact of Nigeria's transformation from military to democratic rule, plus the recent insurgencies in the Niger Delta and the northeast.
Presidents Putin/Medvedev and Georgia W. Bush both adopted basically unilateralist approaches towards the three wars. There was commonality in all three wars, for each took place within ethnically divided states: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Georgia. Russia was wiling to permit American access to Central Asian air bases in republics that had previously been part of the Soviet Union. However, there was considerable controversy between the two over the Gergia war as well as the war in Iraq. Presidents Bush and Obama both utilized a common surge strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the final results in each were disappointing in terms of the continuing turmoil within the two nations. One positive feature of the effort in Afghanistan was support by NATO through its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whereas no allied naions provided help to Russia in its incursion into Georgia. Both nations incurred considerable costs, the Russians in global public opinion and the United States in considerable depletion of its treasury.
Brazilian approaches to terrorism and counterterrorism in the post-9/11 era
Jorge M. Lasmar
This chapter examines how international terrorism has impacted Brazil in the post-9/11 era and transformed its counterterrorism policy. It begins by noting that Brazilian politicians have long suggested that terrorism is someone else’s problem and that the political and cultural choices that the government has made have somehow immunized it to the terrorist threat. This perception has been durable, despite the actual evidence of terrorist group operation inside the country. In the post-9/11 era, external pressure from the United States has forced counterterrorism onto the agenda of the Brazilian state, but political deadlock has meant that relatively little legislation criminalizing terrorist activity has been passed. The state also still lacks effective counterterrorism policies due a dearth of expertise on the subject, the lack of a consolidated strategy to guide institutional actions and the inexistence of a systemic legal framework to structure counterterrorism policies. As a result, in terms of international cooperation, Brazil may be seen as an ‘involuntary defector’ from the international coalition against terrorist actors.
China’s responses to terrorism since around 2008 have been seen in the West as an attempt to jump on the bandwagon to justify Beijing’s long-term religious, cultural and political suppression of the Uyghur community, both internationally and domestically. Uyghur activists and human rights advocates have long decried the liberal use of the term ‘terrorist’ by the Chinese authorities as well as their tendency to conflate ethnic, religious and violent activities. On the other hand, China has often criticized Western approaches to counterterrorism and attempted to promote its own measures as a better alternative. This chapter seeks to address the questions raised by such issues as China’s definition of terrorism and how China’s resistance to and criticism of the US-led counterterrorism campaign has reshaped the domestic conceptualization of terrorism and the subsequent implementation of countermeasures.
The conclusion draws out some of the historiographical implications of the book’s narrative. It devotes particular attention to the way in which this narrative decentres the categories that have conventionally been employed to understand post-war political history. And it suggests ways in which the study of political thought can be enhanced by adopting a more conceptual approach to the history of ideas. An epilogue brings the book’s arguments into a dialogue with contemporary debates about distributive justice.
The final chapter of the book discusses the social and political changes of the 1980s. By locating Penguin’s books in a broader context, it challenges the notion that Thatcherism reshaped Britain’s political landscape. Although some Thatcherite themes acquired a hegemonic status in this period, others often encountered considerable resistance. Indeed Penguin’s books reveal that the 1979 and 1983 elections did little to resolve the social antagonisms that had been exposed in the 1970s. Not only did many of its publications expose the contradictions of Thatcherite policies and beliefs, but they also popularised ideas that were incompatible with Thatcherism’s legitimising ideology. Some of these ideas would inform the New Labour project of the 1990s, and it is possible to argue that the origins of Thatcherism’s demise can be traced to the early 1980s.
The introduction outlines the book’s narrative and situates it within relevant scholarly debates. The historical significance of Penguin Books’ ‘paperback revolution’ is established, and the reader is introduced to some of the ways in which the publisher’s history can be used to better understand the intellectual and cultural politics of post-war Britain. Particular attention is devoted to the way in which its non-fiction books can be employed to trace semantic and ideological change.
In the late 1960s, the contradictions of Britain’s meritocratic settlement were brought to the fore. The chief consequences were the emergence of a more polarised political climate, whereby the boundaries of contestation were significantly expanded. As it had done in the inter-war period, Penguin’s texts revealed the character of this contestation. Indeed the publisher itself, which had been regarded as a benign instrument of cultural democracy in the preceding two decades, became implicated within broader patterns of ideological conflict that were driven by the collapse of the post-war consensus. This chapter traces these developments and suggests that they amounted to an eclipse of Britain’s meritocratic moment.