Rejection of assistance from the European Union (EU) and reliance instead on increased Russian connections, by the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych led to the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. As a result, the Russian ethnic group that held majority status in the Crimean Republic pushed for a referendum that led to its detachment from Ukraine and attachment to Russia. Russia held continuing military exercises along its border with Ukraine, and that activity fed the instability in the eastern border region of Ukraine. Western responses included a range of steps that entailed both diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomatic contacts centered on two four-party Minsk Summits that resulted in an agreement called the Minsk Protocol. NATO led the military response that included relocation of western troops from southern Europe to the jeopardized area of northeast Europe. In addition, NATO also created a Spearhead Force of 5,000 troops that could quickly move into any threatened area in the future. Finally, western nations imposed economic sanctions on Russian personnel and institutions in an effort to bring about changed policies.
This chapter explores why the South African Government’s responses to terrorism are confused and ineffective. A significant contributing factor is that the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since the end of apartheid in 1994, is a former liberation movement that was itself labelled ‘terrorist’ by Ronald Reagan’s United States and Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. While in exile, the ANC had forged close ties with other similarly labelled groups and these strong bonds have endured. This historical legacy negatively impacts the formulation and implementation of current counterterrorism policies. What the ANC Government needs to understand is that the nature of the terrorist threat has radically morphed in the past few decades, from terrorist movements pursuing limited political goals to religious terrorist movements with global pretensions and absolutely no possibility of compromise.
The growth of terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, 1999–2016
Jennifer Giroux and Michael Nwankpa
Violence in Nigeria has many forms – from crimes like kidnapping and robbery to political violence, including terrorism and insurgency, to police and military brutality. It's necessary to appreciate how each form relates to specific contextual conditions and to other forms of violence, which are often overlapping. Since Nigeria regained civilian rule in 1999, the term ‘terrorism’ is increasingly part of national discourse. The government refers to countering terrorism within the framework of its national security agenda, and insurgent movements have increasingly used terrorism within their violent campaigns. While terrorism in Nigeria has been growing, analysis tends to consider the phenomenon in isolation and ignore its connections to other forms of violence, and how state responses drive violent non-state groups to adopt new tactics and escalate conflict. To fill this gap, this chapter looks at how terrorism is understood and experienced in Nigeria, and how its conceptualization shapes the practice of counterterrorism. It traces how the conceptualization of terrorism and practice of counterterrorism have changed over time by analysing international and domestic factors – including the impact of 9/11 – and the societal impact of Nigeria's transformation from military to democratic rule, plus the recent insurgencies in the Niger Delta and the northeast.
Presidents Putin/Medvedev and Georgia W. Bush both adopted basically unilateralist approaches towards the three wars. There was commonality in all three wars, for each took place within ethnically divided states: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Georgia. Russia was wiling to permit American access to Central Asian air bases in republics that had previously been part of the Soviet Union. However, there was considerable controversy between the two over the Gergia war as well as the war in Iraq. Presidents Bush and Obama both utilized a common surge strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the final results in each were disappointing in terms of the continuing turmoil within the two nations. One positive feature of the effort in Afghanistan was support by NATO through its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whereas no allied naions provided help to Russia in its incursion into Georgia. Both nations incurred considerable costs, the Russians in global public opinion and the United States in considerable depletion of its treasury.
The final chapter picks up on the call in Chapter 5 for a via media, that is, not for the status quo or for a new comprehensive written Constitution for the UK, but for a discrete Act of Parliament – a Constitutional Reform Act – which will address pressing needs by formally re-constituting the UK as a federation of four parts, protecting a wider range of human rights and with better remedies for breaches of those rights, devising a fairer mechanism for distributing funds from the central government to the three devolved areas, and setting out what the goals of the new federation should be. The Brexit process is an opportunity to re-define the features which the new UK wishes to project in the world – a commitment to peace, democracy, security, human rights, equality and fairness. Maintaining a focus on that more limited reform agenda stands a better chance of strengthening the union between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland than a simple written Constitution will do, however comprehensive it claims to be.
Brazilian approaches to terrorism and counterterrorism in the post-9/11 era
Jorge M. Lasmar
This chapter examines how international terrorism has impacted Brazil in the post-9/11 era and transformed its counterterrorism policy. It begins by noting that Brazilian politicians have long suggested that terrorism is someone else’s problem and that the political and cultural choices that the government has made have somehow immunized it to the terrorist threat. This perception has been durable, despite the actual evidence of terrorist group operation inside the country. In the post-9/11 era, external pressure from the United States has forced counterterrorism onto the agenda of the Brazilian state, but political deadlock has meant that relatively little legislation criminalizing terrorist activity has been passed. The state also still lacks effective counterterrorism policies due a dearth of expertise on the subject, the lack of a consolidated strategy to guide institutional actions and the inexistence of a systemic legal framework to structure counterterrorism policies. As a result, in terms of international cooperation, Brazil may be seen as an ‘involuntary defector’ from the international coalition against terrorist actors.
This book is about what steps should be taken to ensure that the United Kingdom does not fragment. It examines the state of play concerning the devolution of powers in the UK and considers the impact which the Brexit process could have on devolution in the future. It contributes to the debate about what a post-Brexit UK should look like and whether now, at long last, the nation needs a comprehensive written Constitution. After looking at the present situation concerning the protection of human rights in the UK, and by drawing lessons from the experiences of four other common law countries in operating written Constitutions – the USA, Canada, Australia and Ireland, it concludes that the UK should not seek to acquire a single written Constitution and that a much more useful advance would be to turn the nation into a federation. Far from endangering the Union, which is already fragile, a formalised federal structure could strengthen the bonds between the four constituent parts of the UK and encourage all of its people to strive towards upholding a value-based set of national goals articulated in legislation. The book argues that a Constitutional Reform Act should be enacted to create the federation, while retaining the country’s name as ‘the United Kingdom’. The same Act should make related reforms such as reconstructing the House of Lords, adopting a UK Bill of Rights and creating a fairer method for deciding how funds should be allocated by central government to the three devolved regions.
China’s responses to terrorism since around 2008 have been seen in the West as an attempt to jump on the bandwagon to justify Beijing’s long-term religious, cultural and political suppression of the Uyghur community, both internationally and domestically. Uyghur activists and human rights advocates have long decried the liberal use of the term ‘terrorist’ by the Chinese authorities as well as their tendency to conflate ethnic, religious and violent activities. On the other hand, China has often criticized Western approaches to counterterrorism and attempted to promote its own measures as a better alternative. This chapter seeks to address the questions raised by such issues as China’s definition of terrorism and how China’s resistance to and criticism of the US-led counterterrorism campaign has reshaped the domestic conceptualization of terrorism and the subsequent implementation of countermeasures.
The chapter offers a reflexive account of the author’s own cowardice to
condemn calls for condemnation. Younis looks at that terrible marriage of
cowardice and silence – each begetting the other. It is one thing to not
condemn, it is another to know deep down that silence, a failure to ‘condemn
condemnation’, is born of an ever-present desire to remain seen, recognised
and validated. Younis shares a personal account of a time when he consulted
for the Montreal police, as part of a special committee which discussed
Muslim/Arab concerns. It was not uncommon to discuss issues regarding
terrorism/radicalisation in these meetings. When they arose, the narrative
remained static: yes, there are ‘bad Muslims’ out there, but there are ‘good
Muslims’ (especially in the room) who were model citizens. Model-ness, their
very being, was thus the physical manifestation of condemnation. Though
misgivings at this thought, he learned to assert (and fail at asserting) his
apprehension at other times. Chiefly the chapter charts how silence was
often an act of cowardice with its rewards: recognition and trust by those
in Power, and at one time a ‘get out of interrogation free card’ at
US–Canada border control. But silence is suffocating, as he expresses how he
learnt to withhold his thought. This chapter is about how cultures of
condemnation result in a yearning to be seen by Power, so that those who are
accused can find its ‘good’ light.
Charting the response by authorities since the 2011 ‘riots’ following the
killing of Mark Duggan, Adam Elliott-Cooper assesses the ways in which Black
lives and culture have been pathologised as potentially dangerous through
the policing of the Nottingham Hill Carnival and drill music. The chapter
takes influence from Stuart Hall’s notion of ‘moral panic’ in his 1978 book
Policing the Crisis in relation to what was then presented as a specific
problem of ‘mugging’ within Black communities by presenting the four stages
of moral panic. Taking the reader on a journey through the way the media,
politicians and the general public have responded to drill music, the
chapter goes through their shock, anger, sadness and finally acceptance of
the cost that must be borne by Black communities through increased profiling
and policing. While Elliott-Cooper is a scholar resisting racism, he
simultaneously cannot escape its violence as he demonstrates how he is
expected to condemn his own communities in the process of calling for
alternative ways of understanding cultural forms of expression. Although
providing a critique of public policy and the development of what the author
calls public safety racism, it also operates as an important
autho-ethnographic account of the complex ways in which racism operates in