Chapter 3 spells out the strategies put in place in each Germany to wage their Cold War in the Middle East. The chapter examines the intensifying East German efforts to drive a wedge between West Germany and its Arab partners; to use the question of the FRG’s readiness to pay reparations to Israel to galvanise the German population against the Luxembourg Agreement; and to resist Israeli demands that East Germany, too, pay reparations to the Jewish state. Special attention is also paid to two West German political manoeuvres: the efforts to placate Arab concerns on the economic and military strength of the State of Israel following the signing of the Luxembourg Agreement, and the use of the agreement as a tool to bolster West Germany’s claim to international legitimacy. The chapter challenges the view that Arab–Israeli and Cold War rivalries started intertwining following the 1955 arms deal between Nasser’s Egypt and Communist Czechoslovakia. In fact, as this and the previous chapter show, by the early 1950s the Arab–Israeli conflict and the German–German Cold War were already firmly entangled.
The second part of the book commences with the Suez Crisis, and explores how the German–German and Arab–Israeli power struggles played out in the second half of the 1950s. Chapter 4 builds upon minutes of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) meetings, analyses of the West German intelligence services (BND), and assessments of the US National Security Council. These documents show that, as domestic and international crises developed in the second half of the 1950s, each Germany found itself increasingly at odds with its respective superpower patron. This deeply influenced German policy-makers and their perceptions of each Germany’s international role. On the one hand, the consequences of the Suez Crisis spread insecurity among the West German political elite regarding the extent of the American readiness to protect the interests of its Western European partners. On the other hand, East German leader Walter Ulbricht became increasingly intolerant of the Soviet constraints on East German overtures to Middle Eastern partners. Thus, the GDR intensified its international propaganda campaign against West Germany, focusing especially on the West German–Israeli entente to woo Arab audiences, with mixed results.
The first part of the book opens in the late 1940s. Chapter 1 traces the early discussions between future representatives of West Germany, East Germany and the State of Israel. From 1949 onward, the question of German reparations to Israel began to acquire ever greater significance. The chapter challenges the widely held assumption that East Germany was, from the outset, hostile to the State of Israel, and revises the general portrayal of West Germany’s readiness to pay reparations to Israel as a grand moral gesture. Indeed, the chapter emphasises the early openness of representatives of the Soviet occupation zone (until 1949, later the German Democratic Republic, GDR) to sustaining Israel’s efforts to integrate Jewish refugees from Europe in Palestine and places Adenauer’s declaration on the question of reparations within the wider context of the reintegration of many former Nazis inside West German political institutions, including the embryonic West German Foreign Ministry.
Gender Equality and Culture in Humanitarian Action
Ricardo Fal-Dutra Santos
Despite increasing attention to gender issues in the humanitarian sector, the
notion of gender equality as a humanitarian goal remains largely rejected, as
some argue it would require interfering with cultural values and practices, and
thus lie beyond the remit of humanitarianism. This paper questions this by
examining the close relationship between certain humanitarian goals, and
cultural values and practices. It ultimately calls for a gender-transformative
humanitarian action that recognises and supports local feminist actors, in an
effort to transform gender relations both in local communities and within
This review examines the appropriateness of including men within the existing
sexual and gender-based violence programming in armed conflict settings rather
than providing services explicitly designed to address their needs. A central
premise of the paper is that men experience sexual violence differently to women
and that the way they seek help also varies. This gender-specific difference
calls into question why humanitarian organisations pursue a
‘gender-inclusion’ approach, which simply extends services
designed for women to men. There is a need to reconsider this approach, and
specifically its implementation. The paper reviews relevant secondary sources
and argues that current practices of sexual and gender-based violence
programming fail to translate into actionable responses suited for and sensitive
Dispelling Misconceptions about Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in
Conflict and Displacement
Heleen Touquet, Sarah Chynoweth, Sarah Martin, Chen Reis, Henri Myrttinen, Philipp Schulz, Lewis Turner, and David Duriesmith
Sexual violence against men and boys in conflict and displacement has garnered
increasing attention over the past decade and has been recognised in UN Security
Resolution 2467. Despite increased evidence and understanding of the issue,
myths and misconceptions nevertheless abound. The authors of this article
– practitioners and academics with extensive experience in the field
– aim to dispel ten of the most common misconceptions that we have
encountered, and to highlight the current evidence base regarding sexual
violence against men and boys in humanitarian settings. We argue that just as
there is no universal experience of sexual violence for women and girls, there
is no universal experience for men and boys, or for nonbinary people. In order
to address the complexities of these experiences, a survivor-centred,
intersectional approach is needed.
The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain, this book reflects on the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. The book is structured around a three-phase periodisation, from November 1949 to March 1955 (marked by Adenauer’s declaration that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was ready to pay restitutions to the State of Israel for the Nazi persecution of the Jews, and by the East German refusal to do the same); April 1956 to February 1960 (characterised by the entanglement of the German–German Cold War and the Arab-Israeli rivalries in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis); and finally from March 1961 to October 1969 (characterised by the Eichmann trial, the establishment of official diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel and by East Germany’s attempts to galvanise the discontent of West Germany’s Arab partners). By breaking this twenty-year period into three different phases, the book identifies the major changes in East and West German policy-making and, in each phase, it analyses why they took place at that particular point, and how they affected the overall dynamics of German–Israeli relations, the Cold War, and of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.
Following months of discussion as to whether the two Germanys should pay reparations to Israel or not, representatives of West Germany and the State of Israel met in the Netherlands to negotiate on the matter, while Arab League members, especially Egypt and Syria, intensified their efforts against the signing and ratification of any such agreement. As these efforts failed, East German envoys concluded the GDR’s biggest trade agreement yet, with Egypt. Chapter 2 supplements the literature on the so-called Luxembourg Agreement (between West Germany and Israel) by providing a detailed account of the international context in which the negotiations took place. This did not just consist of the American, British and French influence on West Germany’s decision, but also included inter-Arab disagreements as to how to face the question of West German reparations to Israel; German–German rivalry; and superpower involvement in each Germany’s dealings with Middle Eastern audiences. This multifaceted international historical angle is used to reinterpret the debates about the significance of the agreement between West Germany and Israel, and to assess how the intensifying German–German rivalry played out in the Middle East in the early 1950s.