This chapter reviews some of the many attempts that have been made in recent times to devise a written Constitution for the UK. It begins by looking at proposals made in the late 1980s and early 1990s by Charter 88 and the Institute for Public Policy Research before examining in more detail the suggestions made in three ‘illustrative blueprints’ produced by King’s College London for the House of Commons’ Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform in 2014. These are a Constitutional Code, a Constitutional Consolidation Act and a Written Constitution. The constitutional significance of the Brexit referendum in 2016 is then considered and there is discussion of whether the government had to obey the will of the people and whether Brexit could in law be triggered by the government or only by Parliament. The chapter concludes with an account of the steps being taken to enhance dialogue between the central government and the devolved governments in a post-Brexit era. The difficulties engendered by the withdrawal legislation as far as the devolved administrations are concerned are also addressed and views about the need for a written Constitution at this time are aired.
This chapter explains the way in which rights have traditionally been protected by law in the UK. It highlights the role of judges in making such laws but points out that unlike their counter-parts in the USA judges in the UK have not given themselves the power to declare Acts of Parliament to be invalid. The two central pillars of the UK’s Constitution are set out – the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the principle of the rule of law – and a hypothetical scenario is presented to speculate on whether the latter could trump the former on a future occasion. While no court has yet held an Act of Parliament to be invalid it is possible that in future a court will issue a declaration of inva-lidity with suspensory effect or that a court will declare new common law that operates only prospectively and not at all retrospectively. The usefulness of creating a category of con-stitutional rights is raised and attention is the given to why there needs to be a new Bill of Rights for the UK to better guarantee a wider set of rights than are at present protected.
In the 1990s, Russia’s wars in Chechnya alientated the officials in the Clinton administration, for they deemed the response by the Yeltsin government to be an overreaction to the acts committed by Chechnyan terrorists. However, the Twin Towers attacks in 2001 created a certain common understanding between the two powers. In spite of the contrasting attitudes of the two towards bin Laden and al Qaeda during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, responses to global terrorism put them on the same page in the new century. With the support of NATO’s Article 5, the American decision to invade Afghanstan and dislodge the Taliban met with allied approval and support. However, there was considerable controversy between Moscow and Washington over the Iraq war that America commenced with the Coalition of the Willing in 2003. Russian leaders condemned this invasion as an illustration of an American overreach as well as an inappropriate response to the 9/11 attacks. One commonality in the effort to contain terrorism was considerable administrative centralization within both political systems.
The chapter explores how, despite earlier counterterrorism failures and two bitter wars in Chechnya, terrorism in Russia has declined in the 2010s. The Islamist–separatist terrorism problem that used to dominate national politics has been degraded to a relatively peripheral issue that hovers at a level of low-scale and increasingly fragmented violence, primarily confined to the North Caucasus. The strategy that has worked in Russia has not been ‘war’, but a combination of a policy of Chechenization, shifts in federal security strategy towards smarter suppression and prevention, and massive reconstruction and development assistance. This solution was made possible by an internal split within the insurgency catalysed by its increasing jihadization. While this is no substitute for addressing the underlying structural causes of violent extremism and has involved enormous costs for the nation, these are much lower than the cost of war. This is the key lesson to be gleaned from Russia’s response to terrorism. It also explains why Russia has a interest in ensuring that this degree of stabilization and decline in North Caucasian terrorism is not reversed by destabilizing transnational influences and connections, especially those related to ‘Islamic State’ in the Middle East.
Why did the Russian take-over of Crimea come as a surprise to so many observers in the academic practitioner and global-citizen arenas? The answer presented in this book is a complex one, rooted in late-Cold War dualities but also in the variegated policy patterns of the two powers after 1991. This book highlights the key developmental stages in the evolution of the Russian-American relationship in the post-Cold War world. The 2014 crisis was provoked by conflicting perspectives over the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the expansion of NATO to include former communist allies of Russia as well as three of its former republics, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and the Russian move to invade Georgia in 2008. This book uses a number of key theories in political science to create a framework for analysis and to outline policy options for the future. It is vital that the attentive public confront the questions raised in these pages in order to control the reflexive and knee-jerk reactions to all points of conflict that emerge on a regular basis between America and Russia.Key topics include struggles over the Balkans, the expansion of NATO, the challenges posed by terrorism to both nations, wars fought by both powers in the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflict over missile defence, reactions to post-2011 turmoil in the Middle East, and the mutual interest in establishing priorities in Asia.
This chapter discusses the role of 'terror' and 'terrorism' as an aspect of state policy in Iran during the twentieth century, looking at its historical context both within Qajar Iran and during the French Revolution. It critically assesses the Iranian state’s relationship with the term, as both a perceived victim and a perpetrator, and focuses on the application of political violence against both dissidents and political opponents, where the term 'terror' is used in Persian as a synonym for assassination. The chapter looks at the various justifications for the use of terror and political violence, the legacy of the Rushdie affair and the impact of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ on perceptions within Iran.
Japan is unfortunately no stranger to terrorism. Indeed, since the mid-nineteenth century and the Meiji Restoration, the country has experienced political assassinations, kidnappings of innocent citizens and strikes by apocalyptic millenarian sects. Japanese citizens too have been involved in conducting terrorist attacks, notably in affiliation with Middle Eastern groups. Yet, terrorism and counterterrorism barely feature on academic syllabi within leading Japanese universities. Nor was the term ‘terrorism’ understood as a generic concept in Japan until recently. This chapter seeks to identify historical precedents that have shaped the Japanese perception of terrorism; responses to historical terrorist groups such as the Red Army and Aum Shinrikyo; the way the Japanese authorities identify the terrorist threat today, including that emanating from North Korea; the role of the police and the Japan Self-Defense Force in responding to terrorism; and Japan’s response to the ‘global war on terrorism’.
Models of power, systems theory, critical junctures, legacies, realism, and realism revised
James W. Peterson
There are five models that analysts have utilized in efforts to depict accurately the evolution of the Russian-American relationship from the late Cold War through the first part of the twenty-first century. While bipolarity characterized the early days of the Cold War, it yielded to a multipolar model in the last decades of that period. Post-Cold war patterns have centered on early American-centered unipolarity, re-emergence of multipolarity, and at times complex or chaotic patterms. In addition, five theories cast light on many of the details of the relationship. While legacy theory displays how some features of the communist past carry over into the post-communist period, the concept of critical junctures pulls our attention to key transitions in the political life and relationship of both powers. Debates about individual foreign policy decisions by both often center on the dialogue between realists and post- or revised-realist theoreticians.
Rejection of assistance from the European Union (EU) and reliance instead on increased Russian connections, by the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych led to the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. As a result, the Russian ethnic group that held majority status in the Crimean Republic pushed for a referendum that led to its detachment from Ukraine and attachment to Russia. Russia held continuing military exercises along its border with Ukraine, and that activity fed the instability in the eastern border region of Ukraine. Western responses included a range of steps that entailed both diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomatic contacts centered on two four-party Minsk Summits that resulted in an agreement called the Minsk Protocol. NATO led the military response that included relocation of western troops from southern Europe to the jeopardized area of northeast Europe. In addition, NATO also created a Spearhead Force of 5,000 troops that could quickly move into any threatened area in the future. Finally, western nations imposed economic sanctions on Russian personnel and institutions in an effort to bring about changed policies.
This chapter explores why the South African Government’s responses to terrorism are confused and ineffective. A significant contributing factor is that the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since the end of apartheid in 1994, is a former liberation movement that was itself labelled ‘terrorist’ by Ronald Reagan’s United States and Margaret Thatcher’s Britain. While in exile, the ANC had forged close ties with other similarly labelled groups and these strong bonds have endured. This historical legacy negatively impacts the formulation and implementation of current counterterrorism policies. What the ANC Government needs to understand is that the nature of the terrorist threat has radically morphed in the past few decades, from terrorist movements pursuing limited political goals to religious terrorist movements with global pretensions and absolutely no possibility of compromise.