This chapter explores the future of European Union (EU) sports law and policy. The Bosman ruling led to the creation of the sports policy subsystem. A system of law governing the practice of sport is emerging in the EU of which the use of soft law is a particular feature. For the Single Market coalition, soft law does not legally challenge entrenched Treaty principles. For the socio-cultural coalition, soft law, although less satisfactory, allows for the construction of the separate territories approach which can safeguard sports autonomy. The future of sports law and policy is likely to be influenced by developments external and internal to the EU. The Single Market coalition and the socio-cultural coalition possess the institutional resources to undermine each other's deep and policy core belief systems. Sport should recognise that the EU is remarkably receptive to claims of special treatment.
By the Middle Ages the power of the Church was such that it was able to forbid Christian knights from using certain weapons as hateful to God. In fact, the feudal knights were aware of what they knew as 'the law of chivalry'. The 'law of chivalry' was a customary code of chivalrous conduct that controlled the knight's affairs, which was enforced by arbitrators specially appointed or, in England and France, by Courts of Chivalry. Contrary to the Geneva Law is the law concerning means and methods of conducting actual military operations in armed conflict. This is known as Hague Law, although it had its origin in a conference of fifteen European states called in Brussels at the invitation of Czar Alexander II of Russia. Another instrument that seems to have been applied as expressing accepted law, even though it never received a single ratification, is the Declaration of London.
Traditionally, international law was divided into the law of war and the law of peace, with no intermediate stage between. When hostilities began, usually following a declaration of war, and non-parties to the conflict were held by the belligerents to be subject to the duties of, and they claimed the rights pertaining to, neutrals, war was recognised and the law of war came into operation. As with the situation under customary law, it is irrelevant whether the conflict is in accordance with the obligations of Hague Convention III, the Pact of Paris or the Charter of the United Nations. Even if the conflict does not amount to war in the legal sense of that term, there is nothing in international law, other than human rights conventions, preventing a country imposing restrictions upon the freedom of residents possessing adverse-party nationality.
The relations between a belligerent government and the adverse party's nationals are regulated partly by international and partly by national law. Civilians in the adverse party's territory are treated broadly speaking in accordance with the provisions of the national law, and while their freedom of movement may be restricted their treatment overall must be in accordance with Geneva Convention IV. If the capitulation relates to the surrender of an inhabited place, it may contain stipulations concerning the treatment of the civilian population. Conditions in a capitulation should relate only to the immediate purpose of effecting the surrender and not contain terms which would forbid the surrendered personnel from carrying arms in the future, for that is a political and not a military issue. Passports may be granted by a commander on his own authority or in accordance with his own military law.
Traditionally, for an armed conflict to warrant regulation by the international law of armed conflict, it was necessary for the situation to amount to a war, in other words, a contention between states through the medium of their armed forces. While the full panoply of the international law of armed conflict does not apply to non-international conflicts, to some extent non-international conflicts have come under the aegis of international law since 1977, with the adoption of Article 1 (4) of Protocol I. The first and only international agreement exclusively regulating the conduct of the parties in a non-international conflict is Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As to non-parties to the Conventions, in so far as the Conventions embody rules of customary law they will apply in any international armed conflict, as will all other rules of the customary law of armed conflict.
The defining characteristic of European Union (EU) sports policy is the construction of a discrete area of EU sports law. EU sports law extends beyond the mere application of law to sport, to the construction of a legal approach for dealing with sports disputes which allows both the EU's regulatory and political policy objectives for sport to co-exist within the EU sports policy framework. The emergence of a coordinated EU sports policy held together by a discrete area of sports law is a new development in the EU. The sports policy subsystem is composed of two advocacy coalitions: Single Market coalition and socio-cultural coalition. The construction of the separate territories approach for dealing with legal disputes involving sport is the defining characteristic of coordinated sports policy. The future debate on the relationship between sport and the EU will be dominated by the issues of sports law and doping.
A non-international conflict has traditionally been one in which the governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that state seeking to overthrow those authorities by force of arms. In accordance with the fundamental principle of customary international law concerning the independence of a sovereign authority, this type of conflict has traditionally been regarded as falling outside the ambit of international law. Apart from Article 3, common to the 1949 Conventions, the first major attempt to introduce international legal control of non-international conflicts by way of a statement of black-letter law is Protocol II, 1977, relating to the protection of victims of non-international conflicts. In non-international armed conflicts, as in those of an international character, civilians are to be protected against the dangers arising from the conflict.
In ancient times, as evidenced by the Laws of Manu, the Old Testament or the writings of Kautilya or San Tzu, there was no attempt to identify those who were entitled to be treated as combatants. It is only with the writers of the nineteenth century that either a clear definition of the rights of soldiers or the first use of the term 'combatants' is found. Irregular forces and resistance movements are protected only so long as they satisfy the normal requirements for recognition as combatants, in which case they are entitled if captured to be treated as prisoners of war. Until the adoption of Protocol I no attempt was made to discriminate among the members of an armed force on the basis of their nationality or the motives which lead them to join that force, whether those motives were ideological or mercenary.
This chapter introduces the study of the law of armed conflict by considering the nature and legality of war. The treatment of Napoleon served as a precedent for the policy adopted by the principal Allied and Associated Powers at the end of World War I when considering the treatment to be accorded to those responsible as authors of that war. A more definite attempt to render the war illegal is to be found in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The United States was not a member of the League, but by virtue of being among the victors in 1918 was an important power whose views could not be ignored. In 1946 the General Assembly at its first session adopted a resolution affirming 'the principles of international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal'.
Like other branches of international law, the law of armed conflict has no permanent means to secure its observance. Apart from the procedures established regarding prevention and supervision of breaches of the law, the surest guarantee of observance is compliance by a belligerent, even though reprisals or other retaliatory measures, such as the taking of hostages, are forbidden. Under the Geneva Conventions no party is able to absolve itself from liability, criminal or otherwise, for any grave breach of those Conventions. Protocol I introduced a new method of seeking to avoid breaches of the law or dealing with them when they occur. The greatest innovation effected by the Protocol in relation to supervision of its execution is the establishment of a permanent International Fact-Finding Commission which came into existence in 1992.