This paper questions the extent to which the (arguable) end of the liberal humanitarian order
is something to be mourned. Suggesting that current laments for the decline of humanitarianism
reflect a Eurocentric worldview, it calls for a fundamental revision of the assumptions
informing humanitarian scholarship. Decoloniality and anti-colonialism should be taken
seriously so as to not reproduce the same by a different name after the end of the liberal
The modern global humanitarian system takes the form it does because it is underpinned by
liberal world order. Now the viability of global liberal institutions is increasingly in doubt,
a backlash against humanitarianism (and human rights) has gained momentum. I will argue that
without liberal world order, global humanitarianism as we currently understand it is
impossible, confronting humanitarians with an existential choice: how might they function in a
world which doesn’t have liberal institutions at its core? The version of global
humanitarianism with which we are familiar might not survive this transition, but maybe other
forms of humanitarian action will emerge. What comes next might not meet the hopes of
today’s humanitarians, however. The humanitarian alliance with liberalism is no
accident, and if the world is less liberal, its version of humanitarian action is likely to be
less liberal too. Nevertheless, humanitarianism will fare better than its humanist twin, human
rights, in this new world.
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
In this interview, Celso Amorim, former Brazilian foreign minister, discusses changes in
global governance and their likely impact on international cooperation. He critically reflects
on his experiences in positioning Brazil on the world stage and democratising human rights. And
he considers whether the influence of Brazil and other Southern states is likely to continue
The months May-December 1965 saw several developments in the Harold Wilson-Lyndon B. Johnson relationship. The White House feared, in the light of London's ongoing Defence Review, that economic troubles might compel the Wilson government to reduce its military commitments East of Suez, leaving the United States as the only world policeman. Wilson wanted to reduce the cost of Britain's defence commitments, but he still supported the idea that Britain should continue to play a global role. The documentary record contains few of President Johnson's direct comments about a bargain with Wilson. The measures of the United States to try to ease its own, substantial balance of payments deficit compounded British economic difficulties. A Foreign Office analysis from June 1965 examined the Vietnam War in the context of the Anglo-American relationship. On 25 and 28 June respectively, China and North Vietnam dismissed the Commonwealth Peace Mission.
Labour's handling of the British economic crisis occasioned a great deal of concern on the part of the President, given the possibility that sterling might have to be devalued or that any rise in the Bank of England lending rate could precipitate a run on the dollar. There was also concern about the multilateral force (MLF), a matter due to be discussed at the planned summit meeting in Washington early in December. President Lyndon B. Johnson had never feared a Labour victory in Britain, but he felt it necessary to ease any concern in the world at large (especially in financial markets) about the British 'socialists' entering office. Britain's role in the world would depend in large part on the country's economic health. Some of Harold Wilson's colleagues disdained his efforts to gain American help for Britain's economic problems.
This chapter examines Turkey's relations with Israel, suggesting that Israel and Turkey have been motivated to weave their close ties by mutual interests, some of them existential. Israel aids Turkey with arms and equipment denied by an indifferent Europe and hostile American public opinion, while Turkey is making its space, ports and other installations available to Israel. The chapter contends that Turkey's relations with Israel and the inevitably pro-Israel position which that relationship projects offer a further expression of Turkey's growing involvement in the Middle East. It also argues that the development in Turkish–Israeli relations adds a more solid element to the much-publicised Turkish–Israeli military cooperation, implying long-term relations, even if Middle Eastern military and political circumstances change.
This chapter uses comparative analysis to elucidate how the interaction between the system level and particular state formation paths shapes similarities and differences in states' international behaviour. What explains the similarities and differences in the foreign policy behaviour of Middle East states? As this chapter shows, neither state features nor systemic forces alone have an impact on foreign policy but the interrelation between a state's specific position in systemic structures and its particular internal features determines its foreign policy behaviour. The level of consolidation determines whether a state remains a victim of its systemic environment or becomes an effective actor in it. Finally, leadership, by virtue of its location at the intersection of the systemic and the domestic, can make choices that set states on new tangents.
This chapter sums up the key findings of this study on Turkey's involvement and handling of intertwined conflicts in the 1990s. The analysis reveals that Turkey's political and strategic status seems to be solid, and suggests that the country's leadership should be complimented for avoiding becoming embroiled in the conflicts around it. The chapter also analyses the prospects for Turkey in the twenty-first century and comments on its depiction in the media as a rising Middle Eastern power, emerging regional superpower and multi-regional power.
Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson: a ‘special relationship’?
The year or so from late 1967 to the end of 1968 had important implications for the Lyndon B. Johnson-Harold Wilson relationship, as it saw the devaluation of sterling and the demise of the remaining British commitment East of Suez. There has been the suggestion that the Anglo-American 'special relationship' died or at least went into some form of diplomatic hibernation with the end of the John F. Kennedy-Harold Macmillan era in 1963, reemerging with the close personal bonds between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Thomas Schwartz has suggested that Johnson and Wilson managed to 'compartmentalise' their relationship, learning to live with their differences over Vietnam in particular and cooperating on issues in which their views coincided. The personal relationship between Wilson and Johnson cannot be described as 'special', although their mutual dealings were unlikely to prosper when British weakness was felt so painfully in Washington.
Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture
This chapter addresses the issues and debates that were presented in the previous chapters and studies them in relation to the three main questions posed in the Introduction. The first question is on identification, the second question is on change, and the third question is about behaviour. This chapter concludes that while Germany's strategic culture has not changed since its creation after the Second World War, a more self-assured Germany, in terms of security issues, seems to be emerging.