Browse

You are looking at 51 - 60 of 632 items for :

  • Manchester International Relations x
Clear All
A historical survey
Andreas Osiander

Historically, Germany seems to have or have had a ‘problem’ with power. This was undoubtedly true of the Nazi regime, but there is a body of opinion that sees a tradition of German power being mishandled reaching further back, to the 1871 Empire or even beyond. This chapter seeks to put this issue into a historical perspective that is longer still, beginning with the founding of the German kingdom in the tenth century and then taking the story to the early twentieth century. Necessarily, such an approach entails discussing what ‘Germany’ actually was at different stages of its historical trajectory. Its successive iterations involved much change that necessarily also meant that power played a different and variable role for each of them.

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Changing images of Germany in International Relations

This volume traces changing images of Germany in the field of International Relations (IR). Images of countries are mental representations with audio-visual and narrative dimensions that identify typical or even unique characteristics. This book focuses on perceptions of Germany from the English-speaking world and on the role they played in the development of twentieth-century IR theory. When the discipline originated, liberal internationalists contrasted cooperative foreign policies with inherently aggressive Prussianism. Early realists developed their ideas with reference to the German fight against the Treaty of Versailles. Geopoliticians and German emigre scholars relied on German history when they translated historical experiences into social-scientific vocabularies. The book demonstrates that few states have seen their image change as drastically as Germany during the century. After the Second World War, liberals, lawyers, and constructivists developed new theories and concepts in view of the Nuremberg trials, the transformation of the former enemy into an ally of the West, and Germany’s new commitment to multilateralism. Today, IR theorists discuss the perplexing nature of ‘civilian power’ Germany – an economic giant but a military dwarf. Yet the chapters in this volume also show that there has never been just one image of Germany, but always several standing next to each other in a sometimes compatible and sometimes contradictory manner.

Abstract only
Germany in American post-war International Relations
Felix Rösch

After the Second World War, the German roots of scholars who were forced to leave Germany during the 1930s and found refuge in the US became forgotten. Their scholarship was no longer situated in the liberal democratic milieu of Weimar Germany that upheld humanistic educational ideals and was sympathetically critical to Marxist thought, but was connected to an American liberalism turned idealism that lacked the intellectual modesty and self-reflexivity that the Weimar version argued for. In other words, emigres had turned into ‘hyper-Americans’ for their peers and IR at large. The intention of this chapter is to investigate the processes that led to this ‘silencing’. How was it possible that their German intellectual socialisation that continued to inform their political thought became overlooked and indeed no longer even realised? It is argued that German emigres and American IR constitute a case of successful integration.

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Twentieth-century Germany in the debates of Anglo-American international lawyers and transitional justice experts
Annette Weinke

Since the 1990s transitional justice scholars have taken the case of contemporary German history as a universal model for dealing with perpetrators and victims of state-sponsored violence. This chapter, in contrast, calls into question that there has been only one, definitive image of Germany. It adopts a historical perspective to show that transatlantic twentieth-century debates about transitional justice and human rights entailed a dualistic image of ‘two Germanies’: one peaceful and civilised, the other militaristic and expansionist. The chapter delineates these debates in a longue durée perspective and analyses their underlying political, ideological, and historical assumptions. Punitive international legalism is deeply coloured by a dichotomous view of twentieth-century German history, and this view influenced the human rights regime that was set up immediately after the end of the Cold War.

in Prussians, Nazis and Peaceniks
Abstract only
Umberto Tulli

The Conclusion discusses the failure of what Carter had envisioned as a virtuous circle between the human rights campaign and bipolar détente. It argues that the rationale for such a failure was threefold. First, the White House underestimated Soviet resistance to the human rights campaign. Second, the domestic consensus for a human rights-based foreign policy was illusory, precarious and short-lived. Finally, Carter’s strategy was based on a negotiation process with partners – the Soviet Union and American opponents of détente – who had no interest in negotiating on their counterparts’ terms.

in A precarious equilibrium
Abstract only
The choice in favour of quiet diplomacy, 1978
Umberto Tulli

The chapter focuses on 1978, when the Carter administration’ decided to discuss Soviet violations of human rights through quiet diplomacy and private channels. The chapter explains this shift through a twofold rationale. First, it argues that the administration was satisfied with the early achievements of its campaign. Moving human rights from open to quiet diplomacy would strengthen both what the White House identified as positive trends in the Soviet record on human rights and the conclusion of SALT II negotiations. Second, the Carter administration tried to confine human rights to backchannels to address growing protests within the United States. To many liberals within the United States, the human rights campaign was becoming a new anti-Soviet crusade. This shift, however, occurred at a time when the Soviets condemned many prominent dissidents and the White House left its flank exposed to conservative critics, who accused the White House of being too soft on Soviet violations of human rights.

in A precarious equilibrium
Abstract only
Quiet diplomacy, SALT II and the invasion of Afghanistan, 1979–1980
Umberto Tulli

The chapter focuses on the decline and collapse of bipolar détente in 1979 and the domestic backlash against Carter’s equilibrium between human rights and détente. Since late 1978, the conclusion of SALT II dominated both bipolar relations and the political debate within the United States, and human rights were relegated to quiet diplomacy channels. This brought a backlash against Carter’s foreign policy, led by neoconservative critics, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick. After the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, détente was finally over and Carter’s difficult balance between arms control and human rights ended. Human rights remained on the American agenda but the issue became a mere propaganda tool to be used against the Soviets.

in A precarious equilibrium
Umberto Tulli

Once at the White House, Carter moved swiftly to give human rights high priority in America’s foreign policy. The chapter recognizes that Carter’s human rights campaign was almost global but it focuses on its impact on bipolar détente. It argues that Carter conceived human rights and détente as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Conscious that the American public’s attitude towards détente represented a major obstacle to bipolar dialogue, the White House hoped to build a domestic consensus on détente through a firm stance on Soviet violations of human rights. At the same time, through the continuation of détente, it tried both to ideologically challenge the Soviet Union and to promote human rights there.

in A precarious equilibrium
Umberto Tulli

The chapter zooms in on the place of human rights during the 1976 American presidential elections. It argues that Jimmy Carter was a latecomer to the new human rights language. Beyond his deep religious and moral beliefs, the chapter points out three major issues for Carter’s human rights commitment. First, the creation of many transnational groups monitoring Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the CSCE and the establishment of a specific Congressional Commission on this issue contributed to putting human rights under the spotlight. Second, the chapter argues that a strong commitment to the promotion of human rights abroad offered an opportunity to unify Carter’s Democratic Party, which at the time was split over foreign policy issues. Finally, the chapter narrows its focus on Carter’s advisers for foreign policy during the electoral campaign, Cyrus R. Vance and, especially, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

in A precarious equilibrium
Abstract only
Umberto Tulli

The introduction provides a general overview of the book and its main ideas. It details three specific concepts. First, it argues that Carter’s human rights diplomacy should be understood in the bipolar context. Second, it points out that détente and human rights intertwined and overlapped in unexpected, ambiguous and contradictory ways. In particular, it argues that the Carter administration tried to develop a human rights policy that was complementary and functional to détente: through a firm stance on Soviet violations of human rights, Carter sought to legitimate détente within the United States, where it was increasingly questioned. Finally, it explains that Carter’s political balance between détente and human rights soon revealed itself unable to simultaneously satisfy both the Soviets and the American public.

in A precarious equilibrium