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This chapter looks at the trends in national identity in England. It focuses on two particular potential sources of resentment identified by those critics, the continued ability of Scottish MPs to vote on English laws, and the distribution of public spending across the UK. Most people would apparently prefer England to be governed from Westminster, albeit with less interference from Scottish MPs, even though they recognise and accept the wish of other parts of the UK to enjoy some form of devolution. For many of its unionist critics, England was potentially the Achilles' heel in Labour's plans, eventually implemented in 1999, to extend the devolution to Scotland and Wales. The chapter assesses whether the attitudes of people in England towards the way in which they are governed have changed. It also focuses on the role that adherence to an English national identity plays in the uncovered patterns.

in These Englands

This chapter focuses on the contribution of the English left, particularly in the twentieth century. The English left was a secondary political movement in England throughout the twentieth century. The chapter looks at the contributions of three figures from the English left: R.H. Tawney, John Maynard Keynes and Tony Crosland. If Tawney represents English Christian socialism then Keynes represents the left-Liberalism for most of the twentieth century. Keynes was the foremost economist of the age and his contribution to the English left came in the form of his theory of demand management. This theory is most forcefully presented in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Crosland is the most important English social democrat of the second half of the twentieth century. He provides a very modern attempt to reconcile the moral tradition of Tawney and the material tradition of Keynes.

in These Englands
The conversational etiquette of English national self-identification

This chapter focuses on one particular device used to elicit talk about English national identity: the research interview. Speakers in England are inclined to treat national self-identification as a potentially face-threatening act, and consequently are often inclined to project an image of themselves as rational and moral individuals despite their acknowledgement of their national identity. The chapter outlines four general rules of conversational etiquette to which speakers typically oriented in the course of talk about national identity. The rules are don't state the obvious, do not make an issue of your national identity, national identity avowals should be recipient-designed, and design your national identity avowals pointed to the sensitivities of the actual or potential audience. Breakdowns in communication regularly occur in the course of academic communication, and information is often lost or distorted in translation between academic, media, political and popular realms of discourse.

in These Englands
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A conversation on national identity

It could be argued that the English always have discussed their national identity at length, if not 'with arms', and rarely at the dinner table. This book introduces the diversity of reflection on Englishness in a number of stages. 'Versions' of England are particularly apparent when reading contemporary travel writing on and about England. The relationship between the claims of continuity and the claims of change can be captured by understanding Englishness as conversation. The book brings together insights from English history, politics, constitutional affairs, literature, psephology and social psychology to provide a digest of current reflection and is divided into three complementary parts. In the first part, the nuances and subtleties of Englishness are explored. It also explores the conceptual structure and sociological texture of what such a cosmopolitan England would look like. The part discusses conversational etiquette of English national self-identification, the fear of an 'English backlash', and the non-white ethnic minority communities. The second part considers Englishness in politics and institutions. After 1997, the Labour government believed that devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland dealt with England in the appropriately English way: pragmatic adjustment without provocation. It includes discussions on Conservatism and Englishness, Gordon Brown and the negation of England, and the Britain central government. The third part reprises the themes discussed in the previous parts with a historical and literary emphasis. It includes discussions on the changing face of Englishness, and the English union in the writings of Arthur Mee and G.K. Chesterton.

This chapter belongs to the genre Anthony Giddens calls utopian realism. It is utopian that treats cosmopolitan England as a good thing, an England whose desirable characteristics and possibilities outweigh its undesirable ones. Some formulations of cosmopolitan theory point to an ultra-cosmopolitanism and as such are unsociological, even anti-sociological; they do not apply to real worlds inhabitable by real people. Others offer a real cosmopolitanism of more practical value to social scientific analysis and empirical research. The chapter focuses on multi- and inter-culturalism, attitudes to diversity, ethnic diversity in London, and bi- and multi-lingualism. In August 2005, Ipsos-MORI conducted a 'multiculturalism poll' for the BBC which included a boosted supplementary survey of Muslims. In March/April 2006 GfK NOP surveyed Muslim opinion for a Channel 4 Dispatches programme in areas with a 5" or more penetration of Muslims.

in These Englands
From forced convergence to divergence

Convergence with Stalinist expections characterized the political experiences of all four states in the immediate period after the post-Second World War transition to communist political patterns. However, divergence from Moscow-led communist directives took place in Poland in 1956 and 1980, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Post-Stalinism in the four East-Central European countries took the form of both unrest under the directives from Moscow and the efforts of top political leaders to conform with the policy positions emanating from the East. Warsaw Pact invasions stifled innovation in all three communist era states but raised expectations in the underground for change in a future and better day. Their communist era resistances to control by Moscow were futile in the short term but important in the long-run in laying a foundation for the return to self-autonomy after 1989.

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989
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A reluctant ally

In the period after the fall of communism, the Czech Republic after 1993 fastened on membership in NATO as a tool for enhancing security in the new more pluralistic period. They enacted military reforms that eventually led to a fully voluntary military force in the early twenty-first century. Defense budgets centered on achievement of the NATO goals of 2% of GDP spent on defense, and they achieved that by the time of alliance membership in 1999 but tailed off into lower amounts in the following years. NATO-related deployments of their military forces were central in terms of the dispatch of Czech troops to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Eventually European Union obligations determined their strategies in Bosnia after the transiton from NATO to EU control in December 2004.

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989
Creating stability in a time of uncertainty

East-Central European countries, the Visegrád Four to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, have developed a divergence of approaches to key issues of national defense. Measures of defense capability include size of defense budgets, numbers of persons in the armed forces, and willingness to engage in foreign deployments led by NATO and the EU that act as integrating forces within the region. The communist experiences of earlier decades have acted as legacies that have shaped countries’ post-1989 approaches to national and regional defense. However, the evolution of liberal-democratic patterns and systems have played a meaningful role as well. In spite of those convergence experiences and patterns, divergence among them has characterized their interactions as well. Poland has been more willing to take on regional defense obligations, while the other three have been more reluctant. Since the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, a strident and divisive nationalism has shaken each of them and modified their approaches to defense issues.

Security and defense realities of East-Central Europe

Chapter 2 examines pre-communist histories of Visegrád countries in search of historical sources of their strategic cultures. Central to the chapter’s inquiry is the fact that all four countries in the modern/early modern age were conquered and peripheralized by larger imperial entities. Hungary and Czech lands (Bohemia) were subjected to Habsburg rule; Poland was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and the Habsburg empire; and Slovak lands were doubly peripheralized within the framework of the Hungarian Kingdom and as a part of the Habsburg empire. However, each of the entities in question had a different past prior to imperial subjugations, each experienced the subjugation differently, and each emerged in 1918 as sovereign entities with distinctive memories of the past and under different structural conditions. Still, all of the countries in question succumbed to Nazi and Soviet imperialism during the Second World War, albeit the subjugation came in different forms and under different circumstances.

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989
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Imperial legacies and post-imperial realities

Forces of liberal convergence drove Hungary to dismantle the communist-era military establishment, subject it to democratic-civilian control, and to join NATO. After 1999 NATO membership, and 2004 EU membership, in turn, led the country’s defense policies adjustment to requirements of liberal alliance politics, including multilateral deployments abroad in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Hungarian defense doctrines, the size of the country’s military structure and role followed the liberal alliances paradigm. However, the persistent theme throughout all these adjustments was Hungary’s neglect of military spending and lack of emphasis on military dimensions of security. The chapter argues that this persistent theme is a result of peculiar anti-militaristic strategic culture resulting from collective traumas of the twentieth century. The Hungarian recent turn towards nationalistic populism changed little in both façade orientation of Hungarian defense policies around liberal alliance policies and a neglect of defense policies as the reality behind the façade.

in Defense policies of East-Central European countries after 1989