Drawing heavily on the original interviews conducted during the research,
this chapter provides a comprehensive account of the history of the Prevent
policy. This chapter identifies the key discursive and organisational shifts
that have occurred within the development of Prevent, periodising Prevent
into three distinct phases: 2001–6; 2007–10; and 2011–15. It demonstrates
that the changes to Prevent reflect an underlying debate that sits at the
heart of the policy: should Prevent focus on those at imminent risk of
radicalisation? Or should the focus be broader, engaging with the ideas and
values of communities that may justify and enable violent extremism? A
security and an identity strand. The debate between these positions,
narrated in the interviews and policy documents, represents the conventional
narrative of Prevent, where, at times, the strands are brought together, and
at times, it is their separation that is advocated.
This chapter demonstrates that the anlaysis of chapter 1 has been,
historically, reproduced across much of the academic literature on Prevent.
This literature, it will be argued, often sees the ‘solution’ to Prevent as
the separation of its security and identity strands. It therefore positions
the two strands as ‘separable’, failing to go beyond the questions that the
policy itself asks. It can thus be argued that the academic literature, even
when critical, has failed to develop an account of Prevent that conceptually
grasps the relationship between security and identity established in the
policy. This chapter then analyses two approaches to Prevent, emergent
within the literature, that provide a means of moving beyond this position:
first, an approach that argues Prevent has produced Muslims in the UK as a
‘suspect community’, and second, an approach that argues Prevent represents
a strategy of counter-insurgency.
This chapter starts to challenge the narrative introduced in chapters 1 and
2, and establishes the central relation within Prevent between security and
temporality. It argues that Prevent represents a novel ambition for the
state: early intervention into processes of becoming violent. It thus
intervenes within conditions of uncertainty, in that it is not certain
whether such an individual would go on to participate in violence or any
other illegal act. Engaging with the emergent academic literature in this
area, the chapter argues that such intervention necessarily acts within
conditions of uncertainty. This in turn requires discursive and
institutional mechanisms that make such a threat knowable and actionable.
The term preclusive is introduced here as a general term that emphasises
this relation between security and temporality, making clear that all acts
of securing are necessarily productive of a future threat they then
preclusively act on to mediate. The chapter then demonstrates how the
concept of radicalisation fulfils this function for Prevent, identifying
potential future violence in the present.
The earliest specific international arrangement, at least indirectly, to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons is the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The negotiation of the treaty—originally designed to be a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing—began essentially in 1955, when the Soviet Union unbundled such an agreement from a general and complete disarmament package, starting thereby an unpicking of the all-or-nothing position on nuclear arms control and disarmament they had taken over the Baruch Plan, vestiges of which remain in the wording of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Bargaining theory has something to add to the understanding of arms control. To take the bargain between the superpowers first, the surplus to be created was a slowing down of the arms race between them. This chapter explores bargaining for test ban treaties and discusses the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States and USSR. It also looks at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
This book provides an introduction to the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. It considers nuclear weapons from varying perspectives, including the technology perspective, which views them as spillovers from nuclear energy programmes; and the theoretical perspective, which looks at the collision between national and international security involved in nuclear proliferation. The book aims to demonstrate that international security is unlikely to benefit from encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons except in situations where the security complex is already largely nuclearised. The political constraints on nuclear spread as solutions to the security dilemma are also examined in three linked categories, including a discussion of the phenomenon of nuclear-free zones, with particular emphasis on the zone covering Latin America. The remarkably consistent anti-proliferation policies of the United States are debated, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself, with special attention paid to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system, is frankly appraised.
‘Safeguards’ is the slightly euphemistic term officially used to describe the measures taken by the Agency (or Vienna Agency) independently to verify the declarations made by states to the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning their nuclear material (principally enriched uranium and plutonium) and the uses it is put to have peaceful ends. This chapter looks at safeguards in the context of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, whose effectiveness requires centrally organised carrots and sticks. The deterrent apparatus is in two parts: the first involves the timely detection of an unauthorised diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes; the second part is the adverse consequences for the state in question of having been caught (economic sanctions, at a minimum). This chapter is much more concerned with detection and how this might most reliably be ensured in the triple context of: the limited resources for nuclear inspection; the requirement minimally to disrupt the national economic life of states; and the necessity of respecting the principle of sovereign equality between states.
This book examines the spread of nuclear weapons and how to curb it. It discusses the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the chief global political instrument operating to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons, in the context of the uptake of nuclear energy for commercial reasons. It also considers international relations theory, with special reference to rational choice approaches; the inspection procedures adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency; regional nuclear-free zones; the NPT in the context of the United States' non-proliferation policy, and vice versa.
In 2000, almost every state in the world (all except Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) publicly subscribed once again to the principle that the spread of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them is dangerous to international security and that it should therefore be energetically discouraged. The occasion was the latest review conference of the 30-year-old Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the chief international instrument for restricting nuclear proliferation, and for reversing such proliferation as has occurred, if its Article 6 is taken seriously. But the correctness of this principle is not self-evident. An important intellectual challenge comes from Kenneth Waltz, writing most recently in 2003. The basis of his challenge is a generalisation of what he regards as a significant lesson of the Cold War years. This chapter deals with nuclear weapons and international security, starting with Barry Buzan's concept of a ‘security complex’. It concludes by looking at two broad approaches to securing the mutually beneficial outcome of non-proliferation: the centralised approach and the decentralised approach.
Nuclear energy has peaceful applications and non-peaceful applications. The centrepiece of all political efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons lies in attempting to harmonise the proliferation of nuclear reactors with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What all nuclear reactors have in common is nuclear fuel, which must contain at least some uranium in the form of the isotope uranium-235 (or very much more rarely 233), or plutonium, or both. This is usually described as ‘fissile material’. This chapter is about nuclear technology and the technical interconnections between commercial and military nuclear programmes. It also discusses the spread of nuclear technology and the use to which it has been put by a number of states, both inside and outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to bring them close to or even take them over the nuclear weapons threshold. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview on critical mass and nuclear bombs, the differences between the United States and its natural allies over nuclear proliferation, radioactive waste and nuclear accidents and uranium enrichment.
This chapter focuses on the properties of an ideal nuclear-weapon-free zone and compares it with actual nuclear-free zones. An ideal nuclear-free zone's job of work is never done and there is always a risk that the arrangement will fail to hold. This puts it on a par with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), but its narrower geographical scope than the NPT is both beneficial to the nuclear-free zone and a problem for it. It is beneficial in as much as resolving the multilateral security dilemma is on average easier the smaller the number of participants involved, but more difficult in that no grouping of states is an island, and the introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone from outside may be difficult to insure against. This chapter also looks at three non-armament treaties: the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty. Finally, it discusses nuclear-free zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok, as well as the Rapacki Plan and the Korean Declaration.