Recognition of Bosnian independence in 1992 followed the secession of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia from the federal Yugoslav state the previous year. The accusations and counter-accusations of bias among both reporters and analysts of the Bosnian war can sometimes become exaggerated because of a fundamental disagreement about the legitimacy of Western intervention in the post-Cold War world. Susan Woodward identifies two competing views of the causes of the Bosnian war, both of which informed the policies of Western governments. First understood it as an 'ethnic' conflict, arising from longstanding mutual antagonisms which had been given free rein with the end of the Cold War. Second explained the war as the result of Serbia's aggressive territorial ambitions. Woodward argues that Western accusations of war crimes were 'a servant of American policy toward the conflict'.
Decisionmaking, intelligence, and the case for war in Iraq
This chapter charts the basis and evolution of a decision that is set to define the ten-year premiership of Tony Blair; the decision was to go to war in Iraq. It focuses on the institutional context within which the decision was taken, paying particular attention to the ongoing presidentialization of British politics and consequent downgrading of Cabinet as a decisionmaking body. This process created the political space in which the decision could be taken. James Piffner, in the chapter, discussed that the US political leaders ultimately misled the public by exaggerating the threat posed by Iraq. The Blair inner sanctum had to sell the war to the British public after determining British's support to the US in removing Saddam Hussein. The focal point of this effort would be the Downing Street's September 2002 publication of a dossier based on intelligence material detailing the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
This chapter aims at studying John Burton's human needs theory and locating his version of theory in a wider tradition of thinking. The assumptive basis of needs thinking as it relates to the analysis of behaviour and motives is examined in the chapter in order to lay the foundations for an understanding of the rationale of Burton's workshop theory. The human needs narrative of Burton postulates a version of the alienation thesis. The thesis consists of the idea of human needs as something original which cannot be suppressed. Human needs thinking often includes a form of biological determinism. The notion of determinism as it relates to the explanation of human behaviour is complex. Since determinism is the thesis that every event has a cause, belief in determinism often embraces the claim that all human behaviour is causally explicable.
An appearance in a political cartoon can provide leaders or interest groups welcome recognition. Actors in cartoons are identified in one of the three ways: through personification, symbolic representation or implication. As a study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cartoons were coded along nationalist lines, using state symbolism and political leaders as identifiers. Israeli or Palestinian characters seen to be sanctioning or engaging in violence were coded as enemies. What one notices when coding Israeli and Palestinian cartoons is the sheer variety of enemy images used. Beasts, barbarians and bugs are only a few of the derogatory pictures that appeared. S. Keen devised his classification by looking at the Western propaganda produced in the first half of the twentieth century. This classification resulted in ten enemy archetypes: aggressor, faceless threat, enemy of God, barbarian, imperialist, criminal or rogue actor, sadist, rapist-infanticide, vermin-beasts and death incarnate.
Several scholars have attempted to tackle the definitional ambiguity of political cartoons. Cartoons focused on the action of the Middle Eastern countries, leaders or populations were coded as dealing with regional issues. Far from being a single-issue conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is plagued by a multiplicity of insecurities. Israeli and Palestinian cartoons respond to diplomatic initiatives and outbursts of violence, despite dramatic differences in political freedoms, economic structures and social norms. Every Israeli and Palestinian cartoon pertaining to the conflict was coded either as expressing a positive or negative mood. The issues over which conflicts are waged are essential for understanding the nature of resolution. Acceptable borders for a future Palestinian state largely depend on the prominence of religious, security or demographic fears. Demographic fears mean that land with large population centres is least desirable.
A cartoon study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more appropriate given the story used by French cartoonist Jean Plantureux to explain why he initiated the Cartooning for Peace conference held at the United Nations on 16 October 2006. In capturing the speculative and emotional basis for violence, political cartoons offer a unique window into the ideational foundations of conflict. Nazi era editorial cartoons clearly reflected the growing anti-Semitism among the German population that culminated in the Holocaust. International angst over cartoon depictions in foreign papers only makes sense if one believes that the public opinion they reflect affects a country's foreign policy. Designing a research project to test the predictive capacity of political cartoons requires careful consideration. By the 1930s, political cartooning had integrated itself into the political fabric of the Middle East.
This chapter presents an anatomical comparison of the conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, emphasising the remarkable similarity between the two. It focuses on to the responses of Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the respective Chechen and Kosovo problems. The chapter discusses rationales and motives can, in the absence of any convincing Realist interests, best explain NATO's and Russia's decision to go to war. It shows how Chechnya and Kosovo are linked, both by Realpolitik and, perhaps more directly, by each being the focal point of an on-going war of interpretation. The outcome of each of these wars of interpretation may influence the European security landscape more than the 'hot war' in Kosovo. Both the Chechen and the Kosovo conflict are essentially a by-product of the breakdown of the Soviet and Yugoslav ethno-federations.
Chapter 5 analyses the ways in which the taboo has had a detrimental impact on the Syrian conflict. In particular, it focuses on the how specific weapons are perceived within a conflict, where the taboo causes chemical armaments to be prioritised over others via inappropriate hierarchies of threat. The way in which the taboo has dominated understanding of Syria has seen other threats ignored – notably the vast numbers being massacred with conventional devices, but also the significant biowarfare threat that exists in the country. This means that policymakers have focused on the wrong issues in respect to Syria, a situation that precludes ever finding workable solutions to the crisis. Simply put, policymakers are not seeing the real problems. The taboo blinds them; or rather, applies a lens through which they can only see the chemical threat and none of the other issues driving this conflict.
This chapter analyses the chemical weapons taboo – the idea that chemical weapons are so abhorrent that they cannot be tolerated. In particular it engages with the work of Richard Price. It reinterprets the taboo from the perspective of Quentin Skinner and his concept of the ‘innovating ideologist.’ Instead of viewing the taboo as a social construction, this analysis argues that actors can exert significant agency over the taboo and the way in which it is employed in political discourse.
During World War II, because of the intensive bombing attacks experienced by the civilian population, some, like the United Kingdom, set up trained units to work in the field of civil defence, assisting those injured or rendered homeless because of air raids. Civilian civil defence personnel may carry light individual weapons for their own protection or to preserve order, but not weapons like fragmentation grenades or those intended for non-human targets. Military personnel assigned to civil defence duties may perform the duties only within their own national territory and must not commit any act outside those duties which might be inimical to the adverse party. If the parties to the conflict are not parties to the Protocol they are not bound by any treaty regulations concerning the activities or rights pertaining to civil defence.