After 1649, parliamentary authors have usually been distinguished as either 'de facto theorists' or 'commonwealthsmen'. De facto theory incorporated languages and ideas which are difficult to fit into current definitions of 'republicanism'. Nonetheless, the writings of Anthony Ascham, Francis Rous or John Dury were intended to support the rule of Parliament, and after January 1649 that meant the rule of republican government. The same combination of distinctive features and similarities between Ascham's and John Milton's writings could be found in Marchamont Nedham's The Case of the Commonwealth of England Stated the case of John Hall. From Rous to Hall, a surprisingly rich and varied range of ideas and values were used to support adhesion to the rule of Parliament and the Republic. These ideas were not inherently linked to a singular form of polity.
This chapter focuses upon the Baltic States' alignment with European Union (EU) initiatives relating to controlling legal and combating illegal transfers of arms and military equipment. It begins by commenting upon the challenges posed by the illicit arms trade in the post-Cold War era. The chapter provides a summary of the EU's main efforts to harmonise export control legislation and co-ordinate responses to the illicit arms trade. Assessments by the Commission and the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) have highlighted a number of general concerns with corruption, experience and resources, which could impact upon their ability to uncover attempted diversions and arms brokering activities. Combating illicit trafficking and preventing the diversion of arms and strategic goods to the international illicit arms trade requires multi-lateral co-operation and degrees of transparency. A considerable number of measures had been adopted to tackle the proliferation and trafficking of illicit arms.
This chapter shows how hegemonic attempts to define and solidify Australian national identity have always been contested and unstable. It elucidates how Australian national conflict has been linked with tangible conflicts over land, injustice and power, and how they have been closely intertwined with anxieties about insecurity. The chapter argues that such a politics forestalls the achievement of a holistic and non-militarized security based upon the emancipation of human beings. It also argues that the operation of security politics gravely distorts Australian defence and foreign policy and directly endangers both others and the state's own citizens. The chapter suggests a range of ways in which the practices and conceptualizations of security, identity and sovereignty in Australia need to be refigured if Australian defence and security policy is to be rebalanced. It is important to place systems and processes of representation in security affairs, and politics more generally, under critical scrutiny.
On November 8, 2001, just days before the federal election, Prime Minister John Howard was making the customary leader's appearance at the National Press Club. This chapter exposes dilemmas about the role of intelligence in democratic politics, one that was to become a major issue in Howard's next term of government as he committed Australia to go to war against Iraq. Intelligence agencies had done much to dispel the suspicions and criticisms occasioned by the partisan conflicts in which they had sometimes been embroiled during the Cold War, and especially during the long period of conservative rule. As the long countdown to the Iraq war began, Australia's intelligence apparatus seemed to be stable and harmonious, and more professional than it had ever been, but there were undercurrents of tension.
At their summit on the western Balkans in Thessaloniki in June 2003, European Union (EU) leaders declared: 'Fragmentation and divisions along ethnic lines are incompatible with the European perspective, which should act as a catalyst for addressing problems within the region'. This chapter is based on secondary sources on Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H). In B-H an amoral approach was adopted, notably by the UK, based on minimising intervention, particularly by refusing to commit troops to a peace-enforcing role. B-H might seem a more successful power-sharing case than Northern Ireland, in as much as the State institutions, however dysfunctional, have at least been in being ever since the Dayton accords. In Macedonia importantly, interethnic dialogue after the outbreak of civil conflict could be presented instead, as Brussels was keen to do, as an integral part of the path to eventual EU membership, via an Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).