Third-party intervention is one form of conflict resolution among legal regulation, the deterrence model and bargaining and negotiation. Third-party activity has traditionally been theorised in three ways. The focus has been on 'intermediary activities', 'general conflict theory' or the 'negotiation system'. The traditional view which emphasises mainly on intermediary activities studies third-party tactics and identities. The fourth approach to third-party intermediary activities can be found in problem-solving conflict resolution, which John Burton's theory exemplifies. Three problem-solving conflict resolution schools emerged, namely, the London, Yale and Harvard schools, which employed International Relations theorising and practical techniques differently. A comparison of three problem-solving approaches reveals that the Harvard group led by H. Kelman emphasises that international conflicts are not simply the product of misunderstanding and misperception. Real conflicts of interest or competing definitions of national interests are often, according to Kelman, at the centre of disputes.
This chapter clarifies the role of relevance structures, typifications, language and discursive rationality in conflict and conflict resolution processes. Problem-solving workshop conflict resolution forms a framework for mutual cultural adaptation. The participants need to find a 'scheme of translation' to produce ways to understand each other and to create a shared reality. Since the problem-solving workshop offers a context for mutual adaptation, it needs to be studied how typifications change in that context. Face-to-face interaction between the conflicting parties is one of the core ideas on which most of the problem-solving conflict resolution approaches rely. Discursive rationality is fundamental in the context of problem-solving conflict resolution, because it contributes to the prevention of the further breakdown of 'sociality' and facilitates the finding of a shared language game. Since the workshop is an encounter where mutual cultural adaptation can take place, problem-solving workshop conflict resolution consists of discursive possibilities.
This chapter examines the European Union's peace-building role and assurance policies in the region of the western Balkans, where intrastate strife occurred between 1991 and 2001. It considers EU civilian efforts in re-establishing peace, stability and prosperity in the aftermath of the Bosnian, Macedonian and especially the Kosovo conflicts. The chapter explores the extent to which core EU values and principles are transferred into EU peace-building activities and the extent to which institution building and civilian tasks are pursued with persuasive instruments. The activities of the Stability Pact (SP) and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) were both complemented and strengthened through EU peace-keeping and police training missions. The adoption of the SP and the SAP has given the EU an opportunity to extend its system of security governance and to create an expanding zone of stability in Europe.
In the immediate post-war period, Western European security was contingent upon the successful recovery of the European economy and institutionalised political cooperation to meet the common Soviet threat. The gradual emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) reflected two sets of concerns, one internal and the other external. Creating an EU that can function as an autonomous actor with a global military presence remains the most vexing security policy challenge facing its member states. The Berlin-plus arrangement has three key institutional components. First, it assured the EU access to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) planning capabilities for preparing and executing EU-led crisis management operations. Second, it made NATO assets and capabilities available to the EU; and third, it created EU-NATO consultation arrangements facilitating the use of NATO assets and capabilities.
The rise of the EU as a security actor is connected with the fact that the threat spectrum has broadened. This chapter explores the responsibilities assumed by the EU and the resources it possesses to implement conflict prevention measures. It explores the internal rationale for the EU as a security actor and examines the goals, principles, norms and rules in the field of conflict prevention. The chapter entails the presentation of the various treaty provisions, mode of decision-making, and financial arrangements that demarcate EU competencies in the policy area of conflict prevention. It presents the specific action and programmes undertaken by the EU as well as the resources expended in the field of conflict prevention. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the EU's effectiveness as a security actor in the field of conflict prevention.
This chapter investigates the EU's emerging role as a provider of internal security policies, what we call the policies of protection. The EU has targeted two general threats to internal security, organised crime and terrorism. The rationale for collective or coordinated action to combat organised crime and terrorism is highly developed. An elaborate set of policy principles define the balance between member-state and EU prerogatives. The EU has sponsored a series of institutional innovations that have created general networks between law enforcement and judicial authorities as well as networks specific to certain categories of crime or security threat. There are three major initiatives in the area of policing, particularly when it comes to serious crime. They are the broadening Europol competencies, the creation of joint investigation teams (JIT), and efforts to generate threat assessments of organised crime towards facilitating common policies within the EU.
Geopolitics and capitalist development in the Asia-Pacific
This chapter explains why an understanding of the political economy of security is important, especially in East Asia. It details the geopolitical conditions that have made politics and economics such inextricably intertwined, mutually constitutive forces across the region. The historical experience of the East Asian half of the Asia-Pacific serves as a powerful reminder that international orders are ultimately social processes, which are realized within specific geopolitical circumstances. The chapter briefly introduces some of the more important theoretical innovations that have made the political economy perspective such an important part of contemporary debates about security and international relations. It gives more detailed consideration to the East Asian experience, explaining what is distinctive about it, as well as how and why East Asian political elites have been keen to promote and defend their approaches to development.
In the Middle East, security is strongly influenced by politicized forms of fundamental belief systems. This chapter examines the dual role of political Islam, with specific focus on Palestine and the case of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas is gaining in popular support due to renewed violence in the Middle East and the Palestinian population's increased endorsement of suicide or 'martyrdom' operations against Israeli targets. Throughout its short history, Hamas has continued to depict its movement most fundamentally as a clear and viable alternative to the secular forces led by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The uncompromising position assumed by Hamas, toward both Israel and the PLO moderates willing to negotiate with the Israelis, is clearly intended to gain adherents to Hamas' more 'revolutionary' approach to the Palestinian issue.
Policymakers say they need and want very good intelligence. Decisionmakers might be better off if they understood the limitations of intelligence but this would place them under intolerable psychological and political pressures. One reason for the intelligence errors about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs is that the US believed that Iraq had an extensive denial and deception program. This explained why the US was seeing only scattered signs of the program. Designing policies that are likely to succeed if the intelligence is good but that will not fail disastrously if it is not is difficult. The main change to come in the aftermath of 9/11 is the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with significant powers over the entire intelligence community.
For analytical purposes, the Burtonian approach is divided into three categories in this chapter: the entry decision, behaviour within the workshop structure and the behaviour of the facilitator. Before studying John Burton, the theory of rational choice needs to be examined. The rational choice approach can be seen to be a subgroup of J. Habermas's teleological model. It offers a model of optimising behaviour, or, as psychologists see it, the rational choice paradigm is a heuristic device for interpreting behaviour. Burton bases his explanation of entry on rational choice theory or, more generally, on a model of strategic action. The strategic action model which relies on the notion does not investigate the beliefs and motivations of actors, but imputes them for predictive and explanatory purposes. By employing a rational choice framework, Burton presupposes non-arbitrary access to the objective domain of behaviour on the part of the researcher.