The Art History and Architecture Collection is a vital resource for academic libraries, offering extensive insights into various themes such as art movements, single-artist studies, decolonising art, gender and masculinity, citizenship, architecture and design. This collection aims to broaden the scope of art history, addressing a diverse range of visual cultural forms from the early modern period to the present.
The collection encompasses theories and histories of materiality, exploring the intricate relationship between making and thinking, fashion and culture, production and consumption, textiles and industry.
| Key series |
| Rethinking Art’s Histories |
| Studies in Design and Material Culture |
| Collection year | Titles |
| 2025 titles | 17 |
| 2023/4 titles | 28 |
| 2013-2022 titles | 74 |
| Total collection | 128 |
| Keywords |
| Singleartist studies |
| Subcultures |
| Design |
| Architecture |
| Citizenship |
| Surrealism |
| Art movements |
| Decolonising art |
| Queer art |
| Gender – masculinity |
| Modernism |
| Postmodernism |
| Thema subject categories |
| Architecture |
| Avant-garde |
| Ceramics, mosaics and glass: artworks |
| Colonialism and imperialism |
| History of art |
| Material culture |
| Performance art |
| Theory of art |
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Art history and architecture collection
The final chapter of Part I focuses on the marketing strategy adopted by Wilsdorf to establish Rolex as a major Swiss watch brand on the global market. It discusses first the various actions carried out to communicate the precision and reliability of the brand. In particular, the chapter emphasizes that Rolex used the strategy of follower at that time: it was not innovative and used the same strategies as the dominant brands on the market—that is, it participated in chronometry concours organized by observatories in Switzerland and the UK and in sponsoring sportsmen and women.
Rolex was, however, not the only brand launched by Wilsdorf during the interwar years. He used other brands, like Prince, Tudor and Marconi, to target specific segments of the market with specific products. Hence, he owned a portfolio of various brands, like other watch companies at that time. This shows that Rolex was not focused on a single product, the Oyster, since 1926 and demonstrates that Wilsdorf did not know what would work in the future. He was an entrepreneur keen on developing new products but not a genius totally focused on a waterproof, self-winding watch from the beginning.
The book ends by returning to the main steps in the transformation of Rolex from a precision instrument to a fashion accessory expressing individual success. It emphasizes the two main competitive advantages of this brand: separation between sales and manufacturing, which allowed an early focus on marketing, and an early position in the new segment of accessible luxury. The conclusion closes with a short discussion on the contribution of Rolex to the emergence of a new luxury industry (beyond watches) based on relative democratisation and mass production (like Louis Vuitton).
Making new products is at the core of design management. This chapter explains how watch companies started to develop specific collections, characterized by technical functions (diving watch, chronograph, date, etc.) and a strong visual identity. Rolex was a leader in this new management of product development. Between 1945 and 1960, it launched a few collections and kept focused on them until today. In this context, all the various models launched during the interwar years, like Prince and Marconi, were abandoned. The company focused also on the Oyster and transformed this watch into a mythical good, making it the beginning of the history of Rolex.
This chapter shows that research and development were used to achieve the objective of creating iconic products. The manufacturer of movements, Manufacture des Montres Rolex SA, carried out many activities to acquire the technology necessary for these new models of watches. At the same time, Montres Rolex SA, in charge of marketing, invested massively to internalize knowledge related to the aesthetic of watches (case making, dials, etc.).
Chapter 2 focuses on innovation, especially of the waterproof watch Oyster (1926). The idea is to put this watch back into the general context of innovation and product development at Aegler and Wilsdorf. In particular, this chapter presents an analysis of the patents filed by these two companies, which highlights the variety of innovations made. This shows that, although research into the water resistance of watch cases is important, work is also being carried out on other subjects and designs. The conclusion of this analysis is that Wilsdorf is looking to develop an original and new product but does not yet know which one will be successful in the UK market. He is uncertain but is creating many designs. This goes against the general understanding that Wilsdorf was a genius who invented the Oyster as a revolutionary product.
The second part of the chapter discusses the internalisation of various activities related to the tangible design of watches (especially case and dial) by Montres Rolex in Geneva. The purchase of patents from suppliers, the takeover of small manufacturers of parts, and the general development of the company during the 1920s enabled Wilsdorf to take control over the aesthetic of his products. This strengthened the division of work with the Aegler manufacturer and led him to focus on consumers and marketing.
This first chapter discusses the beginning of the activities of Hans Wilsdorf in watch sales in London between 1905 and the end of World War I. It shows how a young German salesman with connections in Switzerland develops a business in the UK selling various types of wristwatches and registering the brand Rolex for some of them in 1908. His ambition was to establish this brand on the British market and he wanted to provide excellent and reliable products. At this time, he built close relationships with a watch manufacturer in the city of Bienne, Aegler & Co., who started supplying him with watch movements.
A portentous event, analysed in detail in this chapter, is Wilsdorf’s decision to move the company to Switzerland due to increasing taxes in the UK. He established a new firm in Bienne, then moved into Geneva in 1920 under the name of Rolex Watch Co. However, he retained the division of work between his company (marketing, advertisement, sales) and Aegler (industrial production).
This introduction gives the purpose and content of the book. In particular, it discusses the relevance to write (and read) a book on the business history of Rolex. It shows that no academic research has ever been carried out on the topic and demonstrates why (a conscious decision by the company not to talk about its history to keep the myth intact). Next, the introduction explains the approach followed by the author (business history and design management) and the sources, indicating the originality of the work.
Strange as it may seem, Rolex, the world's leading watch brand for over fifty years, has never been the subject of a book based on independent academic historical research. Now it has, with this book by one of the world's leading specialists in the history of the watchmaking industry. Based on archives in Switzerland, the United States and Great Britain, it offers a fresh look at the conditions that enabled Rolex to establish itself on the world market. From Hans Wilsdorf's initial trials and tribulations in developing an original watch between the wars to the revolutionary marketing strategy implemented by André Heiniger in the 1960s in collaboration with the American advertising agency J. Walter Thompson, this richly illustrated book explores the historical development of a watch brand that has become an expression of individual success. A fascinating account and essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the phenomenal success of Swiss watchmaking.
Chapter 3 explores the implementation of a system of mass production for high-quality watches by Aegler SA, the company that supplies Rolex with watch movements. The discussion focuses on two main points.
First, the chapter analyses how Aegler used the Watch Control Office, an organization set up by local authorities to carry out tests on the precision of watches and hence encourage manufacturers to improve the quality of their products. This highlights two different practices: Aegler used first the services of this office for independent quality control. When it developed new movements, it submitted a few of them to check if these new designs were precise enough. At the same time, when a new movement had achieved a stable technological level, Aegler submitted massively industrial-produced movements to obtain a large number of certificates delivered by this office as proof of the high-quality of the brand. This was broadly used in advertising.
Second, the effects of the industrialization of movement production on labour relations is realized on the basis of the archives of the local trade unions. It shows a shift from conflicts and strikes in the 1920s to better relations in the 1930s, despite the Great Depression, which severely affected the company. This change resulted from paternalistic actions developed by the owner-family towards the workers. Social peace in the factory was a factor that enabled fast-growing production after the 1940s.
Rolex has basically not changed its product development and marketing strategy since the 1960s. Its successful business model has been maintained intact over the decades, and the lack of change gives Rolex strong legitimacy. However, as this chapter shows, the organization of the firm was deeply transformed after 1990 to control production and strengthen competitiveness against the emergence of many new competitors onto the segment of luxury watches (Cartier, LVMH, Omega, etc.). First, Montres Rolex SA, in Geneva (formerly named Aegler), took over the manufacture of movements and numerous suppliers to exert control over production. Second, it relaunched its sub-brand Tudor and focused on a lower segment (premium watches) in order to prevent competitors from this segment from becoming too strong.
Finally, this chapter discusses the sharp increase in prices of Rolex over the last three decades. It shows not only that the iconic models of this brand became more and more expensive but also more exclusive, in the context of growing income inequality. The comparison of this price with the number of working days needed, on average, by an American worker to purchase a Rolex demonstrates an increasing social distance. Related to this change, the importance of auctions and of the second-hand market in increasing Rolex’s exclusivity is explored in detail.
Chapter 7 presents the core of the argument developed in this book. It shows how a new design management strategy (making and selling products that express individual success) shaped the global growth of Rolex. It starts with a discussion on governance and changes of executives, emphasizing the role of André Heiniger, CEO of Rolex between 1964 and 1997. Heiniger strengthened relations with JWT and refocused the discourse on individual success and excellence—and he stopped talking about the precision of his watches. The embodiment of brand values also shifted from politicians and men of power to people from sport, culture, and business who expressed excellence in their field. This cultural change was necessary in the context of the social changes of the late 1960s. In addition, the distinction between men and women disappeared in the late 1970s. Like men, women who cooperated with Rolex for advertising were not chosen for their looks but for their excellence in their field.