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This chapter shows the pathway that was developed between Russia and the UK in naval cooperation. It highlights that this process started before the collapse of the USSR, hence the argument that even in times of tension, it was possible to maintain some level of dialogue. The chapter outlines a series of Confidence Building Measures that were introduced such as the talks at Adderbury starting in 1988 with retired and serving personnel from the USSR, UK and the US. Following the collapse of the USSR these talks continued to become Russia, UK, US talks (RUKUS) which also developed a practical at sea element to the events. As well as this trilateral forum, bilateral events were also taking place, for example through ship visits and exercises and senior personnel visits. Tables of these visits and those involving RUKUS are included and are a unique record derived in the main from the authors’ sources. Reasons for the success of the Adderbury and RUKUS talks are also captured. This period of positive interaction culminated in 1998 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Royal Navy and Russian Navy on Naval Cooperation. Included in this chapter are personal anecdotes of interaction with the Soviet Navy in the Gulf, life at sea in a Russian warship, other official declarations from RUKUS talks and personal observations of those talks by Robert Avery. Also included is a first hand account of the first interaction between the Russian Naval Infantry and Royal Marines.
The early sense of optimism of naval cooperation and more broadly the UK-Russia relationship outlined Chapter 3, began to hit a number of political speed bumps, which characterised the UK-Russia relationship up to 2014. Furthermore, 1999/2000 saw the rise to power of Putin. The chapter examines how, despite the political backdrop, naval cooperation still took place at a time when the Russian Navy was determining its future shape and role and included closer interaction between naval colleges and academies. The Kursk submarine tragedy in August 2000, provided the catalyst for another important area of discussion and cooperation - Submarine Search and Rescue. There was an aspiration to develop a UK-Russia MoU on Submarine Search and Rescue but it did not materialise, largely due to bureaucracy but also suspicion of each side’s motives. A highlight during this period was the rescue in 2005 of the Russian submersible AS-28 Priz in the Pacific by the UK/US and a first hand account from the Naval Attache at the time is provided. Also positive was the UK’s contribution to the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) programme from 2003 - 2006 launched by the G8 and aimed, amongst other programmes, at the safe disposal of Russian nuclear submarines on the Kola peninsula. However, political headwinds were gathering strength in the relationship between Russia and the West, epitomised in Putin’s Munich Security conference speech in 2007 and whose security concerns were perceived as being ignored by the West.
This chapter’s starts with the context of attempted US/UK political resets in the relationship between Russia and the West. The resets could not, however, hide the reality of the deep political divisions between the two sides nor that these resets were ultimately doomed to failure as manifested Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless naval cooperation did continue and a high profile visit by the head of the Russian Navy in 2012, Admiral Chirkov, mirrored the effort being made at the political level to improve the relationship. Attempts were made to reinvigorate some of the ideas from earlier periods of cooperation, including establishing communication links between the Royal Navy’s operational HQ at Northwood and the Northern Fleet. Admiral Yevmonov, then head of the Russian Navy, was the deputy commander of the Northern Fleet at the time and was supportive of such initiatives. Author David Fields’ private meeting with Yevmenov is captured and as such marked the last ‘friendly’ cooperation meeting between the two navies before the annexation of Crimea. The immediate diplomatic aftermath of the annexation is discussed and the mistaken decision to suspend military dialogue with Russia. The chapter concludes with a brief overview that between 2014 and 2022 prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, some military dialogue took place within the maritime context but it was extremely limited and ultimately collapsed. Russia and the West had returned to confrontation.
This short chapter is designed to show that although predominantly a land power, Russia since the time of Peter the Great has always sought to exert influence on the worlds’ oceans. It outlines the early historical links between the UK and Russia, which formed a basis for the cooperation period of 1988 - 2014. The most important thing the chapter aims to set out is that the development of the Russian Navy has not been a smooth one, buffeted by political and military turmoil but nevertheless rising up from each setback to provide a challenge to the UK and its allies at sea. The period 1988 - 2014 provided an opportunity to witness at first hand one of these cycles in Russian Naval history as it emerged from the Cold War and set about developing a ‘new Navy’ from about 2010. The sources used for this section included ‘The Russian Navy - a historic transition’ which was published by the Office of Naval Intelligence in 2015 and Bruce Watson’s book ‘Red Navy at Sea - Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas 1956 - 1980, published in 1982.
The conclusion draws together the arguments of the previous chapters, setting in context the importance of the period of naval cooperation between 1988 and 2014. Its key points are:
Russia has sought to be a maritime power since the founding of its Navy by Peter the Great and despite setbacks and constraints is building a capable navy that is able to compete in the global commons and has been battle-hardened by its campaign not only in Ukraine but also in Syria.
The period of cooperation in question, although buffeted by political disagreements, achieved a degree of success albeit not evenly across the whole spectrum of naval capability, in particular, sub-surface with the notable exception of the rescue of the submersible Priz in 2005.
The Royal Navy will be at the forefront of the 3 pillars of engagement with Russia - defend, deter and dialogue. The detailed history of cooperation between 1988 and 2014 will help academics, policy-makers and naval/military personnel to better understand the Russian Navy and its people and the pathway that could be adopted to return to some form of dialogue and ultimately cooperation with Russia.
The maritime environment and how the Russian and UK navies operated with and sometimes against each other between 1988 and 2014, also offers an example of how politically both the West and Russia could seek ways to co-exist after the present crisis is concluded. Coexistence with autocratic governments is not without precedent e.g. China and Saudi Arabia.
This chapter highlights that the experience of the interaction and cooperation between 1988 to 2014 and the lessons learned, provides an important foundation and context to the nature of UK’s defence engagement with Russia both now and in the future. Using both primary and also secondary sources, the chapter examines the three pillars of that engagement - defend, deter and dialogue. The Royal Navy in the maritime environment has a key role to play in all three of these elements - defending the 3 ‘crown jewels’ of UK defence i.e. at sea nuclear deterrent, the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and the at sea elements of UK’s critical national infrastructure; deterring Russia globally through maritime presence and projection of military power, but also arguing that dialogue is a part of deterrence, which is lacking at present. The section on dialogue offers future policy makers suggestions on a pathway back to dialogue and cooperation, while mindful of the political and diplomatic complexities of achieving this in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, in which the UK and West have been heavily involved. Since 2014, the focus of engagement with Russia has been on defend and deter, with dialogue along pre-2014 lines suspended. The latter will at some stage need to be addressed but for the foreseeable future, it is highly likely that the former two elements will remain the focus.
This chapter aims to set the context for the start of the period of cooperation examined in the book, since as with chapter one, history is important to the Russians and it is important that future Euro-Atlantic policy makers and naval personnel are aware of it too. In particular, it covers the period after the First World War to 1988 and shows that operational cooperation was possible during the Arctic Convoys in the Second World War and that even during the Cold War some diplomatic visits took place. It also highlights the point that following a political rupture in relations between the UK and Russia, the Royal Navy has often been used to foster re-engagement in the military sphere.
Between 1988 and 2014, the Royal Navy, first with the Soviet Navy and then the Russian Federation Navy, developed a close working relationship, signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 1998 on naval cooperation. The book examines this unique period of history, the lessons that were learned by both sides about how their respective navies operated and the lessons drawn by Russia about the application of its maritime power in protecting its national interests globally. The book also examines the type of navy Russia seeks to procure. In light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the deep divisions between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, the maritime environment is an important arena in which the UK and its allies will be defending themselves against Russia and its strengthening naval forces, while also deterring it, and through which military dialogue and cooperation could one day be re-established. The period of UK-Russia naval cooperation examined in the book, also provides lessons from primary sources, that improve our understanding of the Russians, which is particularly important for decision and policy-makers and those serving in the military. The book argues that for Royal Naval personnel and those in allied navies, now and in the future, whether it be through cooperation, competition or confrontation, the Russian Federation Navy will play a significant and challenging role in their careers.
This chapter outlines the type of Russian Navy which the Royal Navy and other navies will be confronting, competing with and one day cooperating with. It outlines Russia’s maritime aspirations outlined in its policy documents and discusses the relative successes the Russian Navy has had in the Ukraine conflict. It seeks to show that Moscow has an ambitious and future oriented strategy, in which the sea and the navy play an important role. There is then an examination of Russian naval capabilities operating now or in the future, together with constraints and weaknesses within both its ship and submarine building capacity. Tables of ship and submarine building schedules at the various yards are included, derived largely from Russian open sources. With attention also focussed on the High North and Freedom of Navigation along the Northern Sea Route, the chapter also outlines the Icebreaker and Ice-class Patrol vessels that are being procured, and the challenges of navigating in the region. The chapter concludes that despite a number of ongoing debates about its character, what vessels it needs and how it will build them, the horizon will remain global and focused on the imposition of costs on an adversary. The Russian Navy will thus pose a constant challenge to the UK and worthy adversaries or even colleagues to many future generations of RN personnel.
The emphasis of this chapter is on what the Royal Navy learned about the culture and procedures of the Russian Navy during two-and-a-half decades of cooperation. Illustrations from face-to-face experiences gathered by the authors support some general hypotheses about Russian ‘top-downism’, stove-piping, enslavement to fixed procedures regardless of the given circumstances as well as the preference of depth over breadth in officer training. To balance these perceptions, an attempt is made to assess Russian impressions of the Royal Navy – often surprisingly positive. The use of the authors’ ‘lived experience’ brings colour and the human element to the Russian way of doing business not widely available in other sources on the subject. An element of humour humanises some of these encounters and seeks to add some meat to the bare bones of these interactions. ‘What were the Russians like?’ is a question frequently asked, the more so in the light of the invasion of Ukraine and the loss of direct access. Here, an attempt is made to answer that question – especially for those in the current and future Royal Navy who will need to assess and even second-guess their maritime adversary for years to come.