Enhance your library’s holdings with our comprehensive collection of 56 titles in international law, international relations and security studies. This curated selection includes both timeless classics and pioneering new works, featuring esteemed titles from the renowned Melland Schill series, known for its signifi cant contributions to the field.
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| Total collection | 56 |
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This chapter explores how contemporary policies and discourses about the Canadian national security landscape have targeted and policed Muslims, such that they have become a ‘suspect community’ within the national imaginary. This has resulted in the securitising of Muslims in Canada. Though some may argue that the securitisation of Canadian Muslims is an outgrowth of anti-Muslim racism and bias that has come about from the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror, this chapter traces the roots of these Islamophobic manifestations as part of broader historic practices associated with the racialised logics of coloniality. The securitisation of Muslims in Canada has manifested through surveillance and racial profiling as well as anti-terrorism legislation, which have normalised states of exception for Muslims with regards to their civil rights, as well as restrictions in movement of Muslims through a no-fly list. Ultimately, the hyper-securitisation of Muslims in the War on Terror draws attention away from other serious threats to Canadian society. These threats include the rapid growth of white supremacist and far-right extremist groups, which have targeted racialised and minority communities, including Muslims. This chapter explores the racialised logics underlying the securitisation of Canadian Muslims, the fatal consequences this has had for this suspect community, as well as the rapid growth of far-right extremist activism that has largely stayed under the radar in security discourses in Canada.
This chapter explores the convergence between anti-Muslim political activism and counter-terrorism policies. It shows how international counter-terrorism policies have responded to, and been shaped by, far-right metapolitics concerning gendered narratives of Muslim male sexuality. This chapter presents a comparative analysis of two case studies: ‘love jihad’ in India and the Great Replacement theory in Europe and North America. Building upon these narratives, this chapter analyses social media content related to love jihad and the Great Replacement produced by Hindu nationalist and Identitarian Movement activists respectively, and traces how local ideological narratives of Muslim sexuality are embedded in global Islamophobic tropes. The author then explores the connections between the far-right metapolitical discourse on gendered representations and its impact on counter-terrorism policies. In India, state-led legislation prohibiting interfaith marriage and religious conversion has been propelled by Hindu nationalist activists campaigning against love jihad. Similarly, in Europe, the passage of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee legislation spearheaded by populist radical right parties can be construed as a function of far-right metapolitical activism on these issues expressed through the Great Replacement theory. In both contexts, far-right grassroots actors have mobilized on these conspiracy theories to influence public opinion, and ultimately, government legislation that responds to these threats through a counter-terrorism framework.
The book’s final chapter states that the fourth triangle ended when Mosul fell under ISIS control, shaking, once again, the balance of power. Yet, it argues that it is still not possible to define which contours – if any – the fifth triangle has. Thus, the chapter takes a look into the current conjuncture of the three dyads and points to some interesting horizons. First, Saudi Arabia’s empowerment in the last decade has led to a gradually less dependent position concerning the United States. While not interested in harming its relationship with Washington, Riyadh makes it clear that it will prioritise its own interests even if in opposition to the United States. Second, after almost four decades, the pattern of US–Iranian enmity remains, swinging only from stagnation in the best case or inflated tensions in the worst case, observed during President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. Thirdly, competition between two self-perceived regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, seems to be consolidating itself as the new normal in the region and will shape much of the geopolitical arrangements there. The chapter also returns to the relevance of Neoclassical Realism (NCR) to the International Relations of the Middle East (IRME) scholarship, stressing its ability to frame ideas, identities, and leadership in coherent explanative chains. It argues for the power of NCR to bring IRME closer to Global IR discussions and vice versa. The final note relates to multipolarity, the emergence of new extra-regional powers, particularly China, and the promising future research agenda in the Persian Gulf.
The introductory chapter presents the intricate relationship between three key countries in the Persian Gulf. The chapter casts Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States as key actors in this regional system and advocates for a unified approach to understanding the dynamics of their interactions. It argues for why studying the relations between the three countries simultaneously and uniformly in a strategic triangle framework is critical for uncovering nuance, interdependencies, and interconnections between the actors and their behaviour. It presents the main questions that guided the research and sets the theoretical and methodological grounds of the book.
This chapter explores the first strategic triangle, the ‘mènage à trois triangle’, characterised by a period of positive relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. It revises the Twin Pillar Diplomacy associated with US President Nixon, Iranian Shah Pahlavi, and Saudi King Faisal. It presents the British decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf as a systemic change. Second, it explores the geographic, demographic, military, and economic factors that define the countries’ power projection in the region, as well as their alliances, partnerships, and regional appeal. It assesses each country's status satisfaction, state identity, and leadership preferences to explain how these domestic factors shape their policy. Throughout the 1970s, the triangulation served to maintain the regional status quo. After the British withdrawal, the United States aimed to guarantee it under the Western interest without direct involvement. The chapter shows how Iran and Saudi Arabia capitalised on that to boost their militarisation and modernisation and restrain revisionist actors. The analysis also reveals that leaders were alert to identity and political appeal. Despite their close friendship, Nixon knew the Shah could not be alone accepted as a regional leader by other Arab actors, and by including Saudi Arabia, he sought to reduce local anxieties. Both Faisal and the Shah captured this signal and worked together to improve ties. Thus, the chapter explains how Iran was gradually assuming the role of surrogate power for the US strategy while Saudi Arabia increased its relevance as an economic and stability promoter partner.
Chapter 2 delves into the book’s theoretical framework for grasping the strategic triangle. It first introduces how International Relations of the Middle East (IRME) has developed in the intersection of the discipline and Area Studies, focusing on how a dilemma between particularism and universalism has permeated the field of study. Second, it pinpoints that many outstanding works today combine Area Studies’ in-depth knowledge about the region with IR's more parsimonious theories and concepts in eclectic combinations that cope with local particularities while highlighting systemic pressures. Nevertheless, the chapter argues that this analytical eclecticism suffers from many pitfalls, particularly when it comes to contributing to the overall progressivity of the IR discipline and its de-Westernisation. For that matter, the chapter presents Neoclassical Realism (NCR) as an effective solution, as it is also a Realist course correction that opens the state’s black box to include domestic variables in structural analysis. This way, NCR is presented as a theoretical approach that can circumvent some analytical eclecticism’s shortfalls while maintaining in-depth analysis, rich explanatory, theoretical rigor, and practical value. After reviewing NCR’s foundations, objectives, and methodological preferences, the chapter presents the book’s explanative chain. While the independent variable continues to be systemic, the book explores how status satisfaction, state identity, and leadership preferences for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States work as variables shaping their decision-making process concerning international politics. This way, the strategic triangle, which is the dependent variable, is presented as malleable, complex, and passive of change due to external and internal pressures.
This chapter contextualises the Persian Gulf as a regional system, drawing upon seminal literature from scholars specialising in regional systems and the Middle East. It provides a critical review of this literature to frame the book’s analysis and argue for the analytical value of the concept of regions to explore patterns of intrastate relations, international politics, and security concerns. It depicts the Persian Gulf as a subsystem that emerged following the British departure and defines for it four key characteristics: the interface between Islam and politics, the role of oil in consolidating regimes, militarisation, and the long-standing influence of the United States. Its main outtake is that the Persian Gulf is and has always been multipolar, in the sense that no country managed to accumulate capabilities to become a hegemon. However, it always offered challengers or candidates for regional dominance, which has changed over time. Hence, it highlights five events that have shaped the balance of power: the British withdrawal, the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq invasion, and the conflict against ISIS. These events serve as defining moments for subsequent chapters, shaping the trajectory of regional dynamics. Additionally, it reviews the literature on the three dyads that comprise the triangle, namely US–Iran, US–Saudi Arabia, and Iran–Saudi Arabia. It concludes underscoring the importance of ideational, cognitive, and leadership factors as crucial explanatory elements, setting the stage for the operationalisation of these elements as intervening variables in subsequent chapters.
This book investigates the intricate relations between the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia within the Persian Gulf, conceptualising their ties as a strategic triangle. It underscores the interconnectedness of their interactions, wherein changes in one bilateral tie can reverberate across the other two. Spanning from 1969 to the present day, the narrative unravels the complex tapestry of interactions between the three actors, emphasising how ideological constructs, state identities, and leadership preferences influence not only how they perceive one another but also the strategies they choose for the region. Employing a Neoclassical Realist framework, the book offers a nuanced analysis that balances regional particularities with systemic pressures. Moreover, the analysis blends insights from International Relations theory with Middle East Studies, bringing interdisciplinarity to shed light on a phenomenon that has been central to the dynamics of the multipolar Persian Gulf system for over four decades. By delving into the historical evolution of the four manifestations of this strategic triangle (1969–1979; 1979–1989; 1989–2003; and 2003–2014), the book elucidates the intricate web of power struggles, alliances, and conflicts that have influenced much of the region's geopolitical landscape. By unpacking these factors, it provides a deeper understanding of the underlying forces at play in the Persian Gulf, offering valuable insights for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike.
This chapter contends that the period from 1990 to 2003 was one of the lost opportunities. It shows how the three countries shared threat perceptions that could lead to a relationship improvement. However, the triangle turned into a ‘romantic triangle’ instead, in which the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement materialised, but Iran and the United States failed to reconcile. The chapter presents the Gulf War as altering the balance of power and, by exploring ideational, cognitive, and leadership factors, shows how domestic politics played a crucial role in the three countries’ regional strategies. It detected that Iran's assessment of threats became more complex, enabling the necessary pragmatism for reinsertion into the international system. The Saudi leadership, satisfied by Washington’s continuity of the Carter Doctrine after the Cold War, perceived Iran’s pragmatism as a signal to readjust ties. The chapter exposes how interconnected environmental perceptions, cognitive lenses, and political ambitions are. These factors explain how the US Dual Containment strategy ensured that attempts to improve the US–Iran ties failed. Thus, the triangle continued to be marked by the US–Iran enmity, ultimately weakening the Saudi–Iranian advances. Eventually, 9/11 and the US’s neoconservativism led to environmental restrictions for both Tehran and Riyadh. In sum, the chapter demonstrates how leadership can drive the relations towards a more collaborative scenario when the systemic environment allows it. However, by 2003, the opportunities faded. Ultimately, the Iraq invasion would return the triangle to a similar scenario of the 1980s: an interventionist Washington, an anxious Riyadh, and a non-conformist Tehran.
Chapter 6 delves into the restoration of a ‘stable marriage’ arrangement within the strategic triangle, with working US–Saudi relations while US–Iran and Saudi–Iran relations soured. Emphasising the complexity and fluctuation of power dynamics, the chapter examines how the Iraq invasion catalysed a re-evaluation process in Riyadh, reaffirming, therefore, the strategic triangle. This event favoured all three parties: the US expanded its military presence and security ties with the GCC, Iran bolstered alliances with empowered Shia groups, and Saudi Arabia, above all, welcomed Saddam's downfall. The 2000s oil boom further boosted the military capacities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, by the 2010s, the United States showed signs of war fatigue, and sanctions curbed Iran's momentum. Only Saudi Arabia retained steady growth and arrived at the end of the period with more power than it started with. The chapter argues that while Iran's empowerment, together with the strong rhetoric of new neoconservative figures like President Ahmadinejad, explains the détente’s discontinuance, Riyadh's new aspiration for regional leadership also emerged due to its discontent with US policies, especially during the so-called Arab Spring and Iranian nuclear talks under President Obama. Leadership assessment is also pivotal in understanding the timing of nuclear negotiations and the factors that, for the first time, aligned to reduce tensions between Iran and the United States. However, it also points out how Obama’s failure to assess Saudi Arabia’s dissatisfaction while reaching out to Iran led to increased anxieties in the Arab nation, which responded with proactivity, sectarianism, and militarisation.