For over two decades, Manchester Studies in Imperialism has been a trailblazer in the realm of imperial history. Positioned firmly at the forefront, this series has illuminated the annals of history and transformed our understanding of empire.
Pioneering perspectives
The Studies in Imperialism series has embarked on a transformative journey, reshaping not only British history but also the vast landscape of imperial histories. It has boldly expanded boundaries, delving into uncharted territories, and shining a light on subjects that were once overlooked. More importantly, it has masterfully unveiled the intricate and inseparable relationships between these domains.
A treasury of knowledge
Within the pages of Manchester Studies in Imperialism lies a treasure trove of scholarly exploration. It unveils the rich tapestry of cultural encounters between colonisers and the colonised, shedding light on the intricate web of power that flows through the production and organisation of colonial knowledge. It unravels the complex construction of identity, both at the heart and on the peripheries of empire.
2025 Manchester Studies in Imperialism
After her victory in the 2015 elections, Aung San Suu Kyi announced a plan of reconciliation after decades of ethnic conflict in Myanmar. In 1947 her father had attempted a similar plan, culminating in the Panglong Agreement signed in London with Clement Attlee and the Panglong Conference held in the town of that name in the Shan States. This chapter examines the historical and cultural background to these negotiations from the point of view of the minority Shan people and their rulers. It reveals how the Shan reacted to the tensions and conflicts that surrounded the signing and why they felt that the British failed them.
The chapter follows the ruling princes of India, the maharajas, rajas, ranas and others, from the partition of British India and the establishment of the successor nations of India and Pakistan in August 1947. It tracks Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel’s integration of the princely states into India, and the problems posed by the former princely state of Kashmir. In 1971, Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party won a landslide victory in general elections in India. The size of her majority enabled her to abolish the princes’ regal privileges and slash their privy purses. The ex-rulers attempted to cope with their difficult financial situation by, among other measures, converting assets such as their palaces into luxury hotels, or by promoting new industries in their former territories. Other ex-princes entered public life from different directions and some stood for election to parliament – with varied success. The chapter concludes with a look at popular attitudes to the ex-princes using their depiction on a logo developed by Air India for its posters and calendars. Its maharaja was presented as having a likeable and humorous persona – and witty.
The Sultan of Yogyakarta is the only royal figure in Indonesia who now retains an official government position, both as head of his sultanate and as hereditary governor of the province of Yogyakarta. This chapter explains how Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (1912–88) was able to safeguard and strengthen that position through his support for Indonesian republicans in the struggle for independence against the Dutch in the 1940s, his negotiations with the new government to secure recognition of Yogyakarta as a ‘Special Region’ of the country, his own charisma and administrative abilities, as well as astute actions in favour of his subjects during this period. The contrasting case of Surakarta, where the sultanate survived for only a short time beyond independence, is also considered.
In Thailand, an exalted veneration for the monarchy generates a continuous production of royalist and nationalistically inclined popular culture. One strand within this royalist nationalism evolves around the patriotic quality of ‘being Thai’ or ‘Thainess’, a combination of being united as a people in love with the monarchy while remaining proud of the nation’s everlasting independence. This narrative emphasises the bravery and wisdom of the old Siamese kings in fighting their arch-enemy, the Burmese, and their successes in maintaining the kingdom’s independence throughout its entire existence, including the period of Western high imperialism and aggression towards Siam. This particular historiography originated during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (r. 1865–1910), which paradoxically involved a grand scheme of internal colonisation by the absolute monarchy. Although scholarly work has thoroughly deconstructed the royalist account of the Siamese experiences with colonialism, this post-colonial perspective still exerts a strong impact on the cultural politics of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, inspiring a continuous production of monuments, novels, movies and television soap operas. Focusing on statues and monuments as material mediators in the domains of popular religiosity, nationalism and entertainment, this chapter explores the present-day popularity of Siamese royal historiography.
Defeat in 1945 brought the end of the Japanese empire and occupation by foreign powers for the first time in Japanese history. As the American-dominated Occupation introduced radical reforms of democratisation in politics and society, debates among the Allies and Japanese raged over the fate and future of both the person of Hirohito and the institution of the emperor. The new constitution in 1946 transformed the emperor from an absolute monarch to a symbol emperor. This was widely supported in the decade after the Occupation ended in 1952. However, because Hirohito remained on the throne until his death in 1989, the issue of his war responsibility did not disappear at home or abroad. The Japanese left remained vigilant against revival of the ‘emperor system’ (tennôsei) while the far right criticised media treatment of the imperial family as ‘celebrity stars’. Conservative Liberal Democratic Party governments kept the monarchy important in Japanese culture and society, ignoring Emperors Akihito and Naruhito’s expressions of ‘remorse’ for the war while endeavouring to carry out their constitutional role as ‘symbol of the state’.
In the mountain kingdoms and other polities of the Himalayan region, colonial Britain pushed forward the frontiers of its Indian empire, played the ‘Great Game’ against Russia and jousted with China for trade opportunities and political influence. Through the 1800s and early 1900s, Britain imposed a protectorate over Sikkim, exercised considerable sway in independent Nepal, promoted the establishment of a unified Bhutan and sought to gain access to Tibet. Confrontations and negotiations with local monarchs were key to Britain’s efforts. When Britain ‘quit’ India, the destinies of the states where Britain had gained a sphere of influence, and the fate of their sovereigns, hung in the balance. This chapter charts the varying trajectories of the monarchs of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim (and of the Dalai Lama in Tibet) during the late colonial period, and argues that the fates of the dynasties, at that time, and during and after decolonisation, was closely bound up with British imperialist action and its legacy.
Decolonisation in Indonesia was a repudiation of two pasts, indigenous and foreign. Nationalists rejected Dutch governance where political power was lodged in the Netherlands. They also rejected the pre-colonial pattern of myriad principalities headed by hereditary families. In its first years, Indonesia dissolved the three hundred or so principalities that had coexisted within the colonial state, allowing only two sultanates to survive. The framers of Indonesia's first and subsequent constitutions did not resolve the question of whether government should inherit the historic role of the archipelago’s sultans as enforcers of Islamic law, or leave religious observance to each Muslim’s conscience. Today, some descendants of royal families have resumed the use of the title of sultan. The central government understands them as symbols of the diverse ethnic cultures within the nation-state, but it has crushed separatist movements, whether based on ethnic particularity or Islam. It has also banned organisations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Hizbut Tahrir, that champion universal Islamic government under a caliph. The Republic of Indonesia stands for a nation-state whose borders are those of the Netherlands East Indies. The chapter argues that the legacy of colonialism is one state, not many.
This chapter examines how the monarchy was transformed in the first post-colonial state of Laos (1945–75). Using fresh primary sources, it argues that the monarchy was made and unmade by partisan struggles which emerged in the era of decolonisation and the global Cold War. In the late 1940s, the monarchy in Luang Prabang became the sole royal house in Laos with the support of the loyalist movement, a group which explicitly supported the return of the old colonial power, France, after the Second World War. Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, the monarchy was marked by its overt and covert support of anti-communism and right-wing nationalism. The last monarch actively promoted youth groups with parallels to fascist Vichy France. Yet, by 1975, the monarchy was swept away in the revolutionary tide of its sworn enemy, the communist-inspired Pathet Lao. In a larger sense, this chapter considers the role of kings in post-colonial democracies and the inherent political and social tensions they confront.
This chapter asks why kingship has survived and flourished in Malaysia. The particular record of British involvement with the different kingdoms of the country provides part of the explanation; but also, the indigenous institution possessed specific features that help account for its continuing resilience. Monarchy has been more important politically and socially in the Malay world (and probably most of Southeast Asia) than, for instance, in India – and Malay rulers have also possessed a capacity to adapt to foreign civilisations, as well as experience in operating as a small player in hierarchies. Apart from the British incursion, Malaysian monarchs have faced challenges from Fundamentalist Islam, anti-feudal nationalism and the demands of a large non-Malay minority – and these challenges continue to be present today.
In the 1940s, the British king, the Dutch queen and the Japanese emperor reigned over colonial possessions in Asia, whose ‘protected’ indigenous monarchs included Indian and Himalayan maharajas, Shan princes in Burma, and sultans in the Malay states and the Dutch East Indies, as well as the Vietnamese emperor and the Cambodian and Lao king in the French republican empire, and the ‘white raja’ of Sarawak. Decolonisation posed the question about the form of government to be adopted in successor states to the colonial empires and about the fate of local dynasties. As their possessions gained independence, the European and Japanese monarchies also had to adapt to a post-imperial world. This collection of original essays by an international group of distinguished historians argues that the institution of monarchy, and individual monarchs, occupied key roles in the process of decolonisation. It analyses the role of monarchy (both foreign and indigenous) in the late colonial period and with decolonisation. It examines the post-colonial fate of thrones buffeted and sometimes destroyed by republicanism and radicalism. It assesses the ways that surviving dynasties and the descendants of abolished dynasties have adapted to new social and political orders, and it considers the legacies left by extant and defunct dynasties in contemporary Asia.