In green political thought, including degrowth thought, it is not uncommon to see the state as part of the problem rather than the solution (Gough 2017). Nevertheless, most of the eco-social policies that are typically suggested to initiate and deepen degrowth transformations – be it in relation to respecting ecological ceilings or social floors (Khan et al. 2022; see Chapter 7) – would require a great deal of intervention by states and/or international organisations (Cosme et al. 2017). Degrowth advocacy has therefore suffered from a tension between viewing the state as incapable of initiating transformational change and appealing to it to do precisely that. This tension has, on occasion, taken the form of passionate arguments between ‘state-orientated’ and ‘state-opposed’ (often anarchist) degrowth advocates such as during the 2018 6th International Degrowth Conference in Malmö. In the present chapter, we seek to overcome the tension via a broad theoretical perspective on the state, a key institutional form (Chapter 2). We first analyse the state’s roles in the capitalist growth economy, focusing for instance on the welfare and the environmental state. Subsequently, we turn to the potential role of the state in degrowth transformations, considering the form and scales of state intervention, as well as its content in terms of sustainable welfare and eco-social policies.

State roles in capitalist growth economies

In developing our perspective, we draw on recent degrowth scholarship which has started to reconcile state-orientated and state-opposed thinking through a rereading of some classics of state theory (Koch 2020a, 2022a; see also D’Alisa and Kallis 2020 and Görg et al. 2017). Koch unifies the state theories of Gramsci (1971), Poulantzas (1978) and Bourdieu (2014). The three understand the state in relation to wider society, while theorising corresponding patterns of dominance and subordination. They also bring together the two most established social science traditions on the subject, namely the Marxian and the Weberian traditions. Whereas the Marxist tradition emphasises the interconnection of state policies and the capitalist growth imperative, the Weberian tradition focuses on the socio-historic processes that led to the modern bureaucratic state. The three theorists are furthermore united in viewing the state as a relatively autonomous sphere where dominating and dominated groups represent and struggle for their interests. Accordingly, existing state policies do not reflect the interests of any single group of actors. Rather they are outcomes of compromises between social forces within and beyond the state apparatus.

In capitalism, processes of production and wealth creation are structurally separated from the political processes of exercising coercive power and administrative control. Marx, in particular, linked the autonomous existence of the state to the structural prerequisites of the market economy. To be able to exchange goods, individuals must ‘recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors’ (Marx 1973: 243). The state legally facilitates such exchanges, guaranteeing the legal and economic independence of the owners of commodities, preventing, for instance, the appropriation of commodities by force. In this context, the modern state constitutes an independent third party that monopolises the legitimate use of physical force (Weber 1991: 78).

Complementing this perspective, Bourdieu introduced the notion of the state as the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence. Like Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, symbolic capital is the power of making people see the world in a specific way, which, if this power is sufficiently strong, appears as the only possible, universal and natural way. This manifests itself, for instance, in the state’s power to judge sentences and regulate the rules of spelling. More than merely shaping peoples’ consciousness, symbolic domination entails bodily aspects being submitted to (state) power (Bourdieu 1994, 2014). State power, then, takes on both physical and symbolic forms. Because of the strength of symbolic power, the state rarely has to resort to the use of physical force (Bourdieu 2014: 166). Bourdieu understands state power as the historical process of concentration of different forms of capital (including physical force and economic, cultural, informational and symbolic capital). The state is itself a field like others with oppositions such as that between its ‘left hand’ (public education, health and social welfare) and ‘right hand’ (judiciary, domestic affairs and finance departments). However, unlike other fields, the state transcends different forms of capital and has historically played an important role in differentiating civil society into fields (Chapter 4). With his notion of the ‘integral state’, which combines political (the formal state apparatus) and civil society, Gramsci (1971) addresses a similar topic: that contemporary states and civil societies are interlinked in myriad ways, making them empirically difficult to keep apart.

Symbolic state power becomes embodied and fixed in dispositions and habits (what Bourdieu refers to as ‘habitus’, see Chapter 7) and affects the various planes of social being. For example, the school system and other state institutions often reinforce the view of extractivism as the one and only possible form of human transaction with nature, and utilitarianism as the only form of interaction between humans. Nature is here seen as a ‘free gift’ for (economic) capital expansion, and other humans as means to materialist ends. Capitalist state institutions expose citizens to the ideal of ‘economic man’ and the corresponding values of competitiveness, individual advancement and short-term gain, paired often with intolerance, racism, sexism and a general hate of everything and everyone presumed to be different and ‘other’. Further to this, the symbolic power of the capitalist state shapes peoples’ inner being in the direction of entitlement, materialism and egoism.

In a social formation based on exploitative and exclusionary relationships, pertaining for instance to class, race, religion and gender (Chapter 1), the state is the main location for the political regulation of conflicts and for the maintenance of social order (Offe 1984). Since society risks disintegration without such regulation, states ensure the maintenance of a minimum of social cohesion and, at the same time, the legitimisation of remaining inequalities. For example, countless sociological studies since Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have shown that the existing school system largely reproduces and reinforces inherited inequalities, that is, the children’s original social differences. Not least by mystifying and naturalising such differences, the state has proven quite capable of temporarily harmonising conflicting group interests. Still, state policies do not normally simply follow the interests of dominant classes and groups; they also reflect the interests of the dominated ones to some extent. Specific state structures and activities, as well as corresponding modes of governance, are linked to ‘social forces, practices and discourses, the (changing) societal context as well as the contested functions or tasks of the state in societal reproduction’, including that of ‘existing societal nature relations’ (Görg et al. 2017: 9).

The state constitutes a relatively autonomous political sphere, where social classes and groups represent their interests in indirect and mediated ways. As political parties and civil society groups raise various issues, they sometimes become the focus of government action, only to be superseded by others at later points in time. State policies develop, then, as results of the heterogeneity and changing dynamic of social forces that influence state institutions (Jessop 2002). Once such a coalition of relatively powerful actors has been formed and has managed to influence the general direction of state policies, it takes on the character of a relatively homogeneous social force. The more socially coherent the coalition of forces that influences the state is, the less the contradictions there will be across state policies. Gramsci and Poulantzas referred to such a coalition of groups capable of temporarily dominating state policies as a ‘power bloc’ (akin to what was called a ‘historic bloc’ in Chapter 3). To underline the state’s role in securing and stabilising wider societal relations and various social struggles and power asymmetries, Poulantzas (1978) used the term ‘condensation’. The state, then, is a powerful actor which itself is created and recreated by social forces.

On the one hand, the state facilitates the stabilisation and maintenance of the social order via its force, laws, regulations, curricula, resources and its discourses of legitimation. On the other hand, however, concrete state strategies are the results of the material and symbolic struggles and tensions between social forces within and beyond its institutional borders, which may take the form of contradictions between different state apparatuses and branches. Different state apparatuses may, in fact, address problems in different ways. For instance, while one may promote growth and the use of fossil energy, another may attempt to reduce carbon emissions by reducing the use of fossil energy (Brand et al. 2011). Social movements can potentially use such contradictions within the state to advance their interests and turn their projects into hegemonic ones (Görg et al. 2017; Poulantzas 1978).

The post-Second World War welfare state resulted from struggles between organised labour and capital as well as between factions within the wider state apparatus. This Western welfare state defined the extent to which labour power is ‘decommodified’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). Subsequent work in comparative social policy was dedicated to national divisions of labour between markets, states and the third sector, taking the institutional forms of ‘welfare regimes’ (Arts and Gelissen 2002). It pointed to how the social-democratic countries in Northern Europe traditionally featured greater amounts of equality than did liberal (such as the UK) or conservative (such as Germany) countries.

A further landmark step in the internal differentiation process of the state in advanced capitalist countries has been the establishment of the environmental state (Chapter 2). Paralleling the development of the welfare state, the creation of the environmental state can be traced back to struggles between environmental groups and initiatives against large business and state interests. Duit et al. (2016: 5) define the environmental state as a ‘set of institutions and practices dedicated to the management of the environment and societal-environmental interactions’. In addition to being a provider of welfare to a smaller or larger extent, then, contemporary states in some respects protect nature. In other respects they simultaneously allow for violence being done to nature and in some cases states directly cause it themselves. For example, some of the world’s largest oil companies are state owned (Babić 2023). Just as in the case of the welfare state, the expansion of the environmental state is not a linear and uncontested development. A recent example of a drawback of the environmental state is the right-wing populist Swedish government abolishing the environmental ministry as an independent department.

Recent scholarship explored the similarities and differences in the historical developments and current roles of welfare and environmental states. It found that their institutional, political and economic contexts differ significantly, as does the composition of supporting and opposing social groupings and associated constellations (Gough 2016). Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime approach has inspired debates on the environmental state. According to Dryzek et al. (2003), for example, social-democratic welfare states are better placed to manage the intersection of social and environmental policies than are liberal market economies and welfare regimes. Social-democratic welfare regimes generally make a conscious and coordinated effort to manage this intersection and regard economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing (Gough et al. 2008). Yet, although these regimes are the most equal ones in socio-economic terms, their ecological performance is not superior (Koch and Fritz 2014; Duit 2016; Jakobsson et al. 2018). Rather, roughly speaking, the richer a country the worse its environmental performance (Fritz and Koch 2016; O’Neill et al. 2018).

State regulation is permanently subject to rescaling processes resulting in new, multi-scalar structures of state organisation and socio-economic regulation operating on different scales (Kazepov 2010). Particular capitalist growth regimes are oriented towards different scales. The Fordist growth model, for example, focused on the national level. Eventually, it came under pressure through various processes of rescaling and deregulation. In this process, powers were delegated from the national state apparatus to other scales, such as the subnational, regional and transnational ones (Jessop 2002: 206). Increasingly, transnational processes of capital accumulation require regulation extending beyond the borders and capacities of individual states. On the one hand, this led governments to create and strengthen regional and global regulatory systems and institutions such as the EU, the World Bank and the IMF. On the other hand, in the neoliberal era, transnational class actors and institutions have become significant sources of domestic policy ideas and design, and implementation. The contemporary international regulatory sphere constitutes a ‘multi-scalar and poly-centred system of governance’, where states and international organisations interact, albeit not on equal terms (Ougaard 2018: 129). Up until now the interests of the rich countries have largely managed to define the rules of this international regulatory sphere (Castree 2008; Brand and Wissen 2013; Hickel 2020).

Scales and diversity of degrowth transformations

We now turn to the potential role played by the state in degrowth transformations. As in previous chapters, what is provided here is not a precise blueprint. Indeed, no serious treatment of degrowth can deliver this. What is offered instead is a broader framework for thinking about the state in degrowth transformations, which builds on the previous section and our reflections in Chapter 2 on the ‘degrowth state’ as an institutional form. In what follows, we first consider issues related to scale and form, and then focus on content by turning to the notion of sustainable welfare and the eco-social policies that are currently being discussed in degrowth circles.

Many degrowth thinkers advocate strong localist visions (Trainer 2012) and in this context regard municipalities as key change agents. They envision international networks of towns and cities as driving forces behind transformations. The local ‘scale of politics is considered ideal for degrowth as it is in the municipality that people can practise face-to-face political deliberation’ (Schmelzer et al. 2022: 249).¹ As regards the state, it is perceived mainly as a negative force which is, for instance, disrupting the necessary transformations, maintaining borders and acting in authoritarian ways (2022: 291). In this view, then, there is little room for national states to play a positive role in degrowth transformations. Such transformations are, it would seem, mainly to be driven by actors in other sites or state apparatuses on other scales. Our take on degrowth transformations is somewhat different, in that we find it difficult to imagine how such transformations could ever come to enjoy the necessary momentum on a societal scale in the absence of comprehensive state involvement. This is not to turn a blind eye to the negative aspects of contemporary state activities or to say that we see the state as the key actor in degrowth transformations; it is to say that we see national state policies as one very important mechanism that, alongside action at the local and transnational levels, can facilitate such transformations.

Further to the observations in the previous sections, it should be recognised that degrowth processes unfold from the starting point of a regulatory architecture that spans several scales. State apparatuses existing on the local, national and transnational scales may act to block transformations, but potentially they could also come to play more positive roles. In our perspective, primacy should not be ascribed to state interventions on any one particular scale. Rather, state activities on various scales are important to degrowth transformations. Importantly, on each scale, the state would have different functions.

On the national scale, the state has a key role to play as a provider of ‘sustainable welfare’ (a matter we come back to in the next section) and more generally as an actor initiating a host of degrowth-compatible reforms and other activities in collaboration with civil society actors and businesses to ensure the respect of ecological and social limits in production and consumption patterns. Most eco-social policies, including, for instance, a reduction in working hours, most taxation and many green finance initiatives, would seem suitable for this scale. State power can also be used to build transnational networks connecting myriad local economies.

As regards the transnational scale, interstate collaboration would be important, for instance in the context of international bodies such as the United Nations, the OECD and the EU. Just as the capitalist national state would need to gradually be transformed into a degrowth state in order to come to play a positive role in the transition, international organisations – the bulk of which currently (at best) promote ‘green growth’ – would also need to be profoundly reformed. One reason the transnational scale is important in relation to degrowth transformations is that it is the scale at which local and national policies can be coordinated. Such coordination is crucial inasmuch as the adoption of a particular degrowth-compatible policy, say a tax on pollution, in one country may have no or detrimental effects if other countries introduce no such tax. In a similar vein, if a policy such as caps on income and wealth is not to result in capital flight on a major scale, it would either need to be implemented directly by international organisations or, if implemented by national states, be closely coordinated at the transnational level (Buch-Hansen and Koch 2019). Sustainable welfare, for instance, entails that some of the distributive principles underlying existing OECD welfare systems are extended to include people living in other countries and into the future (Brandstedt and Emmelin 2016). To make this happen, cooperation at the transnational scale would undoubtedly also be required.

It would also be important for the degrowth state to delegate powers to the local scale. This is the scale at which direct participatory democracy (complementing representative democracy) is most feasible and the scale at which degrowth initiatives tailored to local circumstances can be launched. As such it is a crucial scale. A range of eco-social policies may well be implemented at the local level, cases in point being policies related to funding of local degrowth-compatible businesses, many educational activities, transportation and housing provision.

In proposing that state action at multiple scales is important to degrowth transformations (see also Moore et al. 2014), and in linking the scales with particular eco-social policies, we do not mean to suggest that the relative importance of state activities at different scales would not vary over time and geographically. As regards the temporal aspect, it is conceivable that state action at the national level would be more important in early stages of degrowth transformations than later on. An example would be nationalising the currently enormous fossil energy sector as a precondition to a quick phase-out of the burning of oil, gas and coal² to retain any chance of meeting the Paris climate targets.³ As a corollary, the state’s wealth and power would increase in an initial phase, only to decrease again in sync with the disappearance of fossil energy extraction and the concomitant transition to renewable energy sources and their communalisation/localisation in a second phase. Smaller states may be acceptable as long as these are embedded in an economic system that provides relatively egalitarian outcomes and costs related to inequality, (unhealthy) work-life balances and environmental deterioration. During the transition, state policies would be indispensable to steer just transitions for those currently employed in the fossil fuel industries (Chapter 4). In the long term, the involvement of the state may be essential in safely handling technologically complex and expensive operations, such as management of nuclear waste, which cannot be handled by local communities.

In terms of geography, it is important to keep in mind that transformations start out from currently existing institutional arrangements, arrangements that vary considerably from one place to the next. That is, further to the observations regarding capitalist diversity and the importance of existing institutions to degrowth transformations that were made in Chapter 2, divergent non-identical driving forces are likely to initiate degrowth transformations in different countries, transformations that start out from different forms of capitalism. Keeping things simple, we can distinguish between three varieties of capitalism: a liberal, a state-led and a coordinated variety (Chapter 4; see also Buch-Hansen 2014). Countries currently characterised by the market-oriented liberal form of capitalism such as the UK, the US and Australia are premised on the view that competitive relations between businesses are essential to maximising wealth in society. The state generally does not intervene directly in markets but sets rules and settles conflicts. In such countries a broad movement in civil society initiating the transformation itself is a more likely scenario than it is that the state or a coalition of social forces cutting across the traditional class divide would initiate it.

Countries with state-led capitalism, in which the state, for example, intervenes in market relations to steer business development, is where the prospects of centrally steered initiations of degrowth transformations are most likely. Cases in point, at least in some respects, are France, Japan, Russia and China. State-led degrowth transformations are most likely in countries with strong social and intellectual movements that support these transformations and provide inputs to them. Thus, of the countries just mentioned, France is the more likely candidate to witness this sort of degrowth trajectory. In countries with coordinated capitalism, in which business relationships tend to be coordinated and network-based, the state typically does not intervene directly in the market. In such countries – the Scandinavian countries and Germany being cases in point – degrowth transformations could conceivably be initiated via broad societal compromise between governments and employers’ associations and unions, perhaps in alliance with various interest groups and social movements, such as the environmental movement.⁴

Our point is not to suggest that the degrowth trajectories just outlined are currently the most likely scenarios to unfold in the various types of capitalism (it follows from the argument in Chapter 3 that degrowth transformations are currently not very likely to happen on a societal scale). Rather, the point is that in some contexts, the national state is more likely to play a prominent role in facilitating such transformations than in others. Because of the diversity of the institutional frameworks in different types of capitalism, and because degrowth transformations would materialise through open-ended democratic processes, degrowth would take different forms in different settings.

Sustainable welfare, eco-social policies and self-transformations

The matter and energy throughput, and the associated ecological footprint of global society would need to shrink if it is to respect ecological limits. This concerns, above all, the rich countries, yet the populations of many developing countries also already live beyond their ecological means (Fritz and Koch 2016). Reduction of humanity’s ecological footprint, however, is not the end in itself to be achieved by any means possible. It should come together with the satisfaction of the basic needs of all. To pursue the achievement of this dual aim, several frameworks conceptualise a ‘space’ where ecological and social considerations meet (Rockström et al. 2009; Raworth 2017). Ecological considerations would ensure that the use of nature’s resources is below the level of planetary limits, while social considerations establish social boundaries whereby basic needs (but not hedonic wants) of all humans are satisfied. This resonates with the calls for ‘sustainable welfare’, which combines social welfare approaches with sustainability beyond economic growth (Koch and Mont 2016).

The satisfaction of human needs rather than hedonic wants is central both to sustainable welfare and degrowth (Koch et al. 2017; Büchs and Koch 2019).⁵ Needs differ from wants in that they are non-negotiable and universal (that is, they do not vary over time and across cultures) and that failure to satisfy these produces serious harm (Gough 2017). While needs are universal, how they are satisfied varies geo-historically (Max-Neef 1991; see also Chapter 7 for an empirical operationalisation based on a combination of academic/codified and practical knowledge). For instance, the need for food or subsistence was satisfied by hunter-gatherer communities via foraging, while the same need is most often satisfied by modern societies via global, industrial production and distribution of food mediated by money.

To achieve the satisfaction of the basic needs of all humans while staying within the ecological limits of the planet, corresponding policies need to be introduced. In the literature, state policies are frequently highlighted as mechanisms of key importance to bring about degrowth (e.g., Fitzpatrick et al. 2022). Many of the discussed policies are eco-social policies, that is, policies advancing at once ecological and social goals (Dukelow and Murphy 2022; Gough 2017). For example, slow travel by train may be less affordable than flying and thus unaffordable to many. As a result, many people fly. Subsidising train tickets can thus simultaneously serve the purpose of making transportation affordable to all as well as reducing the environmental impact of transportation. Caps on income and wealth, and income and wealth taxes, are likewise eco-social policies. They can at the same time reduce economic inequality via redistribution and prevent rich individuals from overconsuming and leading environmentally unsustainable lifestyles (Pizzigati 2018).

To ensure that the basic needs of all are satisfied, suggestions have been made for the introduction of a universal and unconditional basic income (e.g., van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017), the expansion/introduction of universal basic services such as housing, education, healthcare and transportation (e.g., Coote and Percy 2020), a voucher system (Bohnenberger 2020), or a combination of these policies (Büchs 2021). Implementation of such policies is an expensive undertaking which can initially be financed via greater taxation of wealth or caps on income and/or wealth. Proposals to place a cap on income usually suggest some quantitative proportion to minimum incomes such as 10:1 or 20:1 (Concialdi 2018; Martin et al. 2023). Beyond this, 100% taxation would take place. There is, however, no agreement about where exactly the cap level should be set and which forms of wealth should be targeted (Buch-Hansen and Koch 2019). Beyond suggesting income caps and wealth taxation as the policies which target the ecological aspects of consumption, other ecological policies include decarbonisation of energy supply, carbon rationing and protecting nature and the commons from the interests of multinational corporations (Büchs and Koch 2017).

Some policies target the quality of life and wellbeing beyond the satisfaction of basic needs. Working time reduction is an example of such a policy (Spencer 2022). Reduction of working time, combined with the reassurance that basic needs of a person are (and will be) satisfied, can free up time for engaging in, for instance, activism, spiritual pursuits and education. Education in itself is a sphere in need of reform. Currently, it is often the case that instrumental views of nature and other humans are promoted by the education system. Employability, or becoming appealing and useful to someone else’s pursuits of profit, rather than personal growth and responsibility towards the self, others and nature, is highlighted. Starting from the very first stages of formal education, environmental and social values need to be nurtured. This concerns the content of curricula as well as teaching spaces, forms and methods. For instance, nature- and art-based didactical traditions can be utilised alongside more traditional, classroom-based modes of interaction between teachers and students (Huizinga 1950; Macy and Johnstone 2022).

It is important to note that the policies identified above should not be seen in isolation from one another. No single policy can bring about degrowth transformation on its own. For instance, it may be unaffordable for governments to implement a universal basic income without wealth taxation in the longer term. Changing school curricula without reforming the labour market and creating space for a different way of running business (see Chapter 6) can create a mismatch between the graduates’ skills and employers’ desires. Enforcing carbon and income caps and thus reducing the possibilities for consumption would only result in frustration if humans are not encouraged to relate to the self, others and nature differently from the beginning of their life.

The challenge to implementing such policies is not a lack of knowledge about them or a lack of ideas. Yet, as mentioned, financing of a programme including a multitude, if not all, the policies identified above, would be enormously expensive. In the absence of GDP growth it is very likely that rich countries would experience tax losses despite the new sources of income deriving from, for instance, the taxation of wealth (Bailey 2015: 795). Combining sustainable welfare and deviation from GDP growth thus remains a challenge (Büchs 2021; Koch 2022b). One way to make financing easier is a new transnationally coordinated system of taxation which requires cooperation and solidarity between nations. Here, national governments would need to play active roles in achieving this new tax system and consider the interests of humanity as a whole rather than the interests of one’s own nation. The issue of financing comes with another challenge, that of orchestrating the eco-social policy cycle, that is, combining these policies in such a way which will result in synergies and ultimately in all humans’ needs being satisfied sufficiently and sustainably within nature’s limits (see e.g., Hirvilammi 2020).

In orchestrating the eco-social policy cycle, it is important to avoid glamorising these policies by assuming a direct and immediate link between their implementation and human wellbeing. It may well be that the process of implementation would be riddled with difficulties. Moreover, though basic human needs can presumably be met during the transition, many individuals may experience decreased subjective wellbeing, at least in the short term (Koch et al. 2017). Eco-social policies will significantly alter humans’ way of life. Though the current way of life is not ecologically sustainable or solidaric, it is familiar. Stepping on a different path may cause anxiety, fear and ultimately search for a new meaning (Frankl 2006) and one’s place in the world. Only if members of civil society self-transform are they likely to embrace a fundamentally different way of life. Importantly, the need for self-transformation applies well beyond civil society. Although it has unfortunately so far barely been recognised in the degrowth discourse, the role of the state regarding self-transformations is not limited to facilitating such transformation of the ‘subjects’ of the state (members of the civil society). It also includes nurturing self-transformations in individuals positioned within state apparatuses, including, for instance, politicians, judges and administrators.⁶

Currently, the green growth discourse continues to shape the worldviews and hence policymaking of many of these individuals – that is, provided any ecological and social reflections arise at all, which may typically not be the case with respect to, for instance, law enforcement and military personnel. Self-transformations of the state ‘from within’ entail largely the same self-transformations that would need to unfold in all the other members of society. As we have already discussed this in some detail in Chapter 4, suffice it to say that self-transformations would entail reflecting on one’s being part of the broader natural and social world. This reflection would involve acting in and upon the world correspondingly, with genuine concern and with immaterial values such as love, friendship, care, fellow-feeling, solidarity and empathy guiding one’s actions.

Such self-transformation ‘from within’ the state is necessary if the emergence of new state nobilities, that is, occupants of power positions in various government and administrative departments, is to be prevented. Even state philosophies (such as social democracy and communism) which claimed to have broad human interests in mind repeatedly led to the emergence of new state nobilities. Rather than tackling ecological and social issues, such individuals and their groups focused on defending their power against competing groups within the state bureaucracy. While the degrowth discourse insists on its inherent difference from other approaches and its genuine concern for all humans and nature, it is not immune to a similar unfolding of power relations. Discussions on how the focus on power can be discouraged beyond the call for self-transformations are important. Proposals may include limiting public office to a certain number of years and complementing the institutions of representative democracy with the elements of direct democracy.

In conclusion

In this chapter we have outlined a broad theoretical perspective on the state and used it to shed light on the state’s role both in capitalist social formations and in degrowth transformations. Our perspective, which seeks to transcend state-oriented and state-opposed thinking, entails viewing the state and civil society as strongly interconnected. Consequently, state policy is regarded as fundamentally shaped by social forces within and beyond the state. In this view, the state could come to play a positive – indeed crucial – role in degrowth transformations if a comprehensive coalition of social forces (a power bloc) united around the political project of degrowth were to gain sufficient momentum. The state can play an important role in facilitating self-transformations in civil society and business, yet it is equally important that such transformations occur within the individuals occupying positions in the state itself. It also follows from this perspective that any strategy for degrowth exclusively targeting civil society and not the state (or vice versa) is unlikely to be successful (Koch 2022a).

What, then, are the main differences between the capitalist state and the degrowth state? In capitalist circumstances, the growth paradigm delineates the limits for state action in economic, social and environmental domains to a significant extent. Environmental policies are feasible only so long as these do not undermine the overall growth orientation. Hence, state action is largely reduced to the facilitation of ‘green growth’. In a degrowth context, by contrast, the policy priority of achieving economic growth is replaced by the goal of moving the economy and society into a space where both ecological and social considerations are met. The economic, social and environmental policies of the state would be oriented towards minimising matter and energy throughput and maximising sustainable welfare, specifically the provision of sufficient need satisfiers for all people now and in the future. Another difference pertains to the nature of steering: although degrowth would probably require many policies oriented towards the national scale as well as transnational coordination, substantial powers would be delegated from the national to the local scale, where citizens can shape policies through direct participation.

Thinking about how different kinds of eco-social policies may be combined to initiate a new virtuous circle of policymaking in degrowth contexts is important (Hirvilammi 2020). Such thinking could be enriched by considering time and scale as we have done in this chapter. That is, the achievement of synergy across policies would need to go beyond the general orientation towards planetary boundaries and social floors and include concrete ideas at what scales (local, national, transnational) particular policies should be applied and in which temporal sequence.