Conclusion: shades of belonging and exclusion

Normatively, integration refers to the process by which immigrants become accepted into a society, both as individuals and as groups.¹ However it comes to be defined, the implicit assumption is that some degree of conformity represents 'successful' integration.² But conformity to what? Theories of segmented assimilation suggest that different groups of immigrants are confronted with the challenge of adapting to different parts of the social and class structure of the host society or have opportunities only to slot into particular spaces. The various kinds of adaptation documented throughout this book, as well as the range of barriers experienced by different groups, exemplify patterns of segmented assimilation in both Irelands. It can be seen in differentiated access to housing, employment and education. Some of this is influenced by stratifications in rights and entitlements experienced by migrants on arrival. Some of the differences between the experiences of some immigrants and others might be accounted for by racism. There is also significant evidence that pathways to assimilation or integration are shaped heavily by gender and class, so that patterns of employment, education and social interaction for any group or part of a group are affected not just by the characteristics of the migrant group, but by gender and class divisions in the host society.

Sociology is concerned (among other things) with understanding social reproduction, how society changes from one generation to the next in terms of values, culture and beliefs, and the relationships between this changing social structure and individual agency. Here, it is not just identity rules of belonging that matter but the capabilities that contribute to successful adaptation within a particular host society. Overlapping aspects are captured by concepts such as habitus, cultural capital, acculturation and capabilities. The characteristics, dispositions, skills and forms of knowledge understood to foster integration can change over time as well as differing from place to place. Some immigrants in both Irelands have considerably lesser rights or poorer options than many citizens. Some, because they do not speak English, do not have meaningful access to their rights and may

not be able to make use of education and skills they acquired in their countries of origin.

Of course, there are many marginalised people in both Irelands other than immigrants. It may not simply be the case that these lack human capital. They may also be disempowered by a relative lack of capabilities that confer upon them skills that might help them get on better in life.³ Amartya Sen has argued in his writings on capabilities that people make choices based on the information they have access to and can understand. He is critical of overtly simplistic accounts of human motivations proposed by economists that ignore 'all other motivations other than the pursuit of self-interest'.⁴ He argues that 'so-called rational choice theory' actually takes the rationality out of choice; it ignores the conditions, contexts and individual capabilities which inform the actual choices open to people.⁵ Education, from this perspective, is not just about conferring skills and qualifications. It potentially empowers people by enabling them to choose in a more informed way, to advocate on their own behalf and to be taken more seriously by others. Many parts of the world are generically modern, with comparable education, health and administrative systems, similar supermarkets, brands and mass-produced foods and goods, all sharing a globalised mass media. Well-equipped immigrants may even fare better from the outset than marginal groups within a given host society. Economic rules of belonging, where those with marketable skills find favour, do not just apply to migrants.

The basic capabilities needed by any immigrant (or indeed anyone else) seeking to avoid discrimination and find work that matches their skills, abilities and aspirations include various kinds of knowledge in addition to what economists call human capital. But not being able to speak the language of the host society places people at a huge disadvantage; they are utterly dependent on intermediaries in their own families and communities. There is a significant body of research which shows that dependency induced by language barriers leads to exploitation. Also, not having a secure legal status, being a so-called 'illegal immigrant' or an undocumented one, makes it very difficult for migrants to seek help and support.

There is, however, a need to understand language and rights as part of a broader sphere of capabilities. Immigrants and others who are failed by the education system are likely to become outsiders even if they have citizenship rights, even if they speak the language of the host community. Conversely, well-educated English-speaking immigrants may have considerable advantages over some members of the host community. Some may possess forms of cultural capital that are valued within the host society. Pierre Bourdieu defines cultural capital as skills and dispositions that confer advantage on a person in a given society.⁶ Cultural capital may be understood as a form of intellectual capital that affects the life chances of individuals even as it reproduces a specific social order. It confers status-enhancing

forms of knowledge, norms and habits. The unequal distribution of cultural capital is seen to result in cultural hierarchies (defined in terms of socio-economic status as well as in terms of ethnic or religious divides) alongside material ones.⁷

Various chapters have described how some immigrants experience initial periods of state-induced marginalisation, have become excluded from employment, are shunted towards disadvantaged schools or encounter racism. Others describe immigrant experiences that are in many respects positive ones. While there is an urgent need to address some institutional barriers, address discrimination and provide supports for vulnerable migrants, it is important to acknowledge that many immigrants are doing well, that their migration journeys have been successful ones, that many are making significant positive contributions to the societies in which they have settled, that many have experienced the communities into which they have settled as welcoming places, that the day-to-day problems many immigrants face are often the same as those experienced by anybody else.

Viable lives

The biggest challenge facing immigrants (or anyone else) is to build viable lives for themselves and their families. If they fail to do so (or are failed by institutional barriers or discrimination) this potentially sets up future inter-generational problems for the host society as well as those who come to be excluded. The term ‘functional integration’ denotes what migrants themselves might consider as viable lives in the host society, as distinct from the host society’s expectation of integration.⁸ Migrants might arrive in Ireland, or anywhere else, hoping to make a living or build better lives for their families at home. Some have clearly experienced dysfunctional and damaging levels of exploitation. Others might be part of a supportive community that is somewhat marginal within the host society, but within which day-to-day life is nonetheless socially and economically viable.

By such criteria, many immigrants on the island of Ireland are functionally integrated. Many are at least as well integrated as many Irish-born people. Ireland is a society where economic rules of belonging matter greatly and where cultural belonging has never stemmed emigration or other kinds of marginalisation. Irish Travellers, recognised as a marginalised community since the 1960s, are included in this book because the kinds of inequality that they have experienced in both the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland exceed those of other marginal Irish communities that have experienced intergenerational class inequality and social exclusion, those being compounded by racialised discrimination. The struggles of Pavee Point and other Traveller organisations to redress institutional discrimination in education, healthcare and in other areas of social policy have

had limited success and demonstrate the difficulties of challenging the structural barriers in these areas. The formal recognition of Traveller ethnicity by the Irish state in 2017 came after decades during which Irish politicians and political parties were complicit in anti-Traveller racism and during which Traveller cultural distinctiveness was denied by the Irish state. The situation of Travellers is in some ways analogous to those African Americans who continue to experience racism, disproportionate incarceration and a form of ghettoisation. Most are marginalised but there are a few Traveller music, film and sports stars as well as some public intellectuals and activists. Some Travellers have also done well in business but there is not much of a Traveller middle class.

The kinds of exclusion and marginalisation experienced intergenerationally by Travellers in education, employment, housing and health have proved exceedingly difficult to shift. The nature and extent of exclusion experienced by many Roma if anything exceeds that encountered by Travellers because of linguistic barriers and very low rates of literacy. A number of chapters in this book have highlighted anti-Roma racism, including attacks on Roma homes in Belfast and Waterford, and even the repatriation of Roma subject to organised racist harassment. We need always to be careful to avoid over-deterministic claims about the impact of racism on people's lives for all that there is an urgent need to take racism seriously in both Irelands. Otherwise what are we to make of the statement of one young Roma woman at a 2015 community event in Belfast that she loved living in Northern Ireland, which had been her home for the past fourteen years, and that she and her family felt safe and included there.⁹ It may well be the case that many Roma see themselves as living viable lives and, although many experience relative deprivation, their migration journeys to Ireland reflect a measure of success, particularly in offering better prospects for the next generation.

For many Roma in Ireland, the likelihood of future intergenerational marginalisation is all too real, not just because of racism but because of language deficits and poor education. Of the immigrant-origin communities examined in this book, the Roma perhaps experience the greatest accumulation of barriers even if, as EU member state citizens, they have most of the same rights as Irish citizens. Other groups can also be described as particularly at risk of intergenerational exclusion because of combinations of low levels of capabilities and racism and due to their assimilation in deprived neighbourhoods where long-term Irish residents are also marginalised.

Several chapters focus on those whose experiences of lesser rights and entitlements contribute to their marginalisation. The experiences of migrants have come to depend very much on how they are classified by the host society. Since 2004 migrants from the Eastern European countries that joined the EU at that time have settled in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland without hindrance. Others requiring visas from countries

such as the Philippines and India work in healthcare and other sectors and have become Irish citizens in large numbers. Tens of thousands from places like China and Brazil came as students and have been allowed to work during their stay.

By contrast – and unlike in most other EU countries including the United Kingdom – asylum seekers in the Republic of Ireland have been prevented from working. In 2017 the Republic of Ireland's Supreme Court ruled that this absolute ban was unconstitutional. The Burmese Rohingya man whose case led to the ruling had spent eight years in enforced unemployment before getting refugee status. At the time of writing, considerable institutional barriers remain which effectively prevent most asylum seekers from applying for a work permit. Various studies cited in Chapter 5 of the exceedingly high rates of unemployment among African-Irish have concluded that the long periods of compulsory joblessness experienced by asylum seekers, as well as 'severe racism', had much to do with this. Both Irelands are racist societies and institutional commitments to addressing racism in both jurisdictions have been weak.¹⁰

Many immigrant communities are internally stratified on the basis of social class. Alongside Indians, Pakistanis and Filipinos who have become citizens, homeowners and hold middle-class jobs, there are others who have migrated to both Irelands to do badly paid work. The Filipino care workers described in Chapter 6 worked for low pay but most had become Irish citizens. They were considerably better off than undocumented Filipinos interviewed in some other studies in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.¹¹ They had not fared as well as better-paid qualified nurses, many of whom had purchased houses and settled with their families in Ireland.¹²

The sole chapter in this book on Ireland's Muslim community focuses on young people who are far from the most marginalised within the Republic of Ireland's education system (although there are evident stratifications between the experiences of children of asylum seekers and other Muslims with secure residency status or Irish citizenship). There is some evidence to suggest that Muslims in both Irelands are on the whole not as economically marginalised as in some other European countries.¹³ Ireland's Muslim communities, both in the North and in the Republic, were founded and came to be led by medical students, some of whom became permanent residents or established the first mosques. The 2011 Northern Ireland Census identified some 3,832 Muslims.¹⁴ At 2002 the Republic's Muslim population stood at 19,147.¹⁵ Of these, around two thousand were medical doctors.¹⁶ The 2016 Census identified 63,443 Muslims living in the Republic. For several decades this community was decidedly middle class, different in profile from the Muslim communities in a number of other European countries which attracted many poorly educated post-colonial settlers, like France, or guest workers, like Germany. But by the turn of the century this profile had begun to shift. Ireland continued to attract Muslim medical students, doctors,

nurses and other middle-class professionals. However, others arrived to fill comparatively poorly paid jobs in service industries.¹⁷

The 2002 Census had identified 5,472 Muslims who were citizens of African countries. Most of these were asylum seekers. This number rose to 6,909 by 2006 and to 15,376 by 2011. A 2010 study of Somali Muslims who arrived as refugees found them living in deprived areas, experiencing high levels of unemployment because of language barriers and low levels of education, with their children finding the education system difficult.¹⁸ The settlement of some of the most vulnerable immigrants in Ireland's most disadvantaged urban localities sets up scenarios potentially similar to and as difficult to fix as those that have played out in other Western cities with marginalised immigrant-origin populations.

Chapter 12 examines evidence that immigrant-origin children have been disproportionately shunted into schools in disadvantaged areas, partly as a result of residence patterns and partly because of schools' admissions systems. One-quarter of African children were found to attend a disadvantaged school (compared with 9 per cent for the overall population) and one-quarter were likely to have limited fluency in English. It seems likely that children from such families were the ones most likely to find themselves living in poverty in disadvantaged areas and attending disadvantaged schools whereas the children of well-educated Africans, fluent in English and better off, may be less likely to be living in marginal areas or attending marginal schools. Some Africans are as such far more at risk of growing up as outsiders than others. Stratification along class lines is greatly exacerbated by the compounding factors of what Chapter 13 refers to as non-employment and labour market disadvantage, by lesser language fluency and low opportunity for residential and economic mobility, as well as by the lower overall capacity to escape the effects of institutional and direct racist discrimination.

Invisible lives

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of many new immigrant communities has been their near-invisibility within Irish society. Compared with many other European countries immigration stayed off the political radar, and political emphasis upon the integration of immigrants, which tends to be driven by host community anxieties about immigration, has been half-hearted at best. Many immigrant inhabitants of twenty-first-century Ireland are largely invisible to and within the major institutions of both jurisdictions, including within the media, within universities and within the political system. They go about their lives like anybody else. They exist below the radar, except sometimes as the focus of hostility. Comparison with the Irish in Britain during the decades after the Second World War is useful

here. There was some degree of acknowledgement that Irish-born immigrants encountered some hostility and discrimination but this is not recognised within legislation such as the Race Relations Act 1966. Irish-born people and their descendants who identified as Irish were statistically invisible; they were not counted (i.e. disaggregated) within administrative data that might identify the nature and extent of barriers or discrimination. This changed, thanks to activism by Irish groups in Britain along the lines of subsequent activism by Traveller organisations in Ireland. The Irish in Britain had to become politically visible before they could become visible to policymakers. Some community activists interpreted high levels of deprivation among the Irish as evidence of 'racial discrimination'. However, this discrimination fell outside the narrower definition of racism then prevalent in academic scholarship and the terms of reference of the Commission for Racial Equality.¹⁹ Similar issues might attend to xenophobia or anti-refugee sentiment in Ireland today.

To address this, community activists and academic researchers collected a substantial body of empirical evidence of experiences of institutional and individual discrimination among the Irish in Britain in areas such as education, policing and the criminal justice system, health and employment.²⁰ During the 1990s Irish organisations in Britain sought recognition of Irish ethnicity, believing that formal recognition and being counted in Census data were crucial to address forms of marginalisation. In many respects what these groups sought was similar to what Traveller organisations have since sought in the Republic of Ireland.

Many immigrant communities have established some degree of infrastructure in the form of places of worship, shops and community organisations. There are now a significant number of immigrant-led organisations in both Irelands. Some serve specific immigrant-origin communities (such as the Chinese Welfare Association in Belfast or Forum Polonia in Dublin); there are pan-African organisations such as the Africa Centre and single-issue collectives such as AkiDwa, which campaigns against female genital mutilation. Most immigrant communities have not mobilised as ethnic blocs like the Travellers or the Irish in Britain.

Poles, who are the largest immigrant-origin community in both the Republic and Northern Ireland, very quickly established a network of Polish-language schools. Their community activism appears to be very much focused on the Polish diaspora and on cultural events such as the now-annual Polski Eire festival. The shared Catholicism of Poles in both Irelands is potentially a rallying point. It is also likely that shared feelings of Polish nationalism work to foster a cohesive sense of Polish identity. None of this has translated yet into political influence in either of the two Irelands. Several Polish candidates stood unsuccessfully in the 2009 and 2014 local government elections and Forum Polonia has run voter registration campaigns. Although Poles constitute some 3 per cent of the population

of the Republic of Ireland, they punch politically far below their weight. Most have not become Irish citizens.

The second largest immigrant group as revealed by the 2016 Republic of Ireland Census were those born in the United Kingdom. Of a total of 124,267 some 53,183 of these were citizens of the United Kingdom. The third largest group, Lithuanians (36,552 in 2016), who also constitute a significant population in Northern Ireland (around 7,000), are strikingly invisible within both academic research and in policy debates. In compiling this book, we sought unsuccessfully to redress this. Most of the chapters in this book are built on specific doctoral studies, research projects by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or upon research commissioned by the state. Census data tell us that about a third of the Lithuanian population in the Republic live in the vicinity of Dublin and that many others live in counties on both sides of the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland. A number of studies of migrant exploitation in agriculture on both sides of the border appeared just before and after the Enlargement of the EU in 2004. These interviewed Lithuanians as well as migrants from other countries. In effect, these studies provided snapshots of people's lives at that particular time. The experiences of those who went on to settle on both sides of the border have not been tracked. In the absence of proper research all there is to go on are a few newspaper stories here and there. Some of those who initially worked as agricultural labourers are likely, a decade later, to be part of well-established Lithuanian communities in towns like Clones in County Monaghan. If an Irish government minister or their Northern Irish equivalent were asked how well have these integrated, or (our question) how and to what extent (if at all) are these outsiders? she could do no more than shrug her shoulders. Insofar as Lithuanian migrants are effectively invisible to elected officials, public services, NGOs and even academic researchers, their lives in Ireland are invisible ones.

A high proportion of non-EU-origin immigrants have become Irish citizens. These have yet to wield any discernible political influence. The sole exception is the Dublin 15 area, where there is a relatively high concentration of African immigrants. Several Nigerian candidates stood unsuccessfully against one another in the 2009 local government election and Congolese-born Edmund Lukusa, a Sinn Féin candidate, was elected in 2015. In Northern Ireland, Anna Lo successfully moved from leading the Chinese Community Welfare Association to chairing the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities, which she co-founded, before being elected as a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. She did so as a member of the Alliance Party, which stood apart from the two main host community ethnic blocs that dominate Northern Irish politics.

The invisibility of migrants within this political landscape is compounded by the ways in which administrative data are disaggregated. The use of the 'other' category in Northern Irish equality legislation and in policy

documents makes explicit outsiders of those who do not fit into the two main communities. Occasional panics about violent racism in Northern Ireland have, as Chapter 3 shows, resulted in the main work on anti-racism being located within policing and criminal justice, rather than in community development and social policy. Institutional responses to racism have been far poorer in the Republic of Ireland, where there has been little political or policy acknowledgement of either violent racism or other manifestations of racist discrimination.

One problem with thinking of immigrant communities as ethnic blocs is that it makes less visible those groups who have low numbers or are highly dispersed. Another is that it tends to emphasise the differences between groups, rather than the shared experiences along the lines of gender, age, class and within arrival contexts or subsequent systems of rules and rights. For example, LGBT Poles appear to have been marginalised within Polish civil society to some extent and may well identify primarily with lesbian and gay communities in Ireland that cross ethnic lines.²¹ Victims of female genital mutilation living in Ireland did not mobilise as Nigerians or Somali but as part of *AkiDwa*, a collective which brings together women from many different ethnic backgrounds. Multiculturalist approaches which have tended to favour ethnic blocs through political recognition or funding have, in places, achieved greater political visibility for migrants and subsequently greater recognition for rights, but in the absence of large numbers are less useful in creating institutions and services (as well as systems and rights) which can be equally inclusive of the heterogeneity within migrant groups.

The lens of 'superdiversity' offers an alternative approach.²² Places like London have been described as superdiverse, with immigrant populations from dozens of countries of origin. Ireland, with more than two hundred nationalities among its migrants and these highly dispersed across the country, may not look exactly like London but the concept of 'superdiversity' can still be applied. Some analysts have described a 'diversification of diversity' where national origin is not an adequate category to capture differences in religion, ethnicity and the main spoken languages.²³ Disaggregation of ethnic data has, in the UK, demonstrated the value of identifying subgroups which are extremely disadvantaged compared with others in the same ethnic or national group.

The Republic's 2016 Census identified migrant communities of more than 10,000 persons from 15 different countries, with communities from a further 25 countries of between 1,000 and 10,000 persons. To put this into historical perspective, the Republic now has perhaps two dozen immigrant communities that are already larger than its Jewish community, which dates back to the late nineteenth century. But the word 'community' may not capture the religious, linguistic and cultural diversity to be found among migrants from some countries of origin. For example, many Lithuanian nationals are in fact ethnic Russians and form part of a Russian Orthodox

religious community alongside migrants from other Baltic states. It is useful to be able to recognise differences between Catholic Igbo, Pentecostal Christians and Muslims among the Nigerian-Irish population. In places like Dublin 15, Nigerians with different religious and cultural backgrounds live alongside other Africans as well as migrants from many other countries. All settled in Dublin 15 because of the availability of housing there at a particular time, a factor that also accounts for 'superdiverse' immigrant communities in some inner urban areas in Belfast as well as inner city Dublin. Chapters 4 and 7 respectively address how some migrants may choose superdiverse areas for safety and convenience while others seek to settle in more homogeneous areas, perhaps because these are more middle class.

Superdiversity is a useful concept in thinking about the needs of diverse immigrant populations that include groups that are, in effect, invisible to policymakers. It would not make sense for the Republic or Northern Ireland to design policies aimed at supporting immigrants by configuring these separately for all immigrant communities. However, lessons about barriers encountered by specific groups can be extended to address the needs of other groups. While Traveller-specific issues can be identified in areas such as healthcare, education and housing, it is also the case that similar institutional barriers apply to the Roma. Other kinds of barrier experienced by Roma might also apply to other immigrant groups, and so on. It is crucial that public services, schools and healthcare for diverse or superdiverse communities become fit for purpose. Yet various chapters have described the policy approach of 'mainstreaming' as failing the minority groups it is designed to serve.²⁴ In essence, lip service is paid to the idea and the work to design services and guarantee access to these on an equal footing for everyone has yet to be done. Examples of good mainstreaming practice that might be drawn on include FGM and HIV sexual health campaigns aimed at supporting people from many different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.

Integrated lives

Media debates about integration tend to fixate on culture, that is, on the ability (or not) of immigrants to fit in with the culture of the dominant ethnic group. New immigrants may not be particularly interested in becoming Irish, either of the two main kinds of Northern Irish or British, initially at least. This, we have argued, is not necessarily a problem when it comes to achieving functional integration. However, racism and xenophobia can have much to do with how immigrant-origin minorities are perceived within the host society or, as examined in Chapter 10, how they are represented in the media.

There are two good reasons why immigrants should become citizens if possible in the places where they settle. The first, addressed in the previous

section, is that people who vote are taken more seriously by politicians than people who don't. Those who are not entitled to vote in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland include the vast majority of immigrants from EU member states. Poles may constitute the largest immigrant-origin community in both jurisdictions, but they are politically irrelevant.

The second reason is that citizenship has a symbolic value. Insofar as more than 150,000 immigrants, most from non-EU countries, have taken out citizenship of the Republic of Ireland since 2011 they have empirically shifted what it is to be a member of the Irish nation. The Enlargement of the EU in 2004 coincided with a Referendum in the Republic on citizenship in which almost 80 per cent of those who voted endorsed a proposal to remove an existing constitutional right to Irish citizenship from the Irish-born children of immigrants. During the Referendum debate Irish citizens were generally referred to in the media as 'nationals' and immigrants as 'non-nationals'. Unlike in the United Kingdom there has been, to date, no significant political backlash against the removal of all controls on migration from the new EU member states. Voters in the Referendum inevitably drew on their own strong preconceptions of what it was to be Irish.²⁵ They did not need to reach for actual blood and soil justifications for their beliefs in national distinctiveness in order to draw such conclusions. Almost 80 per cent of those who voted in the Referendum apparently declared to immigrants: 'we're Irish, you are not'.

However, national identities are malleable political and institutional inventions that can be reinvented. Nations, as Benedict Anderson put it, are imagined communities and they have come to be reimaged over time.²⁶ The challenge for the Republic is how best to foster future social cohesion through more inclusive conceptions of Irishness – by turning immigrants into Irish citizens (which has begun to happen), and perhaps, over time, by shifting the centre of gravity of Irish identity a bit – as well as through social policies that leave nobody behind.

This is, as examined in the previous chapter, no simple task but it is much easier to see how this might work in the Republic than in Northern Ireland, where sectarian divisions and profound political disagreements about national identity persist. Here and there in writings about immigrants in Northern Ireland there is a sense of hope that somehow their presence might dilute sectarian divisions, by mixing up what it means to be Northern Irish a bit. But then there is the old joke told in Neil Jordan's film *Angel*, where a Jewish policeman is asked whether he is a Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew.

While racist attacks on immigrants have been predominantly associated by the media and researchers with loyalists it also seems that many immigrants have settled successfully in Protestant neighbourhoods. It seems more difficult for immigrants to settle in socio-economically deprived Protestant or Catholic localities than into middle-class ones. Those who settle in

disadvantaged localities, whether in Northern Ireland or the Republic, do so because they cannot afford to do otherwise or because they lack the necessary social capital and cannot read the lay of the land.

The Republic of Ireland has so far managed to avoid the kinds of toxic anti-immigrant politics that now plays out in many other Western democracies. It has no history of successful anti-immigrant political parties akin to France's *Front Nationale* or influential ones like the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Britain's decision to leave the European Union was driven, to a considerable extent, by opposition to the free movement of migrants from the post-2004 enlarged European Union. A majority of those who voted in Northern Ireland in the 2016 referendum on whether to leave the EU voted not to do so. As noted in Chapter 3, British debates about racism have had some normative influence in Northern Ireland. However, policy and legislative debate have been to a considerable degree influenced by the need to address local legacies of sectarianism, and the legislative consequence of equality policies that corral significant diversity under the category of 'other'.

The politics of immigration in Northern Ireland cannot be detached from the wider UK context. Several chapters address the implications of sectarianism in Northern Ireland for immigrant communities. There is a sense, examined in Chapters 2 and 3, that institutional preoccupations with sectarianism within the host communities have undermined responses to racism. Migrants quoted in Chapter 4 (African refugees) and Chapter 7 (Polish women) were keenly aware of the spatial segregation of Belfast into Protestant and Catholic areas. The case studies considered in Chapter 7 suggest that some Catholic Poles were unwilling to live in, as they saw it, more deprived Catholic areas, or to live in areas where there were many non-white immigrants.

In the Republic, there has been little evidence of an equivalent anti-immigrant political populism, at least at the time of writing. Yet there is an increasing anxiety about integration and failure to address far-right posturing, such as the occasional appearance of British and European far-right groups and attempts to create racial tensions in places like Drogheda or Balbriggan with racist posters in town centres and videos online. Fear of violent racism among some migrants is growing, as Chapter 4 notes, with African taxi drivers afraid that the racist abuse they now experience on a regular basis will end in injury or loss of life.²⁷ In Northern Ireland also, failure to address racism in employment has left even many highly skilled migrants, now fluent in English, trapped in low-paid and insecure jobs since few can access the graduate-level positions for which they are qualified.²⁸

Migrants can be highly adaptable and, as we see repeatedly in this book, can at times respond to their problems in ways that sometimes circumvent or work around mainstream institutions. First-generation migrants are often preoccupied with establishing a foothold and may have obligations

to provide for family members in their countries of origin as well as where they settle. The international experience is that the children of newcomers (the second generation) tend to acculturate to a greater extent than their parents. However, the degree to which such children acculturate tells us little about their capacity to deal with economic barriers or discrimination they will face in the future. What is certain, however, is that deliberate and unwitting institutional barriers can foster intergenerational exclusions and turn some migrants and their descendants into 'outsiders'.

We do not see integration or assimilation as having an endpoint of complete acculturation, but rather envisage incremental processes that play out alongside changes in wider society. The aim of any integration project should be to reduce the extent to which the host society treats immigrants as outsiders as well as to reduce the extent to which immigrants think of themselves as outsiders. However, it is not enough to change perceptions. Concrete measures are needed in both Northern Ireland and the Republic to strengthen socio-economic and political inclusion. For example, it is important that immigrants be encouraged to become teachers, civil servants, members of trade unions, members of political parties and become elected representatives; in short, to achieve full and equal citizenship.

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