

Pitt and Newcastle (1760–1762): war and peace

George II died suddenly on 25 October 1760, at the age of seventy-seven. His ministers were taken unawares. Paymaster Henry Fox wrote caustically afterwards of the Privy Council that day: ‘I am of opinion they were as much unprepared as if the late King had been only 25, and seemed to have determined nothing’.¹ Bute, by contrast, had prepared a Proclamation for the young King, making a reference to the ‘bloody and expensive war’, which Pitt insisted on altering before publication to ‘expensive but just and necessary war’. Lord Egmont, a Leicester House man, commented that this converted a declaration ‘implying a disposition to peace, into one which imported ... a strong adoption of the war’.² During the day George III suggested to Bute that he should take ministerial office, seemingly as Northern Secretary in place of Lord Holderness, but Bute declined, so the King recalled on 6 March 1761, ‘as not chusing to throw himself into so much business and not knowing what the other ministers might think of it’.³ That discussion presumably preceded one that Bute had with Pitt in the evening, when he announced that his aim was to be ‘a private man at the side of the King’. Pitt made it clear he would not accept Bute as head of the ministry, and he threatened resignation if there was any change in war policy.⁴ Pitt knew he had the whip hand, as Lord Egmont noted. ‘Pitt seems not serene, but bears it higher from the natural turn of his insolent temper, and from a supposition that his popular interest with the mob and the Tories, will force him to be continued in his office, at least during the continuance of the war’. But the Duke of Newcastle looked ‘as if he was quite sunk, ... agitated in his mind. All his adherents confounded.’⁵ Pitt’s refusal to serve under Bute ensured the Duke’s continuance at the Treasury. The offer was made through Bute on 27 October. Newcastle consulted his

friends, lamenting that he had ‘lost the best King, the best Master, and the best friend that ever subject had. God knows what consequences it may have.’⁶ The Duke of Devonshire told him ‘he owed it to his friends and the Whig Party who would be broke to pieces and turned adrift’.⁷ Mansfield and Bedford were among others with similar advice, and Pitt let Newcastle know that he wanted the Duke at the Treasury. Only Hardwicke thought he would be wiser to retire. On 31 October, having been assured he would have ‘the choice of the new Parliament’, Newcastle decided to retain the Treasury.⁸ Pitt from the first suspected that Bute’s intention was ‘to be *the* Minister behind the curtain’.⁹ For the moment Bute took only a household post as Groom of the Stole, but with a seat in the cabinet. This was so as to report back to the King, as Bute told Pitt on 27 October. ‘The King would have no meetings held at which he [Bute] was not present.’¹⁰

Politicians who had sought the mere acquiescence of George II found themselves with a King eager to play a positive role in government. Instead of a septuagenarian there was a young man of twenty-two on the throne, one with a mind of his own. Lord Egmont soon noticed the new monarch’s distinctive stance. ‘The King is advised to keep every body at a distance but with shew of great civility and courtesy but to endeavour to fix a character of being immoveable in his determination.’¹¹ George III was a busy politician, keenly interested in day to day events, with opinions on policies and personalities. It is impossible to ascertain how many of the ideas and suggestions to be found in his correspondence had been put into his head either by way of conversation or by letters that no longer survive. He soon shook off his early emotional dependence on Bute, and it became his frequent but not invariable habit to pre-empt cabinet meetings by making his opinions known in advance. The new King already had clear views on foreign policy and on Ireland, and later formulated others on such matters as America and India. Yet his personal feelings towards individual politicians sometimes caused him to appoint or dismiss ministers regardless of his opinion of their policies. He developed a strong antipathy to the Duke of Bedford and to George Grenville, whose views respectively on international peace and imperial organisation accorded closely with his own. In 1765 he dismissed them from office on personal as much as constitutional grounds, ironically replacing them with the political heirs of ‘the Whig oligarchy’ whose removal from power had been his guiding political principle on his accession. For George III then sought peace not only because of his abhorrence of bloodshed, but also to have the opportunity to

deal with the wicked and corrupt men whom he thought had subverted the working of the excellent British constitution.

There was at first no dichotomy between men and measures. George III began his reign with the simple plan of making Bute his Prime Minister, as the key to the implementation of his political ideas. His former tutor was genuinely reluctant to play the part, because of a well-founded diffidence about his aptitude for the post, and because of his distaste for the rough and tumble of politics, which for a Scottish royal favourite proved to be very rough indeed. Unfounded rumours of a scandalous liaison with the King's mother, the Dowager Princess of Wales, increased the unpopularity of a man whose haughty demeanour did nothing for his public image. Already in November 1760 Lord Egmont noted the popular reaction. 'Strange talk of B—e and the P—ss, verses and indecent prints published, even in the avenues to the Play house the mob crying out no Scotch Government, No Petticoat Government, in the very hearing of the King as he passes along.'¹²

That presaged the future. Pitt's veto on Bute, reflecting his own current indispensability as war minister, prevented his immediate elevation to the head of the administration, even though many politicians flocked to his standard to win favour with the new young King. War and peace dominated the immediate political agenda. How to negotiate a peace that would convert temporary acquisitions into permanent gains was the immediate problem, one thrown into sharp relief by the intransigent attitude of Britain's own hard-pressed ally. Frederick II of Prussia was stubbornly refusing to yield any territory by treaty, however much was occupied by his enemies. France, if now reinforced by Spain, would hold out for better terms than the course of the war so far might seem to warrant. Choiseul was known to be planning another Rhineland campaign for 1761. The German war therefore had to be continued to preserve Britain's overseas gains.¹³

Just at this very moment Pitt's military strategy came under attack with the publication in November 1760 of a famous and influential pamphlet by woollen-draper Israel Mauduit, *Considerations on the Present German War*. The whole concept of a continental campaign was condemned as contrary to British interests, a diversion from the contest with France, a contention reinforced by the claim that Britain was paying Frederick to fight only his own enemies. Instead of a military defence of Hanover Britain should simply demand its return at the end of the war, after conquering the entire French overseas empire. The cost and seeming futility of the German war during the next year or so seemed to provide confirmation of this argument,

which was echoed in Parliament and cabinet as well as the press. ‘After having twice had honourable mention made of me in the House of Lords; and after having twenty times heard myself speaking through other men’s mouths in the House of Commons’, Mauduit recalled the significance of his pamphlet when writing to claim his reward from Bute on 27 December 1762, after all was over.¹⁴

That the King held the same opinion was demonstrated by his speech to Parliament on 18 November and by his later intimation to his ministers that Hanover need not be defended from French attack. But for the moment Pitt’s direction of war policy was not challenged, and Bute sided with him against Newcastle when the Belleisle expedition was approved at a cabinet meeting on 11 November.¹⁵ Before the end of the year lack of success in Germany led Newcastle to concur with Pitt’s wish for a ‘proper and timely operation’ elsewhere to boost national morale.¹⁶ The Duke accepted that ‘if we cant make peace, we must try our fate with expeditions ... and beat France into a peace’.¹⁷ At a cabinet meeting of 31 December 1760 to plan future campaigns two major new initiatives were agreed. The army in Canada would be redeployed to the West Indies, primarily to attack Martinique, France’s chief naval base there. The other project was the capture of the Île de France (Mauritius), a French island in the Indian Ocean that provided support for campaigns in India. Nor could the German war be neglected, since the French would seek to trade off any gains there against colonial losses, and early in 1761 sufficient reinforcements were sent there to produce the strategic aim of a stalemate.¹⁸

Harmony on war strategy failed to conceal divisions within the ministry. Newcastle was discovering that he was often not being consulted on patronage, the traditional prerogative of the Treasury. He was also concerned about the anomalous position of Bute, who was wielding political power without the responsibility of office. Above all the Duke was anxious to ensure that he would have the management of the general election due by March 1761. He had retained the Treasury on such a promise, and told Lord Chesterfield on 29 November 1760 that ‘the securing of a good Parliament is my great and first object’.¹⁹

Both Pitt and Bute, from different motives, were content to allow Newcastle to manage the election campaign. Electioneering was not Pitt’s kind of politics, and he had told Hardwicke on 29 October that ‘for his part, he did not desire the chusing of a new Parliament, but only to have some of his friends taken care of’.²⁰ Bute was aware that he lacked the Duke’s expertise and experience, and knew that management of the election was a point of no consequence. ‘The new

Parliament would be the King's, let who will choose it', he thought, and that veteran politician Lord Bath, the former William Pulteney who had led the Commons opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, opined that Newcastle would 'soon find that his supposed friends were only the friends of his power, and will continue firm to him no longer than while he has the possession of the means of gratifying them'.²¹ Newcastle missed the warning signs, that during the election campaign there were numerous individual desertions of the old minister for the young King and his favourite. Bute himself gave the Duke the names of only three candidates, at a meeting on 4 February 1761, having shed his earlier vague and exaggerated ideas about the number of seats to which the Crown could nominate. Newcastle's lists of the new House of Commons, gradually elected over several weeks after the dissolution of the old one on 20 March 1761, which gave him great satisfaction at the time, bore little relation to political alignments in the subsequent Parliament. That was indeed 'the King's', giving majorities to five successive ministries, three of which the Duke opposed. Most of those whom he deemed 'friends' in 1761 proved to be government men not Pelhamites, personal followers of the Duke, a distinction he would indeed not then have recognised.

By the time of the general election Bute had become Northern Secretary, the post he had refused from George III at his accession and again when pressed by his friends in November; but he had since changed his mind, after membership of the cabinet. The initiative came from Newcastle. 'We all thought, that considering his known might and influence, it was better for the public, and for us, that he should be in a responsible office, rather than do everything and answer for nothing.'²² Holderness was willing to quit the post, but Pitt objected that favourites should not become ministers. Not until Pitt suffered a two-month illness could the proposal be implemented, Bute being formally appointed on 25 March. Pitt subsequently complained to Newcastle on 9 April that this had been done 'without concert with him; that he would overlook it and would go on with good humour'.²³

Bute had already been acting as virtual Premier with regard to cabinet appointments. It was he who in January 1761 arranged the elevation of Lord Henley from Lord Keeper to Lord Chancellor, a post entailing membership of the cabinet.²⁴ And it was Bute who on 12 February offered Pitt's ally Lord Temple, then Lord Privy Seal, the Viceroyalty of Ireland. The following conversation was reputed to have ensued. 'I suppose your Lordship does not mean to look upon

me as a bare Groom of the Stole. The King will have it otherwise.’ To which Lord Temple replied, ‘Certainly so. I look upon you as a Minister and desire to act with you as such’.²⁵ Bute suggested ‘a permanent system’ of ‘harmony and union with him and Mr. Pitt’.²⁶ Such an alliance, the prospect of which made Newcastle tremble, was never on the cards. Temple was critical of Newcastle for having allowed Bute to undermine his authority as Premier, so he told Devonshire. ‘After having been the Minister of the Country, to continue when the whole power was taken from him.’ Temple himself had been insulted by the offer. ‘If they had a proper consideration for him, why did they not offer him First Lord of the Treasury, or Secretary of State. He believed he should not have accepted either. But to make him that was Privy Seal, Knight of the Garter and so popular in this country such an offer, it was an affront.’ Temple, who owed all his consequence to his brother-in-law Pitt, thought in his conceit that the two of them were the essential political fulcrum of any ministry, whether they were allied to Bute, Newcastle or the King’s uncle the Duke of Cumberland.²⁷ When Temple eventually declined Ireland, the post of Lord-Lieutenant went to Lord Halifax, President of the Board of Trade since 1748, who asked Bute for it on 2 March.²⁸

Contrary to appearances and expectations, however, it was not Bute who dismissed Henry Legge as Chancellor of the Exchequer without compensation of honour, office or pension. That step, Bute told Newcastle on 4 February, was insisted upon by the King himself. Legge had offended George III by personally and successfully opposing Bute’s intended candidate in a 1759 Hampshire by-election. Legge had compounded his offence by failing to join the stampede of those who flocked to pay homage to the favourite in 1760. Instead he asked for ‘marks of respect’, having a high opinion of his own ability and seemingly a low one of Pitt, for he spoke disparagingly of wild men ‘with great powers of speech and no *real* knowledge of business’.²⁹ Bute thought highly of him, and in a letter to Newcastle disclaimed all responsibility for Legge’s dismissal, which took place in March 1761. ‘That it was the King’s own disgust and dislike to the man, that it was not his (Lord B’s) doing. That his own real opinion was that it was most advisable to let him stay in till the end of the war’.³⁰

It was an awkward time to fill such an important post. Newcastle had earlier thought George Grenville the only other possible candidate, but Pitt now declined to push his brother-in-law’s application, a rebuff that widened their estrangement. Grenville had already offended Pitt by successfully sounding Bute and Newcastle about the

vacant Commons Speakership, held throughout George II's reign by Arthur Onslow.³¹ Legge was replaced by Secretary at War Lord Barrington, always willing to turn his hand to anything. The highly talented but unreliable Charles Townshend moved from a court post to the War Office. These appointments both put square pegs in round holes. Barrington lacked financial skills, and Townshend the steady application required for his onerous task.

The ministry was now more openly a triumvirate. Newcastle had wanted Bute to balance Pitt as co-Secretary, and promised his support 'in case Mr Pitt ... and he should differ'.³² Matters did not work out as he anticipated. Bute was content to allow Pitt the conduct of the war, but increasingly encroached on Newcastle's control of patronage. The Duke found himself often being ignored or simply told what to do.³³ When he unburdened his grievances on Hardwicke, he received the unhelpful reply from his old friend on 8 August that the time for him to resign had been at the change of sovereign. 'If your Grace quits now, it must be either upon reasons of *personal usage* or of *public* measures.'³⁴ By contrast Bute developed a confidential and even supportive relationship with Pitt, who now decided to cancel the proposed expedition to the Île de France. Eyre Coote's victory at Wandewash in January 1760 had ended French power in southern India and removed the worry about the French base in the Indian Ocean. Another consideration, so Pitt told Bute on 13 March, was the danger of a war with Spain. 'We may want our great ships.'³⁵ No such objection applied to the Belleisle expedition, which should yield a dividend for the peace negotiations now proposed by France and agreed to by Britain on 7 April.³⁶

Throughout these negotiations of April to September 1761 the British cabinet remained divided as to what terms should be demanded. Pitt announced that his minimum stipulation was for North America and the entire Newfoundland cod fishery, and that he would continue the war rather than make colonial concessions to save or regain Hanover. When Newcastle replied that France would certainly demand a share in the fishery, Pitt threatened to make it a resignation issue.³⁷ That Pitt also wished to retain the French slave trade ports of Senegal and Gorée in West Africa, taken in 1758, and to regain Minorca in the Mediterranean, was less a matter of concern to the Duke. Pitt's basic aim was to weaken France as much as possible, to guard against a future war of revenge. His desire for a monopoly of the cod fishery was to deprive France of a famous 'nursery of seamen' as much as from economic motives. Since Choiseul was already planning such a war of

revenge, based on the reconstruction of the French navy, even before the peace was agreed, Pitt displayed sounder judgement than the Duke of Bedford. That Duke feared that France would be alienated by too severe terms, and objected to Pitt's apparent idea of retaining every conquest. Bedford displayed more shrewdness in his expectation of trouble from Britain's American colonies if the French threat from Canada was removed, and pointed out that French planters would be difficult to control in any conquered West Indies islands. Bedford also voiced fears that British monopolies of the West Africa slave trade ports and of the Newfoundland fishery would equally lead to widespread resentment in western Europe.³⁸ Bedford soon had the reputation of wanting a bad peace after a good war. Bute on the other hand took the view that George III dare not begin his reign with a treaty that failed to reflect the wartime triumphs. Bute sympathised far more than tradition has it with Pitt's desire to make worthwhile gains, and even sided with him at first over the fishery. Despite George III's public desire for peace the King's prestige had to be safeguarded.

Choiseul began the peace negotiations with a genuine desire to cut France's losses in the disastrous war, albeit with the long-term objective of revenge. But his ally Austria was not interested, being by 1761 confident of victory over Prussia, while Spain's increasingly evident willingness to support France in the current conflict meant that Choiseul was soon involved in simultaneous negotiations for making peace and continuing the war. He began with the realistic proposal for a treaty based on the status quo at specified dates in the future. The chief negotiations took place in Paris between Choiseul and British envoy Hans Stanley, whose hand was soon strengthened by news of the capture of Belleisle on 8 June. Choiseul was prepared to cede Canada, except for the retention of Cape Breton Island as an unfortified fishing base, and this concession ended the lingering Canada-Guadeloupe argument in Britain. The exchange of Belleisle for Minorca was suggested by Britain, who offered to restore Guadeloupe if France would evacuate the Rhineland. But the British cabinet, at a meeting on 24 June, split on the fishery question. Newcastle and Bedford were not prepared to continue the war for that reason, with Bedford warning that the German campaign might collapse during the haggle over that issue. Pitt and Temple were supported by Bute, who was afraid that Pitt would engross all popularity by his stand, but also was himself genuinely concerned that concession of the fishery and the sugar islands of the West Indies would mean that Britain gained little economically.³⁹ On 5 August Choiseul stated his final

terms, some fishing rights with a base other than Cape Breton Island, and a refusal to evacuate the Prussian Rhineland.⁴⁰ On 19 August the British cabinet did concede a fishery, as Pitt gave way after Bute had changed his opinion, but it was too late. For on 15 August France and Spain signed a so-called Bourbon Family Compact, whereby Spain secretly promised France military and naval assistance if the peace negotiations failed. Choiseul promptly lost interest in them, for increasingly he had merely been flying a kite to see what terms Britain would offer.

The British government faced up to reality on 15 September by recalling peace envoy Stanley from Paris, but Pitt's colleagues refused to accept his demand for an immediate declaration of war on Spain, who was obviously arming but not yet ready. Anson said there were not enough ships, while Bedford and Newcastle raised financial objections.⁴¹ Two further cabinet meetings of 18 and 21 September failed to resolve this deadlock, and it was agreed to await the return from Paris of Stanley, since he might have more information on the Family Compact. Meanwhile, on 24 September the cabinet members opposed to Pitt each informed George III of their opinions.⁴² Stanley, when interviewed by the King on 30 September, gave it as his opinion that Spain would declare war, but George III thought he had been 'tutored' or awed by Pitt.⁴³

The decisive cabinet meeting was on 2 October. Pitt argued that Britain was ready for war whereas Spain was not, and that her underhand behaviour had forfeited any claim to diplomatic courtesy. Of the other nine present, only Temple supported him. Newcastle warned of the vast cost. Bute said it was folly to assume Spanish hostility. Anson again stressed his lack of ships, implying that Pitt's idea of a pre-emptive strike was impractical. Pitt then declared that as Southern Secretary he dealt with Anglo-Spanish relations, and 'would be responsible for nothing but what he directed'.⁴⁴ Pitt formally resigned on 5 October, when he assured the King that he would not oppose the ministry 'unless he was attacked', an easy and ominous qualification.⁴⁵ Pitt accepted an annuity of £3,000, together with a peerage for his wife as Lady Chatham, because he was short of money. Grenville had told Bute so, but George III, far from adopting a cunning plan to ruin Pitt's reputation, was reluctant to bestow these rewards.⁴⁶ The episode led to rumours that the great war minister had been bribed to resign, to clear the path to power for Bute. Pitt therefore issued a public statement, in the form of a letter of 15 October to London MP William Beckford that was sent to the newspapers,

pointing out that he had resigned on a difference of policy and that only afterwards was he offered rewards by his sovereign.⁴⁷

Pitt's colleagues deemed a Spanish war too high a price to pay for his continuance in office, but Newcastle for one soon expressed awareness of the loss of the successful war minister, commenting to Hardwicke on 15 November. 'With all his faults we shall want Mr Pitt, if such a complicated, such an extensive war is to be carried on; I know nobody who can plan, or push the execution of any plan agreed upon, in the manner Mr Pitt did.'⁴⁸ For the same reason, Bute had sought to prevent rather than provoke Pitt's resignation, frankly admitting the motive to Newcastle. 'If we had any views of peace, he should be less solicitous what part Mr Pitt took, but that as a continuance of the war seemed unavoidable ... we should do what we could to hinder Mr Pitt from going out and thereby leaving the impracticability of his own war upon us.'⁴⁹ When Lord Melcombe congratulated Bute on the removal of 'a most impracticable colleague ... and a most dangerous minister', Bute replied that he was 'far from thinking' the change 'favourable', explaining that 'the change of a Minister cannot at present make any remarkable change in measures'.⁵⁰ The old view that Bute was now determined to make peace at any price is as erroneous as the one that Bute deliberately engineered Pitt's fall.⁵¹

Bute and Newcastle faced the problem of replacing Pitt, whose resignation had deprived the administration of both its war minister and Commons Leader. Bute, believing in the need to match Pitt in debate, proposed Paymaster Henry Fox. Newcastle said he was too unpopular, and suggested Grenville. Bute at first rejected this idea, since Grenville 'had not a manner of speaking which would do against Mr Pitt'.⁵² Bute soon changed his mind, and with Newcastle's concurrence asked Grenville to fill the double vacancy left by Pitt. Grenville, though now finally breaking with Pitt, for obvious reasons of personal delicacy declined to succeed his brother-in-law as Southern Secretary; but he was persuaded by George III to become Commons Leader, with a seat in the cabinet, while retaining his old post as Treasurer of the Navy.⁵³

The new Southern Secretary was a surprise appointment, the Earl of Egremont, a man who at the age of fifty-one was devoid of administrative experience and had played little part in politics. He was recommended, possibly through Lord Mansfield, by Grenville, who had married his sister. When Bute mentioned him to the Duke of Devonshire, the latter replied that he was 'a very good and proper man', but warned that the Duke of Bedford would be offended, in view of his

experience as Southern Secretary from 1748 to 1751, and also at the Admiralty (1744–48) and in Ireland (1757–61). Bute replied that he suspected a ‘league’ between Bedford and Newcastle, which Devonshire denied. Bute then made the point that ‘if a man who was thought ready to make any peace was to have Mr Pitt’s place, it would be very unpopular’. Despite this apprehension of Bute that the bestowal of office on the Duke of Bedford would give the ministry too pacifist an image, he was given the cabinet post of Lord Privy Seal vacated by Lord Temple on his resignation with Pitt.⁵⁴

The reconstructed ministry had inherited Pitt’s war. Newcastle had no doubt as to what ought to be done. The Duke had always been the foremost advocate of a continental campaign, and in November he endorsed Pitt’s famous boast about winning America in Germany by contending that America would now have to be defended there, to prevent colonial conquests being exchanged for territorial losses in Europe.⁵⁵ He was faced by colleagues who took a different view. At once he was deprived of the support in cabinet of such friends as Hardwicke and Devonshire by a Bute proposal that all policy matters should first be discussed by ‘a cabinet council’ of four, Newcastle, Grenville, Egremont and himself.⁵⁶ Newcastle told Hardwicke on 8 October that while he approved ‘the narrowing the council ... I can never think it reasonable, that the first concoction should be confined to us four, where I am sure to have three against one’.⁵⁷ By the end of the month he believed he was being excluded altogether, writing to Devonshire on 31 October that ‘every day convinces me more and more that my Lord Bute intends to confine the first *concoctions* of affairs to himself, Lord Egremont and Mr G. Grenville. With them he is conferring every moment, and Lord Egremont has already got the *cant* – *he had received the King’s orders*. For Your Grace knows, it is the King who does everything’.⁵⁸ Newcastle’s sarcasm could not conceal his chagrin that he felt increasingly a ‘cypher’.⁵⁹

Cabinet newcomers Egremont and Grenville were soon uneasily aware of the mutual jealousy between Bute and Newcastle, ‘the one saying you are minister for you have got the both Houses of Parliament, the other you have the King’.⁶⁰ Bute, confident that Newcastle would retire at the end of the war, saw no need for a showdown, and privately told Grenville that ‘he thought it better to let the old man tide over a year or two more of his political life’.⁶¹ Devonshire, also anxious to avoid a ministerial rift, assured the King on 18 November that Newcastle could easily be managed with the appearance of power, summarised by George III to Bute as ‘a little seeming good

humour from me and your telling him things before he hears them from others, ... for nothing is so hateful to him as the thoughts of retiring'.⁶² Retaining Newcastle at the Treasury enabled Bute to use the Duke 'as a screen between him and the people', both popular opinion and the Parliamentary politicians. Pitt and Temple were soon attempting to frighten Newcastle into resignation, thinking Bute alone would be an easy target. During November they changed their tactics and approached Newcastle and Hardwicke for an alliance, being rebuffed by both. Temple thereupon warned Newcastle that 'Bute meant to get rid of him apace, as he had done of them', a myth soon to pass into historical legend.⁶³

Newcastle may have begun to feel his isolation when the remodelled cabinet undertook its first task, the formulation of a reply to a paper of 28 August from the Spanish minister Richard Wall to the British ambassador in Madrid, Lord Bristol. It had raised such issues as an audacious Spanish claim to participate in the Newfoundland fishery, and the proposed eviction from Honduras of a long-established British settlement of logwood cutters. Newcastle, failing to perceive that these were merely diversions to clog any negotiation, would have favoured a less strongly worded reply than the letter of 28 October to Lord Bristol. This conventionally stated a wish to settle all disputes with Spain amicably, but with the proviso that 'there was nothing offensive contained in the late Treaty with France'.⁶⁴

Ministerial minds were now turning to the first meeting of the new Parliament, elected over six months earlier. The session was due to open on 13 November, only a few weeks after Pitt's resignation. Grenville, his successor as Commons Leader, was confident that event would not jeopardise the ministerial majority, as Hardwicke told Newcastle. 'His main dependence seemed to be on your Grace's friends, the Whig party, which was the sheet anchor. He did not imagine that Mr Pitt would have any great following of the Tories ... The soberer part of them were sick of Mr Pitt's measures of war, more especially continental, and of the immense expense'.⁶⁵ This forecast of the forthcoming session proved sound. Pitt's numerical weakness in Parliament was to be starkly revealed as, in his own words, he found himself 'out-Toried by Lord Bute and out-Whigged by the Duke of Newcastle'.⁶⁶

Such apprehension as Grenville had about the meeting of Parliament was the personal fear that as Commons Leader he would be outshone as a speaker by Henry Fox.⁶⁷ Bute undertook to dissuade Fox from undue participation in debate, the brilliant young Lord Shelburne being sent to convey this intimation. Fox, already promised

by Bute a peerage for his wife, to maintain parity with Pitt, gave the assurance in a handsome manner, so Devonshire recorded under the date of 10 November. ‘He said, for his part, he did not intend to be always answering Mr Pitt, that he should be glad to sit still. At the same time, if ever the Crown was attacked and administration wanted his assistance, he should be glad to give it.’⁶⁸

No sooner had this point been settled to Grenville’s satisfaction than he found himself overruled in cabinet, on 10 November, over a matter concerning the Commons. He was anxious to have the correspondence with Spain laid before the House, perhaps seeking to preempt a demand by Pitt. But Hardwicke opposed this as improper and offensive to Spain while negotiations were still in progress, and his objection was carried by the support of Bute, Newcastle, Mansfield and Devonshire. Next day Mansfield sought to mollify the indignant Grenville by suggesting a meeting of leading ministerialist MPs to consider the point. This aroused the ire of Hardwicke, who said he would not attend cabinet again if its decisions could be thus queried. A confrontation was avoided when Grenville dropped the idea. Such care not to offend Spanish susceptibilities soon seemed unnecessary. On 14 November a dispatch arrived from Lord Bristol, reporting that when he had asked the Spanish minister Richard Wall whether the Family Compact Treaty contained any hostile intent towards Britain, Wall had angrily adopted a warlike tone. This time Newcastle agreed with Bute’s suggestion that ‘a strong and spirited answer’ should be sent.⁶⁹

When the new Parliament met on 13 November, the debate on war policy was transferred from the cabinet to the House of Commons. Pittites defied their lack of numbers to launch a series of debates in support of their leader, and Pitt himself took several opportunities to explain his behaviour. In the debate of 13 November on the Address John Wilkes, not yet a radical, declared that Pitt was right to expect a Spanish war and threatened to move for the relevant papers. William Beckford reminded MPs that there was now no important officeholder in the House, depicting Grenville and others as mere subalterns. Beckford criticised the cession of any part of the cod fishery, and defended the German war as tying down French resources, a view supported by a third Pittite, Middlesex MP George Cooke. Pitt later rose to inform the House that he had resigned because he would not be responsible for the policy of others. ‘America had been conquered in Germany’, Pitt declared, when urging the need for the German war to continue. As for the fishery monopoly, he had yielded to a cabinet majority. The Address passed unanimously, as Pitt himself had urged.⁷⁰

That the ministry accepted the need for the continental campaign was demonstrated on 9 December, when Secretary at War Charles Townshend proposed finance for an army of nearly 90,000 men in Germany. He declared that ‘Mr Pitt’s divine plan’ should be continued to obtain a good peace. Bedfordite Richard Rigby thought the Prussian subsidy should be discontinued. Grenville equivocated, accepting the obligations of treaty and honour but not the strategic argument, contending that France was being defeated because of her naval weakness and not the German war. Pitt pointed out that the German war had been decided upon by Newcastle and Fox, before he came to office in 1756, and argued that Hanover was now a millstone around the French neck, not that of Britain. As for subsidies, it was usual to give them to our allies, as to Austria and Russia in the previous war.⁷¹ The debate on the report was resumed the next day, when Lord George Sackville, the anti-hero of Minden, attacked the argument that the German war was a drain on French resources. But the highlight of the day was gross abuse of the absent Pitt by a new MP Colonel Isaac Barré, whose savage invective was to be a feature of Commons debates for the next two decades. He had served in Canada, and thought himself ill-rewarded by Pitt. Brought into Parliament by Buteite Lord Shelburne, he was instigated to attack Pitt by his patron and by Henry Fox.⁷²

Next day, 11 December, two Pittite MPs, George Cooke and William Beckford, moved for the Spanish papers. Grenville promptly opposed this as improper, both because international diplomacy appertained to the Crown, and because negotiations were still in progress: the same arguments of impropriety had been used against him in cabinet when he himself had made the same proposal! Pitt supported the motion in a rather off-hand manner, and did not force a vote after a mere dozen yeas were answered by ‘a clamorous No’. Diarist Harris deemed the motion to have been unwise as revealing Pitt’s ‘want of weight and influence’.⁷³ The Pittite group by itself clearly represented no threat in Parliament to the ministry, which now had to adjust its war policy to meet the Spanish threat.

The official professions to Parliament about continuing negotiations with Madrid had belied preparations for a Spanish war. An attack on Portugal, Britain’s traditional ally, was to be expected, and a decision to send 6,000 soldiers there was taken on 26 December. War was formally declared on 2 January 1762, three months after Pitt’s resignation on that point, after Spain had rejected a demand for information on the Family Compact Treaty. The best way to attack

Spain, so a cabinet on 6 January decided, was an assault on her strongest fortress in the New World, Havana in Cuba. That expedition should then attack New Orleans in Louisiana, while another force from India should attack Manila in the Philippines.⁷⁴ But the Spanish war provided another reason to end the German campaign, as Newcastle soon discovered: hence this lament to Hardwicke.

My Lord Bute's schemes for foreign affairs are very different from ours. Popular maritime expeditions in war and a total dislike of all continental measures, are the basis of his politics. These differences of opinion in essentials make it impossible for us to draw together, even less than with Mr Pitt; for although he had all that popular nonsense about him, he mixed it with real system and backed it with a continental support which had sense in it.⁷⁵

Bute had in fact set about ending the German entanglement soon after Pitt left office. On 20 November, as Northern Secretary, he told the Prussian envoy of a cabinet decision to remove from any renewal of the subsidy treaty, due to expire in December, the clause, stipulated by Pitt in 1758, that neither party could make a separate peace. The annual payment of four million crowns, or £670,000, would be continued. Frederick II was dismayed, since at the end of 1761 his military position seemed hopeless, with much of his territory under enemy occupation. But he did not dare to alienate Britain, hoping for diplomatic assistance as well as financial support. His response, received by Bute on 30 December, comprised two demands: that Britain should secure French neutrality in the German war, including evacuation of his Rhineland provinces, a British request that Choiseul had already rejected in the summer; and that Britain should pay him six million crowns a year, equivalent to £1 million, until the end of his war against the Austro-Russian coalition. In a sense this reply merely sought insurance, for Frederick expected a Spanish war would prevent any peace and oblige Britain to continue her German campaign.⁷⁶

The Prussian King misread the political situation in Britain. Bute perceived the new commitments against Spain to be an argument to give up the British campaign in western Germany. He suggested this at the cabinet of 6 January, but not an end to the Prussian subsidy. Newcastle argued that such a decision would disastrously reverse the successful war strategy. France would then be able to concentrate on the overseas war, in alliance with Spain, and could take Hanover to bargain against losses elsewhere. Devonshire supported him with the arguments that Britain would be exposed to invasion, and that no state would trust her

as an ally in future. Grenville backed Bute, and the others were silent, with no decision being taken.⁷⁷ George III approved Bute's idea, commenting that even though his Hanoverian subjects might suffer from a French invasion, 'I cannot help wishing that an end was put to that enormous expense by ordering our troops home'.⁷⁸

The Duke of Bedford, absent from the cabinet, was dissatisfied with such indecision, and made known his intention to propose in the Lords a motion to end the German war. Newcastle failed to dissuade him on 14 January, when Bedford said that '*the King told him, he was determined to give up the German war.* That was news', Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke, 'and more than Lord Bute will say, or admit I am sure'.⁷⁹ Bedford put his motion on 5 February, when, to avoid publicising the ministerial split on the subject, Newcastle allowed Bute to defeat it indirectly by a previous question, thereby avoiding a vote on the motion itself, the division being 105 to 16. Buteite Shelburne was among those who sided with Bedford, who was angry at what he deemed Bute's deceptive behaviour.⁸⁰

The European war scene was now transformed, miraculously for Frederick the Great, by the death of Czarina Elizabeth of Russia on 5 January, for she was succeeded by the Prussophile Peter III. He withdrew the Russian army from the war, and evacuated Pomerania and East Prussia. Newcastle was delighted, commenting to Hardwicke on 28 January, 'So much for Russia. This must make our peace in Germany, and I think with France and Spain if we manage right'.⁸¹ George III more shrewdly and correctly feared that Frederick would not be satisfied with survival, observing to Bute on 5 February, 'I look on the so sudden retreat of the Russian forces, as liable to encourage that *too ambitious Monarch* to breath still stronger revenge against the Court of Vienna, on finding himself freed from one formidable foe, therefore 'tis our business to force him to peace'.⁸² That was indeed exactly how Frederick II reacted, and he requested immediate payment of the British subsidy, obviously to attack Austria. He did not intend to stop fighting just when his luck had changed! Within the British government opinion was divided as to how the new situation could best be exploited. Grenville and Egremont argued that Britain herself should now press for better peace terms from France. Bute was always aware that he dare not risk unpopularity for the King by making an unsatisfactory peace, and the continued tide of war success paradoxically made his task all the more difficult. That Martinique had been taken became known on 21 March. Yet obviously Frederick II's improved military position reopened the arguments over both the British campaign in western

Germany and the direct subsidy payment to him. At a cabinet of 26 March Grenville revived the idea of abandoning the German war, so that Britain could concentrate her resources on the overseas struggle with France and Spain: but Newcastle, despite his own January hopes of peace, strongly and successfully opposed the suggestion.⁸³

That was the Duke's last triumph in cabinet. Opposition to the German war was strengthened by a calculation by Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Barrington on 31 March that a £2 million vote of credit would be needed to cover the war costs in both Germany and Portugal, not the £1 million originally envisaged.⁸⁴ Newcastle informed the cabinet on 8 April, when Grenville questioned the need for the extra money. Bute took the opportunity to attack Frederick II for not disclosing his war plans, and 'hinted' at stopping the Prussian subsidy. No decision was taken on either subject.⁸⁵ The heart of the matter was a genuine difference of opinion over policy. Newcastle thought it absurd folly to end the German campaign without a general peace, and therefore deemed the £2 million essential. His critics adopted one or, like Grenville, both of two counter-arguments: that the German war was not now necessary, and that Britain could not afford to fight in both Portugal and Germany. At a cabinet on 30 April Newcastle and his allies were outvoted on the £2 million credit by Bute, Grenville, Egremont, Henley, Granville and army commander Ligonier.⁸⁶ This explicit decision was followed by an equally important implicit one. 'We had afterwards some talking on the Prussian subsidy, from which the Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire, and Lord Hardwicke, would not depart', Bute wrote to Bedford. 'The other Lords ... thought it highly improper to continue it, and the load of evidence we have, of the most determined enmity of that Prince, and under our own most necessitous circumstances; I should therefore suppose the King will not consent to it; and the vote of credit will be asked for without it.'⁸⁷ Newcastle drew the same inference, commenting to Hardwicke about 'refusing the Prussian subsidy which I take to be now decided'.⁸⁸ Grenville did not regard the financial dispute as settled, and saw the King on both 5 and 6 May to argue that if Newcastle secured the second million 'it would be making him master'. George III told Bute that he had replied that 'the whole affair is the most unpleasant one I have had before me since I have mounted the throne', for he was receiving contradictory expert advice as to how much extra money was needed.⁸⁹ But Newcastle now gave up the point, since he had decided to resign.

That idea had been in his mind for some time: on 10 April he had told Hardwicke, ‘I am determined not to engage another year’.⁹⁰ Now he thought the war strategy in ruins, believing, wrongly, as events turned out, that the decision to vote only an extra £1 million would end Britain’s German campaign. This conviction may have strengthened his reluctance to take ministerial responsibility for a peace that could never fulfil expectations aroused by the great success of the war.⁹¹ Pique also entered into his decision. Others shared the opinion of Henry Legge that the Duke was being pressurised into resignation ‘by taking away from him all powers’.⁹² Newcastle had also long been aware that since early in March Treasury Secretary Samuel Martin had been secretly priming Bute with financial information, to the effect that the extra million was not needed; and he had been openly challenged at the Treasury Board by Gilbert Elliot and James Oswald, both Scotsmen.⁹³ Such behaviour hurt him. Nor was the Duke’s suspicion of a plot to replace him by Bute unfounded. Later, on 1 September, Lord Mansfield told Newcastle that driving the Duke out of office ‘was not my Lord Bute’s own inclination: but that his Lordship had been forced to it; or advised to it, by the Princess Dowager of Wales, Mr George Grenville and Mr Elliot, by representing to my Lord Bute, that he was nothing, while I had the Treasury’.⁹⁴ There does not appear to be any strictly contemporary evidence of this scheming:⁹⁵ but the recollection accords with the known reluctance of Bute to become Premier, and the intention of George III to make him so. In mid-April the King wrote to Bute this forecast of what would happen in the event of Newcastle’s resignation. ‘Are not those who now appear attached to him men of the most mercenary views, men who will ever follow him that pays them; in my conscience I don’t believe he would have ten followers if out of place.’⁹⁶ This attempt to allay the fears of Bute about Newcastle’s Parliamentary strength was a shrewd prediction, even if it did cynically underestimate the pull of party and personal loyalties. Soon afterwards the King directly stated to Bute what could hardly have been news, that he was ‘the successor I have long had in my eye to the Duke of Newcastle’.⁹⁷

The change of ministry began on 7 May, when Newcastle informed Bute that he would give way on the second million, but that he intended to resign. Bute neither sought to dissuade him nor voiced any regret, omissions the Duke deemed incivility. The Duke gave assurances, as he did to the King later, that he would not go into opposition, reporting to Devonshire, ‘I said also smiling. I extremely approve your peace; I wish, I could approve so much your war; meaning his

ridiculous maritime war'. Newcastle next went to the King, and said that he was yielding on the financial argument but would resign the Treasury as soon as George III could make proper arrangements. The King asked him to reconsider the decision, since the financial controversy was over.⁹⁸ That was a mere courtesy, for when reporting the conversation to Bute George III estimated it would be a fortnight before he could take over the Treasury.⁹⁹

The conduct of the war was meanwhile raised in Parliament by the Pittite group, when on 11 May Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Barrington moved the vote of credit for £1 million.¹⁰⁰ John Wilkes and William Beckford expressed a preference for the German war. Grenville replied that on the contrary peace should be sought, since the National Debt had grown by £50 million during the previous four years. The debate was dominated by one of Pitt's great speeches, in which he ranged over matters domestic and foreign. He began by saying that although out of office he would not 'stoop to that little hackneyed practice of party, opposing whatever was the measure of the adversary. He had stood forth for general war, and for reduction of the House of Bourbon. To advise still longer war was constancy to the same plan.' Pitt deplored the idea that there was a choice between Portugal and Germany. He supported both campaigns, agreeing therefore, he said with the two parts of the ministry, and claimed that the German war cost France more than Britain. A continental alliance had always been the key to British success, as in the days of Elizabeth I and William III. 'He wished to move that the continuation of the subsidy to Prussia might be added to the vote of credit: but it did not become him to move for more than was asked by the King's servants; yet he wished the vote of credit had been greater, and he knew the Duke of Newcastle wished so too'. Diarist James Harris confirmed those views recorded by Walpole, and then noted how Pitt 'threw out the plan of an alliance with Russia, Prussia, Hesse, Brunswick, and Sweden ... (Mr Pitt I call an Inigo Jones in politics, a man of great ideas, a projector of noble and magnificent plans – but architects, though they find the plan, never consider themselves as concerned to find the means).' George III suspected Pitt's speech to be 'a lure', to draw him and Newcastle together.¹⁰¹ The £1 million credit was voted without dissent, and when on 14 May Lord Barrington proposed taxes to raise the money he mentioned that £700,000 had been saved by non-payment of the Prussian subsidy.¹⁰²

Before his formal resignation Newcastle retracted his promise not to oppose. Offended that he was not pressed to stay on at the Treasury,

he reacted accordingly, on 14 May informing the young Lord Rockingham that ‘I shall take care that his Majesty shall know when I resign that I am at liberty to act, as I shall think proper, upon every occasion that may happen’.¹⁰³ Five days later George III informed Bute that ‘the Duke of Newcastle has quite altered his language, he says he hopes I will look on him as at liberty to act as his conscience shall guide him, I reply’d that this is the language every man that opposes uses.’¹⁰⁴ That Newcastle was still an active player in the political game caused the King and Bute to revise a strategy based on the assumption that Bute would inherit the Duke’s Parliamentary following. The Bute ministry would face the opposition of two distinct factions, the Pitt group and the Newcastle party. To prevent an alliance between them became an immediate concern.

This political problem would be complicated by difficult policy decisions. There was a peace to be made, and consequential problems arising out of Britain’s greatly extended empire: arrangements would have to be made concerning North America, and Britain’s acquisitions elsewhere, notably India. Ireland was in a sense another wartime legacy, a problem postponed again by the Viceroyalty of Lord Halifax. He had opted for that poisoned chalice in March 1761, confident that he could manage the three leading Undertakers, Lord Shannon, Archbishop Stone of Armagh, and Irish Commons Speaker John Ponsonby, who was also head of the Revenue Board, the main centre of Irish patronage. ‘He has heard of combinations ... to handcuff and fetter him’, Lord Chesterfield told the Bishop of Waterford on 12 September 1761, ‘but he seems not in the least apprehensive of them’.¹⁰⁵ Halifax’s intention was merely to ride the Undertaker tiger, not to tame it. Edmund Burke, who went back to Ireland as an aide to the new Chief Secretary, William Hamilton, commented that Halifax and Hamilton had ‘no notion of dividing in order to govern, they only propose not to be absolutely governed’.¹⁰⁶ Like his predecessors, Halifax soon found that a nominal majority was no insurance against Parliamentary defeat on a popular question. On 2 November 1761 an opposition motion complaining of the financial cost of pensions was carried by 82 votes to 80 in the Irish Commons. The Viceroy thereupon threatened the Undertakers with loss of their patronage if they could not manage Parliament better, and secured a money bill, with the assistance of Speaker Ponsonby and Lord Shannon, by 147 votes to 37.¹⁰⁷ Halifax further showed his mettle over a demand for an absentee tax on official salaries. He suggested to a meeting of office-holders that the idea be extended to all salaries, thereby ensuring the

Castle Party would kill the proposal.¹⁰⁸ But Halifax deemed it unwise to resist an Irish Septennial Bill voted by a 108 to 43 majority in the Commons. Many MPs, under constituency pressure, had supported a measure that was contrary to their own personal interests, since regular elections would make life more difficult for MPs and Undertakers alike. The British Privy Council rejected the measure only after a difference of opinion; Lord Hardwicke was one who thought British power in Ireland would be strengthened by it.¹⁰⁹ Control of Ireland was rising to the top of the British political agenda as European peace beckoned, and rumours that Halifax would be residing permanently in Ireland anticipated the overt policy change later in the decade. In Dublin Sir Henry Cavendish heard that ‘Lord Halifax is to make a long stay with us ... Whatever may be thought expedient now, sometime or other residence will be found necessary’. In London Henry Fox believed that the original intention was for Halifax to stay for two biennial Parliamentary sessions and the long intervening recess, a period of nearly three years.¹¹⁰ Evidence that the British government had some permanent change in mind was an increase in the Lord-Lieutenant’s salary from £12,000 to £16,000, for Southern Secretary Egremont told Halifax on 20 March 1762 that the reason was ‘the King’s intention that for the future the residence of the Lord-Lieutenants in Ireland shall be longer than has hitherto been customary’.¹¹¹ Halifax, aware of the prospect of a cabinet post at home, was unwilling to play any such role, and left Ireland on 1 May. He nevertheless retained the office of Lord-Lieutenant throughout the Bute ministry, for the Irish Parliament was enjoying a biennial recess.

Notes

- 1 BL Add. MSS. 51406, fo. 57.
- 2 He recorded both the original and the altered wording. *Leicester House Politics*, pp. 214–15.
- 3 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 89.
- 4 Namier, *Age*, pp. 120–1.
- 5 *Leicester House Politics*, p. 216.
- 6 BL Add. MSS. 32913, fo. 399.
- 7 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 43.
- 8 Namier, *Age*, pp. 122–6.
- 9 BL Add. MSS. 32913, fos 426–9.
- 10 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 42–3.
- 11 *Leicester House Politics*, p. 227.

- 12 *Leicester House Politics*, p. 227.
- 13 Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 158–9, 177.
- 14 Bute MSS (Cardiff), unnumbered. For a detailed study of the impact of the pamphlet see Schweizer, ‘Israel Mauduit ...’, in Taylor, *et al.* (eds), *Hanoverian Britain and Empire*, pp. 198–209.
- 15 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 56–7. Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 172–3.
- 16 BL Add. MSS. 32916, fo. 369.
- 17 BL Add. MSS. 32916, fos 385–6.
- 18 Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 176–8.
- 19 BL Add. MSS. 32915, fo. 168.
- 20 BL Add. MSS. 32913, fos 426–9.
- 21 Namier, *Age*, p. 156.
- 22 BL Add. MSS. 32921, fo. 60.
- 23 BL Add. MSS. 32920, fos 64–8. *Dodington Diary*, pp. 402–3. *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 72–3, 75, 88–9, 93.
- 24 *Dodington Diary*, p. 414.
- 25 BL Add. MSS. 32919, fo. 287.
- 26 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 81–2.
- 27 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 82–3.
- 28 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 78 n.
- 29 Malmesbury MSS. Photocopies A168.
- 30 BL Add. MSS. 32919, fo. 42.
- 31 *Chatham Anecdotes*, I, 304–5.
- 32 BL Add. MSS. 32920, fos 64–71; 36797, fos 48–50.
- 33 Namier, *Age*, pp. 284–6.
- 34 BL Add. MSS. 32826, fo. 311.
- 35 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 90–1.
- 36 For these negotiations see Rashed, *Peace of Paris*, pp. 70–114, and Schweizer, ‘Lord Bute, William Pitt ...’, in Schweizer, ed., *Lord Bute*, pp. 41–55.
- 37 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 92–3. Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 182–4.
- 38 BL Add. MSS. 32922, fos 5–6, 449–51. Namier, *Age*, pp. 275–6.
- 39 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 102, 109.
- 40 *Grenville Papers*, I, 381–2.
- 41 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 120–5. Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 192–3.
- 42 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 130–6.
- 43 *Bute Letters*, p. 65.
- 44 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 137–9. Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 196–7.
- 45 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 140.
- 46 *Grenville Papers*, I, 412–13. *Bute Letters*, pp. 47, 50, 63.
- 47 *Chatham Papers*, II, 158–9. For the public controversy see Peters, *Pitt and Popularity*, pp. 204–11.

- 48 BL Add. MSS. 32931, fos 45–9. Quoted by Namier, *Age*, pp. 306–7, but misquoted by Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, p. 197.
- 49 Yorke, *Hardwicke*, III, 323. For a reassessment of Bute's attitude see Schweizer, *CJH*, 8 (1973), 111–25.
- 50 *Dodington Diary*, p. 425.
- 51 Rashed, *Peace of Paris*, p. 118, repeats the traditional view.
- 52 BL Add. MSS. 32928, fos 362–5.
- 53 BL Add. MSS. 32930, fo. 104. Malmesbury MSS. Photocopies B691. *Grenville Papers*, I, 401–2. *Devonshire Diary*, p. 140. *Dodington Diary*, pp. 425–6.
- 54 *Grenville Papers*, I, 411. *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 141, 148–51.
- 55 BL Add. MSS. 32919, fo. 133; 32931, fos 46–7.
- 56 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 142.
- 57 BL Add. MSS. 32929, fos 115–16.
- 58 BL Add. MSS. 32930, fo. 221.
- 59 BL Add. MSS. 32932, fo. 363.
- 60 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 145.
- 61 *Grenville Papers*, I, 396.
- 62 *Bute Letters*, p. 70. *Devonshire Diary*, p. 150.
- 63 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 146, 149–50.
- 64 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 121, 126, 144–5.
- 65 BL Add. MSS. 32929, fo. 332.
- 66 Yorke, *Hardwicke*, III, 430.
- 67 BL Add. MSS. 32930, fo. 226.
- 68 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 148.
- 69 *Devonshire Diary*, pp 148–9.
- 70 Malmesbury MSS. Harris Diary, 13 Nov. 1761. Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 71–7.
- 71 Malmesbury MSS. Harris Diary, 9 Dec. 1761. Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 78–83.
- 72 Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 85–8.
- 73 Malmesbury MSS. Harris Diary, 11 Dec. 1761.
- 74 PRO 30/47/21 (cabinet minute of 6 Jan. 1762). *Bute Letters*, p. 78. *Devonshire Diary*, p. 154. Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, pp. 200–5.
- 75 Yorke, *Hardwicke*, III, 357.
- 76 Schweizer, *CJH*, 13 (1978), 383–95.
- 77 BL Add. MSS. 32933, fos 178–82. *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 154–5.
- 78 *Bute Letters*, p. 78.
- 79 BL Add. MSS. 32933, fo. 320.
- 80 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 155–7. On this episode see Schweizer, *PH*, 5 (1986), 107–23.
- 81 BL Add. MSS. 32934, fo. 45.
- 82 *Bute Letters*, p. 81.

- 83 *Devonshire Diary*, pp. 158–62.
- 84 Middleton, *Bells of Victory*, p. 207, citing BL Add. MSS. 33040, fos 317–19.
- 85 *Devonshire Diary*, p. 166. PRO 30/47/21 (cabinet minute).
- 86 Nicholas, Thesis, p. 44, citing PRO/30/47/21 (cabinet minute).
- 87 *Bedford Papers*, III, 76–7.
- 88 BL Add. MSS. 32938, ff. 20–1.
- 89 *Bute Letters*, p. 100.
- 90 BL Add. MSS. 32937, fo. 14.
- 91 Namier, *Age*, p. 336, quoting a memorandum of 12 May.
- 92 Malmesbury MSS. Photocopies A171.
- 93 Nicholas, Thesis, p. 47. Namier, *Age*, p. 313 N.
- 94 BL Add. MSS. 32942, fo. 114
- 95 As is noted by Nicholas, Thesis, p. 49, who states ‘the case remains unproven’.
- 96 *Bute Letters*, p. 91.
- 97 *Bute Letters*, pp. 92–3.
- 98 BL Add. MSS. 32938, fos 105–11.
- 99 *Bute Letters*, p. 101.
- 100 For this debate see Malmesbury MSS. Harris Diary, 11 May 1762; Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 127–32; and Almon, *Debates*, VI, 146–9.
- 101 *Bute Letters*, p. 103.
- 102 Malmesbury MSS. Harris Diary, 14 May 1762.
- 103 BL Add. MSS. 32938, fos 262–4.
- 104 *Bute Letters*, p. 107.
- 105 *Chesterfield Letters*, V, 2,382.
- 106 Hoffman, *Edmund Burke*, p. 279.
- 107 Grafton MSS. no. 539. *CHOP*, I, 79.
- 108 Powell, Thesis, pp. 87–9.
- 109 Walpole, *Memoirs*, I, 111. Powell, Thesis, pp. 89–91.
- 110 Powell, Thesis, pp. 91. Powell has discussed the background to the resident Viceroyalty in *IHS*, 31 (1998), 19–36.
- 111 *CHOP*, I, 167.