5

Deprivation

In the last chapter I showed how ideas of the imperilled white family have animated the scandal of grooming and play a part in how this act is rendered exceptional, and how this conditions the exceptional act of the state depriving subjects of citizenship. Now I want to delve into more detail regarding the tactic of deprivation itself. This means teasing out how deprivation works in relation to race, sexuality and empire. In this chapter I want to explore in more detail how 'citizens' are made into 'migrants' who can then be detained, deported and made killable (for example, at the end of an RAF drone). The threat of citizenship deprivation is used to throw light on postcolonial citizenship more broadly. This follows Saskia Sassen's (2016) provocation that we should examine the 'systematic edge' because doing so reveals broader practices of border regimes, rights and the organisation of dispossession (also see Kapoor 2018: 6).

Following on from the investigation I began in the last chapter, I explore where the practice of citizenship deprivation came from and how it is used today in line with other bordering practices linked to the War on Terror. Whilst the militarisation and securitisation of the War on Terror and the hostile environment have expanded authoritarian governance through tactics such as deprivation (alongside deportation, passport removals and assassination), I show how deprivation is attuned to both the orientation and management of racial categories of empire and contemporary imperial formations. Against much of the contemporary work on citizenship deprivation, which argues that deprivation is an 'exceptional' aberration of citizenship (Joppke 2016; Choudhury

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2017; Fargues 2017; Gibney 2017), I argue that de facto deprivation of rights and personhood was arguably foundational to modern citizenship. Rather than an aberration of citizenship, the racialised control we see today is better understood as an intensification of this past function. This I argue reveals a particular type of imperial family drama which rages through British citizenship.

I conclude the chapter by considering how contemporary rights and citizenship are shaped by the historical figurations of the 'indentured labourer' and the 'fanatic rebel' and/or 'slave'. These figurations, and the colonial violence that accompanies them, continue to haunt and activate British citizenship today. Importantly, the act of depriving a number of terror suspects and CSE convicts of their citizenship further intensifies and normalises the practice of deprivation. We thus need to understand how this makes *all* naturalised and dual citizens amenable to the evisceration of rights. It makes large sections of society once legally categorised as 'citizens' into 'migrants'.[1]

Deprivation and the terrorist

As I began to describe in the last chapter, the increasing use of deprivation of citizenship forms a part of wider counter-terrorism tactics in Britain, which have become bound up with the steady intensification of authoritarian immigration practices, such as detention, deportation and extradition (Kapoor 2018). Intensifying the use of legislation and royal prerogatives to dismantle citizenship forms a particular type of 'sticky border'. This is because as a practice it threatens to potentially convert *all* naturalised and dual British citizens into deportable subjects.

Contemporary scholarship on deprivation has sought to reveal how this works as an aberration of settled forms of British citizenship (Gibney 2014; Ross 2014; Sykes 2016; Webb 2017) – that is, as a particular, exceptional fusion of racialised immigration practice and security logics that have emerged out of the War on Terror (also see Kingston 2005; Bauböck 2014; Joppke 2016; Choudhury 2017; Gibney 2017). There is

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good evidence to support this position. Deprivation of citizenship has emerged as a tactic in Belgium, France, Canada and Australia as a direct part of counter-terrorism protocol (Choudhury 2017). Whilst it has been legally possible to deprive British subjects of their citizenship since 1918 if this was in the expressed 'public good' or for acts of 'disloyalty' (Webb 2017: 296), from 1973 to 2002 this power lay almost dormant. Whilst revamped in the wake of 9/11, it is predominantly after 2011 that we see the wide application and acceleration of this power. Until the cases of grooming it had been used almost exclusively against those suspected of involvement in terrorism or for those accessing citizenship through fraud (which has been widely interpreted).

In 2002 and then 2007 the New Labour administration made it easier to deprive both naturalised citizens and those born into British citizenship of fundamental rights, but only if it could be proved that they had *access* to another nationality. Kapoor (2018) shows how this mirrored extradition legislation that made it easier to expel terror suspects to the United States. Since 2014, in order to circumvent international law on statelessness, the Home Office has pushed the principle that a subject only 'potentially' has to have access to another nationality for deprivation to be applied (effectively anyone with a family attachment – imagined or otherwise – to 'elsewhere'). Using royal prerogatives, the Home Secretary has increasingly used cancellation of passports to avoid juridical procedures and (the albeit light) body of evidence needed to formally remove citizenship (Kapoor 2018). This also expands the population of people who can be subject to such policing. In 2018 it was reported that 115 'suspected terrorists' had their passports cancelled (Lavi 2010).

Whilst formal citizenship deprivation works towards making citizens deportable and ultimately killable (usually at the end of a drone), passport removal works towards a cruddy method of social death internalised within the UK. Those who have their passports cancelled within Britain are bound by internalised borders (Kapoor 2018), this denies them a right to movement and in doing so it restricts access to housing, the job market, welfare and healthcare (especially given accompanying immigration rules mean that access to services and shelter relies on

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showing a passport). As with the proliferation of mass detention and deportation for 'irregularised' migrants, this is a form of criminalisation and incarceration that bypasses the ordinary criminal justice system and expands a racialised state of exception (Hussain 1999). This use of sovereign powers not only bypasses juridical procedures but also parliamentary and civil accountability. For instance, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which presides over cases of deprivation, works by limiting the information available to defendants and defence lawyers.[2]

Whilst deprivation works to contain or expel (through imprisonment, detention, deportation or exile), and passport removal to expel or contain, this also joins up with the (im)possibility of acquiring rights to settlement and citizenship. Since 2001 successive British governments have made accessing citizenship more difficult to achieve – for example, by introducing expensive citizenship tests and ceremonies, and banning people with criminal convictions (including for immigration offences) from applying. Multiple forms of structural disadvantage (poverty, involvement in criminality) are reinforced in this practice where the state reinforces the precarity of populations without settled rights by making them into 'eternal guests' (de Noronha 2016). Such hostility has been a central feature of the architecture of the hostile environment in the UK, which concerns irregularising migrants and criminalising them at the same time. Investigations into what became the 'Windrush scandal' have shown that it is not just those without settled status who can be subject to deportation and subjects of the hostile environment. Commonwealth citizens who have been unable to evidence that they have citizenship (such as with a passport) have been regularly treated as 'illegal migrants' and exiled to Jamaica (Gentleman 2018a).

This reflects increasing links between counter-insurgency practices, the criminal justice system, immigration practice and economic and social inequalities structured by race. Recent operations by the Home Office have ramped up the targeting of migrants with criminal convictions for deportation. In 2012 the Metropolitan Police and Home Office initiated 'Operation Nexus' – an information-sharing programme aimed

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at fast-tracking the deportation of 'foreign criminals'. The scheme not only aimed to deport people with convictions but also those 'suspected' of criminal intent and behaviour, such as involvement in 'gang activity' (Griffiths and Morgan 2017). Given how racialised the discourse of gangs is in metropolitan centres like London and Manchester, the impact of such a move is significant. On the one hand, young black and Asian youth are policed for their suspected involvement in gang activity (e.g. in practices of stop and search, or losing access to social housing due to suspected gang activity); on the other, the heavy policing of black and Asian communities means that people with informal status (who may have been born and raised in the UK, we should remember) can be detained and deported for suspected gang involvement. Operation Nexus criminalises without individuals being subject to due process or criminal prosecution. It is significant that gang activity is frequently linked to the collapse of family structures. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 'failed patriarchy' of black households is made hypervisible in cases of gang violence (Collins 1998; also see Sewell 2018).

We can see here how existing inequalities produced through racialised capitalism with regard to job prospects, housing, education, welfare and the effects of austerity on wider black and Asian communities provide a further structural context for this type of border regime. There is also a clear geopolitical-imperial dimension to this expansion of sticky borders. Deportation programmes are reliant on diplomatic agreements, such as the one pursued by the British government in 2015 when the state offered £25 million to build extra prisons in Jamaica for deported 'criminals' (BBC 2015), just as hundreds of people with distant links to the Caribbean are set on flights and abandoned in cities such as Kingston. The British state uses the structural linkages of empire to refashion and extend the carceral state overseas and to expel and contain its 'problematic' internal colonies (de Noronha 2016).

The racialised structures of criminal justice meet up in insidious and authoritarian ways with the renewed practices of deprivation and deportation (Home Office 2014b). It is important to note here that

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whilst the white family is protected at all costs (as demonstrated in the previous chapter), violent practices of immigration raids, detention, deportation and deprivation split up or destroy intimate relations, kinships and families. And yet this so often goes unnoticed or unchallenged. The dispossession of family and kinship ties is instead broadly accepted and normalised. The power of 'family' fails to stick to those racialised bodies and kinships 'without' value (de Noronha 2016; see, for example, the case of Kenneth Oranyendu described in Taylor 2018).

Deprivation of citizenship

Deprivation has without doubt intensified through the proliferation of counter-terror devices, closed courts and passport removals, alongside the extension of the policy of the hostile environment and the ease with which authoritarian practices are normalised through 'monstrous' security and policing concerns. Here the 'jihadi terrorist', the 'illegal migrant' and the 'grooming gang' do a lot of political work in joining up security mechanisms such as policing with the sovereign power of the immigration state – to expel, abandon and kill targeted bodies. We should consider in particular how neoliberal forms of racialised capitalism mark certain populations as surplus and without 'value'. And how particular imperial military interests of the British state in the Middle East are served in the deprivation of citizenship – such as the case with ISIS recruits. Scholars of citizenship are right to reveal this worrying trend. However, we need to consider how much this offers a radical departure or *aberration* of British citizenship. Instead, I read the proliferation of formal deprivation and its corollary practices of detention, deportation and extrajudicial killing as already tied to the violent mandate of modern citizenship. The settlement and practice of British citizenship is not only forged out of empire but remains wedded to the categories and demarcations of colonial domestication which are reworked and adapted into our contemporary moment. To trace this means thinking more broadly about how deprivation has functioned

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as a historical practice and how this shapes its current articulation. If *de jure* (i.e. formal, legalised, institutional) deprivation was almost dormant during most of the twentieth century then de facto (i.e. practical, structural, everyday) deprivation was alive and well.

For many colonised people, Commonwealth citizens or 'subjects of the Crown', citizenship has never 'stuck'; it has slid off and over them. We need to remember that categories of the human have failed to stick to certain bodies/populations and such categories of the human are remade through contemporary border practices. Appealing to this genealogy of colonial deprivation allows us to consider more appropriately what the relationship is between citizens who are never allowed to belong and those who are formally made deportable, and with that killable. And in turn we must consider how this structures citizenship more broadly.

This is what I turn to now, offering up some examples to remind us how citizenship functioned across the British Empire, in processes of colonial domestication, before reflecting on the reworking of deprivation and monstrousness today as an extension and readaptation of colonial rule.

Deprivations under empire

On 27 April 1888 the SS *Afghan*, a Japanese-owned ship, was stopped from disembarking in Melbourne Harbour. On board were up to sixty-seven Chinese labourers who had travelled from Hong Kong for work in Victoria. Whilst the Chinese Restriction Act of 1881 allowed authorities in Victoria to restrict the movement of indentured Chinese labourers into the state, what was significant was that the majority of those travelling on the *Afghan* were British subjects. As subjects of the Crown they retained the right to move across the British Empire, codified in the promise of imperial citizenship which London was supposed to uphold (Gorman 2007). Amidst mounting pressure from white constituencies who argued that Chinese and other Asians were 'unsuited' for life in

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Australia and posed an economic threat, the local authorities kept the ship under quarantine (Crawford 2014).

As the *Afghan* remained in the harbour, the port authorities worked a sleight of hand: rather than merely outright refusing entry to those onboard, they instead worked to 'check the documents of the labourers' and found that their naturalisation papers and contracts were in fact 'not bonafide' (Campbell 1921); they were, to use a current parlance, 'illegalised'. Whilst protests were raised by both the ship's Japanese owners and elites in Hong Kong, local authorities agreed that this was enough to warrant suspicion and the ship was turned away from the state of Victoria and subsequently quarantined in Sydney (Turner 1904: 278–279). In order to avoid further incidents, the Australian government issued quarantine orders on any ships arriving from Hong Kong, forcing shipping companies to stop selling tickets to people of Chinese descent.

That the passports of around sixty British subjects could be rendered 'fake' or 'inauthentic' rests on how the body of these passport holders could never be fully translated into the authentic 'British subject'. Whilst paying lip service to the 'multiracial' Empire, the British authorities worked in union with the Australian settler state to deprive these subjects of their right to mobility. Several months after the crisis, Colonial Secretary Baron Knutsford expressed sympathy with Australian authorities, arguing that he was also 'keen on not seeing Australia swamped by Chinese labour' (Parl. Deb. 1888). Rather than being treated as British subjects, these labourers were instead translated into 'unwanted' remnants of the Empire. They could be subject to expulsion because the rights of 'imperial citizenship' could not stick.

As I demonstrated in chapter 2, this was how imperial citizenship was managed on an everyday level across the Empire: from dismantling direct shipping routes from the Indian subcontinent to settler states such as Canada, to medical inspections at the border, to the enactment of deportation and vagrancy orders. It was similarly found in the regular claims that identity papers were 'fake' or in claims that a person did not look like a spouse, partner or child of a British subject. These tactics became part of the institutional fabric of the Empire, where the claim

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over the right of mobility, settlement and life were made (im)possible for non-white populations. They could be moved but they never had a right to move.

In considering why those aboard the *Afghan* could be denied entry, it is worth turning to Browne's work on the early emergence of the control of movement. It is worth reminding ourselves that regulation has always been bound to distinctions over personhood. In contributing to a counter-history of the passport, Browne (2015: 52) shows how slaves were subject to extensive surveillance of mobility within and beyond the plantations of the Americas from the seventeenth century. This was regulated at ports, on slave ships, through the slave pass, in slave patrols and in 'wanted' posters. Merely not looking like a citizen (i.e. white) in many US states meant being subject to immediate and legally sanctioned violence. For instance, in 1845 a law in Georgia declared that any slave found off their master's plantation without a pass would be subject to arrest and a standard twenty lashings.

Browne goes on to explore how the figure of the black slave animated bordering practices more broadly across empire. For instance, she details the formation of *The Book of Negroes* in eighteenth-century New York (Browne 2015: 88). This was a ledger that allowed evacuation from the city aboard British ships. If former slaves could be included in the book, they were given a right of mobility out of America (as part of a claim to be a British subject). To Browne, the legal struggles over which black subjects could be included in the book, often against claims by former masters and opportunists that they were 'fugitive slaves', reveals a particular struggle over the racialised codes of personhood. It reveals a struggle over the right to be treated as a person with the *possibility* of legal and political rights, or be deprived of all personhood and translated into property.

What we can begin to see here in these brief examples is that deprivation is not only orientated towards depriving subjects of already existing rights. But deprivation follows a history of practices through which people have been categorised as political (in)humans with access to recognition, rights and dignity. Deprivation in this sense creates boundaries between

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who can be human or not-quite/non-human. As I have argued across this book, this was continuously shaped and resuscitated by claims to the familial. Such violent distinctions between categories of the human rebounded across the British Empire. Writing in 1879 to the Imperial Office in London, Francis Lock, Brigadier General of Aden, provided a detailed assessment of new powers to expel 'vagrants' in his province (Lock 1879). Musing over the usefulness of deportations, Lock argued that the main problem in Aden was 'African coastal migrants'. Whilst indentured labourers of 'good character' could be tolerated, he argued, Africans – who carried with them the 'essence of slavery' – merely cluttered the jail cells and lived lives of deviancy. 'They no doubt are pleased', he argued, 'to be clothed, fed and watered' (Lock 1879). Unconcerned whether the 'African coastal migrants' were British subjects, Lock proposed rounding up and expelling the whole of this idle and deviant population and barring them from re-entering the province.

Almost a decade later, the Governor General of Baluchistan, India, was outlining the best tactics to deal with the infiltration of 'trans-border rebels' into the Punjab region. Described as 'Muhammadan fanatics', the rebels were fighting a low-intensity insurgency against colonial outposts and hiding within the mountain villages (Spence 1887). Sharing a similar logic to Lock, the Governor General suggested that the penal criminal code was again inadequate to deal with these 'fanatics'. Banishment, deprivation of property rights, punishment of the wider family and tribe were all considered as possible options to deal with the rebels. However, it was proposed that the most effective deterrent to rebellion was to hang and burn the fanatic's body in front of their family and village (Archer 1887). This spectacular act of violence, it was argued, was the only way to send a message to the fanatics and the wider community. If this message was not heeded, soldiers were then ordered to burn the whole village to the ground, and force the villagers to cut and burn their own crops and trees (see the Frontier Murderous Outrages Regulation 1901, also Punjab Murderous Outrages Act XXII 1867 and Act IX 1877, which legislated forms of brutal collective punishment over the 'tribal areas' of what is now Pakistan).

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As with the figuration of the 'African coastal migrant', the fanatic or rebel needed to be subject to physical and public forms of suffering. The body of the fanatic was subject to gratuitous violence both before and after death, precisely because they were considered the monstrous *remainders* of social order. Rights as subjects of the Crown did not even form part of the social calculus in either case here. Nor did the associated kinship ties and community relations they were viewed as embedded within. The wider Indian penal code was too good for them; trial and imprisonment made no sense here. The 'African migrant', the 'fanatic', and then the whole 'Muhammadan village' were already rendered outside of logics of progress, labour and thus personhood.

Colonial differentiation

These scales of deprivation structured imperial and colonial rule. Whilst some subjects could become included within modes of personhood as not-quite-human (those who could pass as 'British subjects', labourers or who could be included in *The Book of Negroes*), this rested on the categorisation of others as non-human (the fake citizen-subject, the captured slave, the rebel/fanatic, the African coastal migrant). Here we are able to dig deeper into the different racialised-sexualised subject positions of coloniality, and with this the structural positionalities which are arguably resuscitated today through modern British citizenship. For certain classifications of colonised subjects, a right to labour, settlement and family could be provisionally met and sustained, as long as it worked in equilibrium with the demands of the imperial capitalist and liberal order. We might here consider the figure of the indentured labourer as one who is temporally employed, subject to disciplinary violence but included in a modified form of wage labour and certain rights of mobility and kinship, if not full personhood. Against this, other subjects were viewed as incapable of personhood and family life – as merely flesh, property or as a threat to the reproductive circulations of empire. The exemplary figure here is that of the ungendered slave who is converted to chattel, unable to ever attain access to European ideas of personhood

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such as gender, sexuality and family; their work is never convertible into labour, and they can never have family – they can only reproduce (Spillers 1987).

It is worth remembering here how the figure of the black slave has underpinned the stratification of people into human/not-quite/non-human. It was the black slave who was both denied family life, had all forms of kinship dismantled and was depicted as outside of liberal time and progress. Blackness, via the position of the slave, and engendered slave body, is the defining feature of the unfamilial. To Sharpe (2016), the black body has subsequently been demarcated as the site of gratuitous violence and suffering. Wilderson (2010) further argues that what arranges both suffering and death in colonial modernity is 'anti-blackness'. Following Weheliye (2014) and Mbembe (2003), anti-blackness relates to the structuring of violence and organises treatment of individuals and populations. Here anti-blackness and the propensity towards spectacular violence, social and physical death that reached its peak under chattel slavery can also be applied to other populations who are not socially recognised as 'black'. In this way we can consider how anti-blackness and the reducing of people, bodies, populations to the position of the non-human (i.e. the slave) structures all colonial categories of people and their treatment. Those who are cast in relationship to blackness can be subject to increasingly gratuitous violence (such as the fanatic or African coastal migrant above) because of how they are positioned on scales of differentiation between white and black. However, whilst the indentured labourer could be 'useful', the slave was ultimately expendable and *killable*. Whilst the indentured labourer held the structural position of the not-quite-human, the slave (and/or the fanatic) was explicitly non-human. Violence aimed at the non-human did not have to be justified or accounted for; it was already structurally accepted and normalised.

Struggles over the deprivation of personhood have arguably structured the foundations of modern citizenship. As I have begun to sketch out, this was premised not just on who had access to full political rights, but more fundamentally on who had the right to recognition of life,

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body, intimacy and personhood. Bringing this discussion back into the contemporary moment, we can reflect on how modern British citizenship has been consistently shaped by the (im)possible rights claims of colonised people. If we cast our minds back to chapter 3, we can remember that the British Nationality Act 1981, which created the national definition of British citizenship, relied on an act of mass deprivation. Whilst often overlooked, this Act effectively meant that some four million people across the Commonwealth were deprived of claiming their historic rights of British citizenship. It ended the rights that colonised people had fought to maintain and the legal framework that made it possible to move and settle in the British metropole, to join family members or support communities through work and remittances. Just as British subjects were denied rights and personhood across the Empire in a de facto fashion, this legal deprivation followed and institutionalised this legacy. It did so by marking out the national space as a white family hosting long-invited guests of colour (see Dixon 1983; Kundnani 2001).

As the case of grooming suggests, when these 'guests' transgress, their right to citizenship can be removed, a practice that is not open to white subjects whose citizenship never comes into question (criminal justice is the response to transgressions, not the border). What monstrous transgressions such as grooming reveal is that citizens of colour, following the rhythm and orientations of empire, have never really had full citizenship in the first place.

Impossible rights

In February 2018 the tabloid newspaper the *Sun* published an online article explicitly celebrating the assassination of Naveed Hussain (otherwise known as Abu Usamah al-Britani) by an RAF drone in northern Syria (Akbar 2018). The headline read: 'GO TO HELL'. Hussain remained a British citizen at the time of his death. The article represents a particular theatre of racist violence and sexualised voyeurism which is relevant here. It was reported that Hussain had previously attempted

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to convince a Page Three model to convert to Islam and join him in Syria. The paper celebrated Hussain's death as the destruction of a monstrous deviant. And it did so by juxtaposing his death with a half-naked picture of the 'innocent' white model, who we are invited to imagine has been 'saved' by the RAF drone strike. Revealing the slippery character of the deprivation of rights/personhood in our contemporary moment, on this occasion the British state did not remove Hussain's citizenship before his death. There was no legal wrangling. He was simply killed as an 'enemy combatant'.

What was particularly noticeable in this event were the circulations of rage, hatred and glee that ran through the comments under the online article. Most commenters celebrated the act and the need for more drone strikes ('Wonderful News!' read one from Redbean, 17 February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018). Others called for this kind of spectacular violence on UK streets: 'when finished over in sand-land they can land on the target in any UK inner city' (James Soros, 17 February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018). Again, as we saw in chapter 4, war comes 'home', attached as it is to the racialised-sexualised body of the non-human terrorist/monster. Such racist nationalism could be viewed as exceptional (even monstrous) as it often is to liberal audiences, with the one rejoinder that the killing of Hussain was carried out by the British military with barely a protest in the Houses of Parliament.

That the British state did not need to deprive Hussain of his citizenship formally is significant. It was not necessary because his citizenship could never stick in the first place. One comment on the *Sun* article (Maximus Hispania, 17 February 2018, comment on Akbar 2018) was just as revealing as the actions of the state:

> British? hahaha That monster has no British cultural background, even if he s [*sic*] born in London. Your parents condition your real nationality. And monsters like these don't deserve British citizenship.

At Sassen's (2016) 'systematic edge' (the assassination of an enemy combatant who remains a British citizen) we learn how tightly citizenship is bound to colonial intimacies and the white family. Monsters, we

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should remember, and those who occupy the structural positions of the non-familial/non-human monster have no citizenship in contemporary Britain.

Deprivation as colonial violence

Through the above examples, I hoped to illustrate the persistence of deprivation of citizenship and its varied forms. Deprivation is bound to broader claims to personhood, because if humanity cannot stick to certain bodies then how can citizenship? In this context, contemporary deprivation cannot only be understood as shaped by the War on Terror or the hostile environment.

Instead, deprivation might be more keenly understood as part of the wider racialised governance which has circulated globally throughout modern empire. It is not that British citizenship has been fundamentally altered but that for certain populations citizenship has always been impossible. It has been impossible because the humanity of colonised people is constantly in question. Contemporary changes to the rules of deprivation map onto, resuscitate and are normalised by this historic impossibility. Citizenship in this sense is not only imprinted by imperial 'legacies' but is better described as 'designed' to continue and enhance hierarchies of empire (for a more detailed discussion of 'failure by design' see Tyler 2010). Here contemporary imperial interests such as carrying out colonial military operations in the Middle East, the emergence of ISIS and the rapid expansion of 'surplus' populations through contemporary racialised capitalism meet up with older logics of deprivation.

I want to conclude this chapter by suggesting that cases of deprivation, exemplified by what happened in Rotherham, reveal important things about ongoing colonial and familial hierarchies. Citizenship in contemporary Britain is structured by the afterlife of the colonial categories of the human/not-quite/non-human

The powers of deprivation we have seen develop since 2002, which were expanded in the wake of the Rotherham grooming scandal, continue

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to make *all* citizens who have an attachment to another state, or who are naturalised or dual citizens, into potential 'migrants'. Here possessing citizenship can longer be viewed as protection against bordering and immigration practices. What the threat of deprivation does is transform mainly non-white citizens into a structural position akin to the indentured labourer – that is, these subjects hold provisional rights, and are subject to exploitation and discipline. This exploitation, discipline and provisional regime of rights are increasingly made arbitrary with limited recourse to legal challenge. These communities are made steadily deportable as borders become stickier – that is, they can be subject to citizenship stripping, detention and deportation as their rights become conditional. We can think here of how the removal of passports works as a method of enclosure, or of how those whose citizenship appears to be brought into question are denied essential medical treatment (Gentleman 2018a), or of the high rates of incarceration of young black and Asian men (Elliott-Cooper 2016). The indentured labourer, we should remember, was at times useful: they could be temporarily 'good' and 'worthy', they held provisional recognition of kinship. But their worth and rights were always contingent. This is the realm of the not-quite-human.

What conditions the temporality, control and exploitation of the not-quite-human is the possibility and threat of being subject to state-sanctioned and gratuitous violence. The normalised violence against monsters – street groomers, terrorists, gangs – reminds us that not-quite-human populations can be quickly transformed into killable bodies and populations. Here people who are stripped of their citizenship, abandoned, killed by drone strikes or extradited (Kapoor 2018: 51–83) are arguably subjected to the remnants of anti-black violence that we saw perpetrated against slaves, fanatics and 'African coastal migrants' above. Acts such as the deprivation of citizenship, drone assassinations, torture, expelling of unwanted migrants are orientated towards the destruction and raw punishment of bodies (Richter-Montpetit 2014). We can see this death drive in the glee that runs through the celebration of the deportation of grooming convicts, the expulsion of 'foreign criminals', the drone strikes on 'terrorists'. It is a spectacle of violence

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which is desired and celebrated as the gratuitous deaths of the monstrously perverse. But in these acts of violence is the structuring of the vulnerability of wider racialised populations whose rights and bodies are also brought into question. What differs in terms of the subject position of the racially exploited and those of the (fanatic or) terrorist is that rather than this violence being orientated towards life, as a productive force, it is focused on death. Here we can consider this parallel violence as linked to the history of anti-blackness as a death drive (Sexton 2011). This is the realm of the non-human. Because this violence is motivated through racialised-sexualised claims to personhood, intimacy and evolutionary ideas about family, it structures the treatment of wider populations and creates further conditions for the evisceration of rights and personhood.

Conclusion

What I have demonstrated in the last three chapters is that the family is bound to economies of life and death in ways that do not appear immediately obvious. Whilst chapter 3 examined the way that appeals to family worked to manage colonised populations as shams, in chapter 4 and here the family was orientated towards protecting and sustaining whiteness, bound as this is to gratuitous forms of violence. If the modern liberal family is outwardly presented as inclusive, when we push at this, we can see how imperial, privileged whiteness is reasserted powerfully. Family thus works as control but also dispossession in our contemporary moment. For example, borders are arranged to limit the rights to those deemed shams; citizenship is restricted through the denial of inheritance. But borders are equally bound to securing the white family against its perverse others.

Recognising that deprivation of citizenship acts as a particular form of sticky border has revealed the extent to which British citizenship is already sustained by colonial orientations and racialised logics. Here it is important to further examine how bordering haunts non-white

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citizens, whether they were born into British citizenship or whether they were naturalised – people can be subject to an evisceration of rights and subsequently their lives. This reminds citizens racialised as non-white that not only can they never 'belong' but that their access to personhood (and with it, rights, habeas corpus, survival) is constantly in doubt. In the case of parents losing their citizenship, this effectively means that dependent children are also stripped of their rights (Woods and Ross 2013). Just as legal categories of 'slave' or 'free person' were natally transferred or how citizenship is passed on through bloodline, in modern Britain deprivation can now be inherited through women's bodies (see, for example, Embury-Dennis 2019). This is not merely a 'legacy' of empire, attuned as it is to hierarchies of imperialism, but the ongoing fabric of colonial rule which feeds off the stratification and management of populations along deeply racialised lines.

To understand the role that monstrous violence plays in contemporary bordering is to be attuned to the way that spectacular violence and suffering remains attuned to anti-blackness. Here coloniality is animated by securing the white heteronormative family and paternally managing 'tolerable' populations; but it is equally bound to the spectacle and desire to inflict punishment and suffering, orientated towards bringing certain ways of being in the world to an end. If the feminised body of the reproductive (unintegrated) woman is a threat to the nation through her fertility and failed motherhood (as we saw in the chapter 3), the masculinised monster demands more martial solutions.

If non-white citizens are rendered deportable populations, attached to the legacy of the indentured labourer, they are bound to an inevitable form of failed (or sham) citizenship. They remain positioned by liberal developmentalism as an example of underdeveloped sexuality and family life within the postmetropole. This works to legitimise forms of violent bordering that not only control but also expel people, and in so doing enhances inequalities and creates even more precarious populations and spaces of abandonment. Underpinning this, and structuring this precarity, is the ever-present possibility of being demarcated as killable; as the monstrous; as the expendable. This is the demarcation of not

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only failed citizenship but also failed futurity (Mbembe 2003), where bodies are rendered beyond the social calculus; that is, outside of and without a future.

Notes

1 This chapter was based on archival work undertaken in 2016 and 2017 at the National Archives, Kew, the British Library, London, and the Bristol Archives.

2 Deprivation of citizenship can be done on the basis that it is in the 'public good'. The definition of this is entirely up to the discretion of the Home Secretary. Subjects can appeal through SIAC. However, because the state has the legal right to withhold evidence if it is in the 'interest of national security', defendants and lawyers rarely have adequate material to base their case on. Equally, the Home Office regularly issues deprivation orders when a subject is out of the country, meaning that lodging an appeal may be impossible in the time frame (ten days after a letter of expulsion has been received). Courts are extremely cautious of overturning cases based on issues of security. Furthermore, the legal basis of deprivation stands on such arbitrary grounds that even suspicion of collusion with terrorist organisations can be enough for the court to rule in favour of the Home Office. This evidence-light approach is reflected in the low success rates of appeals: between 2009 and 2017, only one appeal against citizenship deprivation was successful, six were dismissed, two were struck out and three remained open (a list of decisions can be found at http://siac.decisions.tribunals.gov.uk/).

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