A history of the US nuclear presence in Britain from its origins in 1946 through to the run-down of strategic forces following the Cuba crisis and the coming of the missile age. The book deals with the initial negotiations over base rights, giving a detailed treatment of the informal and secret arrangements to establish an atomic strike capability on British soil. The subsequent build-up is described, with the development of an extensive base network and the introduction of new and more advanced types of bomber aircraft. Relations with the British during these developments are a central focus but tensions within the USAF are also dealt with. The book recounts the emergence of the UK as a nuclear power through prolonged negotiations with the US authorities. It deals in detail with the arrangements for RAF aircraft to carry US nuclear weapons, and the development of joint strike planning. A concluding chapter provides a critical assessment of the UK role in the Anglo-American nuclear alliance.
The TransAtlantic reconsidered brings together established experts from Atlantic History and Transatlantic Studies – two fields that are closely connected in their historical and disciplinary development as well as with regard to the geographical area of their interest. Questions of methodology and boundaries of periodization tend to separate these research fields. However, in order to understand the Atlantic World and transatlantic relations today, Atlantic History and Transatlantic Studies should be considered together. The scholars represented in this volume have helped to shape, re-shape, and challenge the narrative(s) of the Atlantic World and can thus (re-)evaluate its conceptual basis in view of historiographical developments and contemporary challenges. This volume thus documents and reflects on the changes within Transatlantic Studies during the last decades. New perspectives on research reconceptualize how we think about the Atlantic World. At a time when many political observers perceive a crisis in transatlantic relations, critical evaluation of past narratives and frameworks will provide an academic foundation to move forward.
The book explores Carter’s human rights policy and its contradictory impact on
US–Soviet affairs. It argues that the administration envisioned its approach to
the Soviet Union as moving along two interdependent tracks that were supposed to
form a “virtuous circle”. On the one side, the United States aimed to renew its
ideological challenge to the USSR through human rights and to persuade the
Soviets to ease internal repression in order to strengthen Congressional support
for détente and arms control. On the other, continuing the bipolar dialogue, the
administration aimed to promote human rights further in the USSR. Contrary to
what he envisioned, Carter was caught between Scylla and Charybdis. The more
vigorously the White House pursued human rights in bipolar relations, the more
the Soviets lost interest in détente; the more the administration relegated
human rights to quiet diplomacy, the more critics within the United States
accused the president of abandoning his commitment to human rights. Trapped in
this contradiction, Carter’s human rights policy did not build domestic support
for arms control and worsened bipolar relations. In the end, the White House
lost the opportunity to stabilize bipolar relations and the domestic support
Carter had managed to garner in 1976. Critics of détente, helped by the Iran
hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defeated him.
, after all, ‘everybody else had
just had a war’ so it was their turn.3 Veterans could not be drawn on the
point and few used the phrase ‘Third World War’ in their recollections.
Yet it was a frequent question and reflected the context in which the
interviews took place. From the vantage point of the very end of the ColdWar, historians and commentators regarded Korea as one of the sparks
that could have led to a global conflict –safe in the knowledge that it had
not. The ‘Third World War’ label did not stick: by this stage, the war was
so firmly welded to its
Introduction: the ColdWar as an
Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann
The ColdWar began as a metaphor.1 It was an analogy that used temperature to indicate a state of conflict just short of an actual ‘hot’ war.
When George Orwell coined the term ‘coldwar’ in his article in Tribune
on 19 October 1945, he situated the genealogy of this new type of conflict in the connections between democratisation, empire building and
weapons technology. Military weapons, Orwell knew, are an instrument
of power well beyond their actual use on the
the Jewish state, and not East Berlin and Israel; and how and why it was achieved against the backdrop of the German ColdWar and the intensifying Arab–Israeli conflict. By doing so, this study has placed the origins of the entente between West Germany and Israel, and the estrangement between the GDR and the Jewish state, within the context of the global ColdWar.
The ColdWar or, rather, invocations of its importance for German Israelpolitik , influenced Bonn’s and East Berlin’s stance towards Israel in complex ways. In the wake of the enunciation of
Britain is often revered for its extensive experience of waging ‘small wars’. Its long imperial history is littered with high profile counter-insurgency campaigns, thus marking it out as the world's most seasoned practitioners of this type of warfare. Britain's ‘small wars’ ranged from fighting Communist insurgents in the bamboo-laden Malayan jungle, marauding Mau Mau gangs in Kenyan game reserves, Irish republican terrorists in the back alleys and rural hamlets of Northern Ireland, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan's Helmand province. This is the first book to detail the tactical and operational dynamics of Britain's small wars, arguing that the military's use of force was more heavily constrained by wider strategic and political considerations than previously admitted. Outlining the civil-military strategy followed by the British in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, Defending the Realm argues that Britain's small wars have been shaped by a relative decline in British power, amidst dramatic fluctuations in the international system, just as much as the actions of military commanders and civilian officials ‘on the spot’ or those formulating government policy in London. Written from a theoretically-informed perspective, grounded in rich archival sources, oral testimonies and a reappraisal of the literature on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, Defending the Realm is the definitive account of the politics of Britain's small wars. It will be of interest to political scientists and historians, as well as scholars, students, soldiers and politicians who wish to gain a more critically informed perspective of the political trappings of war.
This is the first monograph length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practiced against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and revaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
The fall of the Berlin Wall brought
to an end a well established way of looking at the world. Throughout the
ColdWar era, Western governments were generally clear about who their
enemies were and whom they could count on as allies. For the ‘free
world, united under American leadership against the ‘evil
empire’ in the East, anti-communism provided a stable framework
of being “liberal” about it’.1 The Korean
War had come to Britain.
This book assesses the social impact of this ‘small war’ on Britain,
a war frequently overlooked by popular culture and historians alike.
During three years of war on the distant Korean peninsula post-war
Britain was confronted with the complex realities of the ColdWar.
From allegations about American use of ‘germ’ warfare to anxiety over
Communist ‘brainwashing’ methods, the Korean War precipitated a series
of short-lived crises in 1950s Britain. Throughout late June and July 1950