broad array of platform and weapon acquisition programs’. Another indication is the growing presence of Chinese military and paramilitary assets in the seas and maritime airspace of EastAsia and the mounting number of reports of Chinese vessels engaged in manoeuvres that are harassing or dangerous towards their foreign counterparts ( Dickie and Hille, 2011 ; Fackler, 2013 , 2014 ; New York Times , 2009 ). Yet another is China’s increasingly forceful pursuit of maritime territorial claims that conflict with its neighbours, promoting its claim using military assets
. 62. He also
notes (p. 68) ‘the likelihood that acceptance of the norms relating to indigenous
peoples will provide a ﬁrmer base for the pursuit of legal goals in the sphere of afﬁrmative action than the orthodox principles and standards . . . concerning human rights’.
Corntassel and Primeau, ‘Indigenous sovereignty’, 344–5.
‘The applicability of the international legal concept of “indigenous peoples” in
Asia’, in J. R. Bauer and D. Bell (eds.), The EastAsian Challenge for Human Rights
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
War monuments and the contradictions of Japan’s post-imperial commemoration
‘modern’ EastAsian nation, there emerged,
however, a craze for fêting successful individuals, including
military men. According to Sven Saalar, ‘between 1880 and
1928, more than 800 of these statues were erected throughout
Japan’. 6 In
fact, the Japanese government did not only push this campaign during
its imperial era. A large number of reconstructed or redacted sites
unambiguous and also understandably unwelcome, as it conveys a patronising message of Brussels ‘supervising’ the quality of Japanese foreign policies ( Reiterer, 2013 , 2015).
In September 2005, Brussels and Tokyo began discussing Asian security issues on a regular basis by launching the ‘EU–Japan Strategic Dialogue on EastAsian Security’ ( Mykal, 2011 ). The establishment of that dialogue was preceded by the establishment of the ‘EU–US Dialogue on EastAsian Security’ in 2004. Given that the EU weapons
British travel and tourism in the post-imperial world
nineteenth-century counterparts, unilaterally producing and sustaining
fantasies of backward though exotic ‘others’ in order to
dominate them economically and culturally. The governments of
post-colonial nations often colluded in maintaining such ideas in order
to attract tourist dollars. For example, the international tourist
brochures, posters and magazines put out by South-EastAsian tour
influencing societies in our period.
The world-regionality dynamic is particularly visible in such processes as the
development of the European Union as a multi- and supranational governance
system in the European world region, in the rise of China in the EastAsia and
also in the new power and potential of some developing societies across the
world’s continents. To explore globalisation’s world-regionality dynamic and its
implications for mega-events in this chapter we look East. We discuss the role
Mega-events and global change
of mega-events such as the Beijing
Southeast Asia has traditionally occupied a marginal role in US foreign policy in general and US Asia policy in particular, and American commitment to the region has remained quite ambivalent since the end of the Cold War. But during his time in office, US President Barack Obama raised the level of US attention given to Southeast Asia and the Association of South EastAsian Nations (ASEAN) to a level not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. 1 Seeing Southeast Asia and ASEAN as vital to preserving what it referred to as the rules
changing international order mean for Japan? And second, how should Japan respond? With one very major exception – the tragedy of the Greater EastAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere – Japan has not historically sought to establish itself as a pole in its own right. Rather, it has focused on finding ways to adapt to, maintain autonomy in, and gain prestige from the given international order. Thus, the explanatory and normative sides of the Japanese discourse have been closely intertwined, with one informing the other.
The interplay between these dimensions is
China and the concept of multipolarity in the post Cold War era
Nicholas Khoo and Zhang Qingmin
three poles should be considered, but differ on their identity. Thus, scholars variously count the US, Europe, and EastAsia, or the US, Germany, and Japan.
Others identify five entities, including the US, Japan, Europe, Russia, and China, while still others opt for six, adding India.
At times, the Chinese government has even considered the bloc of developing countries as a pole.
immediately successful in gaining a cartooning job that permitted the expression of his critical and satirical impulses, so in 1961 he decided to travel in Australia's immediate region:
Just having come back from Britain which was extricating itself from the colonies, it seemed to me that you had to know who were the geographic scene you were with and the cultural scene that is next door. …
I went to South EastAsia … You sort of knew, there was an emergency in Indonesia – the