victim to the populist-led fear campaign against EU membership – a campaign aided and abetted by many of Cameron’s fellow Conservative Party members.
Cameron was replaced as Conservative Party leader and prime minister by Theresa May, who in March 2017 initiated the process of negotiating the UK’s departure from the EU. The process, under Article 50 of the LisbonTreaty on European Union, promised to stretch out over many months or even years. Whether it will end up as a “soft” departure, with generous terms for the UK, or a more punitive approach, remains to be
Against that background the current debate on the outcome of the EU referendum is hopelessly inadequate. Among former Remainers as well as former
Leavers, the prevailing assumption is that, because around 37 per cent of the
eligible electorate voted Leave, there is nothing more to be said. Article 50 of
the Lisbontreaty has been invoked; and that is the end of the story. But as Lord
Kerr, who wrote Article 50, has pointed out, the British government’s Article
50 application is revocable. In fact, the future is open. We are not doomed to
suffer the economic
deployment of these units. In June 2017, the European Council had cited the
LisbonTreaty in its effort to broaden the base of the costs that members
incurred in support of the program. Specifically, the BGs would consist of
1,500 personnel who would be prepared for 30-day missions that could be
extended to 120 days. The aim would be the establishment of two such units
at a time, and they would be in standby for six months. Overall, the BGs
’ (McCarthy, 1997: vii). The goal was to take the project of
modernity further forward. The ‘prolonged depression’ in Europe anticipated
by Habermas (2005: 4) in the event of a French ‘No’ vote would form part of
a deeper civilisation malaise, not just be a recurrence of Europessimism.
Even after the rejection of the LisbonTreaty by Irish voters in 2008,
Habermas (2008a) continued to campaign for the legitimation of Europe’s
constitutional order. In an article from the same year, he remembered the role
played by Wolfgang Abendroth
. Available at:
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35616768 [accessed 1
Buzek , J. ( 2009 ) ‘ Europe is back on
track: the LisbonTreaty good for Ireland – good for
Europe ’. European Parliament
press release , 3 October. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20091003IPR61802+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
rejection of the Nice and Lisbontreaties in Ireland. Because of the perception of
Ireland as a good European, ‘when Ireland voted No to the Treaty
of Nice in June 2001, the reaction in many quarters was as if a good
pupil had suddenly misbehaved’ ( Holmes
2005a : 1). The further No vote on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008
suggested that ‘Ireland’s long-standing consensus on the
25:2 (1994), pp. 179–95.
3 Peillon, ‘Placing Ireland in a Comparative Perspective’.
4 Lee Komito, ‘Brokerage or Friendship? Politics and Networks in Ireland’, Economic and
Social Review, 23:2 (1992), pp. 129–42.
5 Denis O’Hearn, The Atlantic Economy: Britain, the US and Ireland (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2001).
6 Seán Ó Riain, The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger: Liberalism, Boom and Bust
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2014).
7 John O’Brennan, ‘Ireland Says No Again: The 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon
5 Details of the CSDP are available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
6 Details of the Berlin Plus agreement are available at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/
7 Sushma Ramachandran, “The Expanding EU-India Relationship,” The Hindu,
July 5, 2005.
Indian foreign policy
8 For details on India–EU trade relationship, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
9 The full text of the Joint Action Plan
and transparency of the EU and was, arguably, ‘a harbinger of better governance’
(Dinan 2005: 182). The Constitutional Treaty, however, did not garner adequate
public support and was effectively abandoned in 2005 following failed referendums in France and the Netherlands. The document was eventually replaced by
the LisbonTreaty (2007). In terms of content, the LisbonTreaty does not depart
substantially from the Constitutional Treaty. The former preserves most of the
content of the latter. The LisbonTreaty outlines the exclusive policy competences
of the EU, but
would command general respect, but would
not be a prime minister or president currently in ofﬁce. The LisbonTreaty
conﬁrmed the ofﬁce. This move, among others, was designed to address the
question of identiﬁability in matters concerning responsibility for leading
the Union (Blavoukos et al. 2007).
Several issues can be raised at this point. First, there is the major question regarding the clarity of the division of labour between the respective
roles of European Council president and Commission president. Both the
European Council and the Commission de facto play a