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the findings they arrived at in relation to the threat of transnational terrorism. Thirdly, it will support enquiry into which players impacted most on the review of security policy after 9/11 and whether their dominance had to do with heightened financial and/or political pressures on the agencies. Finally, it will be used to find out if the ‘rules’ governing the scope, extent, style and pace of the
of providing an answer to most of the important issues in international relations. The uninfringeable principle of sovereignty is presented as a necessary condition for stability, Russia’s longstanding opposition to separatism and terrorism is portrayed as an ideal example of how to counter terrorism and Russia’s resistance to efforts by the United States to bypass the UN Security Council is
policy management? Finally we turn to culture: in the years since 9/11 much has been made of the need to radically improve the Garda’s culture of management and discipline (Dáil Debates, 2006b, pp. 13–18). Shortcomings in these regards matter because of the risk to the credibility of Garda evidence in terrorist trials and to public cooperation with counter-terrorism efforts (Tribunal of Inquiry 2004
. (George W. Bush, BBC, 11/03/02) FROM THE Peloponnesian War to the ‘war on terrorism’, neutrality has been depicted as an unrealistic and unacceptable security stance. It is commonly regarded as the security choice of small and weak states, a position that is synonymous with self-interested isolationism. Neutral states are largely
are to invest in the notion that the end of the Cold War, the call to stronger international forms of securitisation and a ‘war on terrorism’ render neutrality a thing of the past, then why is a neutralist stance still the definitive aspect of the foreign policies of Sweden, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Malta? These ‘militarily non-aligned’ states seem unable to make a decisive break from neutrality
security agenda, including terrorism and illegal trafficking, it may not be possible, in the longer term, to maintain such a clear distinction between the internal and external conceptions. At the national level, there has already been some convergence and the European level may have to follow suit, amending the Pillar structure accordingly. 3 This relates not only to how pre-existing policy proposals per
beforehand. The most graphic demonstration yet of the potency of transnational terrorism it may have been, but 9/11 was no critical juncture for those with responsibility for the proactive aspects of Irish security. Identifying the fundamental characteristics of the policy sphere is one thing. Exposing the manifestations of these characteristics is another. Buzan’s framework for threat
, become generative of international terrorism ( Bourdieu 1998b , 20). For Bourdieu, ‘terrorist violence, through the irrationalism of the despair which is almost always at its root, refers back to the inert violence of the powers which invoke reason’ ( Bourdieu 1998b , 20). In a dialectical sense, the habitus of politically violent entities as ‘irrational’ exists as a ‘product of our rationalism, imperialist, invasive and conquering’ ( Bourdieu 1998b , 20). Bourdieu’s perception of the impact of historical neoliberal and neo-colonial domination may be considered in
1969. Doing so will also help contextualise subsequent analysis. For example, the discussion on Northern Ireland will consider, among other issues, the use of law against subversion, what on-island terrorism meant for the Defence Forces’ operational posture and the challenges which border security posed for the frontline agencies. Finally, and by way of placing contemporary Irish national security
networks would come down against attacking Ireland lest it jeopardise Irish overseas development aid: Well, again what you have to take into account is that Ireland has a very strong tradition of help and aid in developing countries and countries where a lot of the terrorism came from or potentially came from. And you’ll find that