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pragmatically, while the latter represents a much more fundamental raison d’être for a political movement – or in this case, a group in the European Parliament. There can be subsequent differences between a party having some sort of deep-rooted political ideology and it belonging to a wider and long-established European party family such as conservatism, nationalism or Christian democracy. Party families are a method of grouping together ideologically similar parties into a broader category, and have often defined the comparative study of European political systems in the
that the EU ought to be reformed, but not destroyed or abandoned. This essentially soft-Eurosceptic position is an entirely mainstream view in European politics and has actually been broadly in line with moderate public opinion across European countries since the start of the eurozone debt crisis. Furthermore, it is also perfectly reasonable (if not necessarily exactly quite the same thing) to root that Euro-realism is a centre-right, economically liberal world view based on a belief that the state should be small and that people should be ‘free’. It has been argued
The 1815 Congress of Vienna is often seen by historians and political scientists alike as a turning point in European politics, with lasting consequences for international security and order. In this chapter, I examine one of the Congress's lesser-known outcomes – the creation of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine – to interrogate the extent to which the Congress and the Rhine Commission represented a new direction for European politics. Two opposing forces framed the Congress of Vienna and its stance toward cooperation
repurposed in new social contexts, and often take on political meanings deeply divergent from what their originators intended. Students of the history of political thought are acutely aware of these complexities in the development of European political ideas during the early modern and modern eras, given the centrality of such ideas for shaping the political worlds in which we now live. These European countries were not only engaged in processes of political debate and transformation among themselves, however. They were also, at the same time, expanding their colonial
’, Comparative Political Studies, 31 (3): http://infotrac.galegroup.com. Jahn, D. and Henn, M. (2000) ‘The “new” rhetoric of New Labour in comparative perspective: a three-country discourse analysis’, West European Politics, 23 (1), January. Kelly, P. (1976) The Unmaking of Gough (Sydney: Angus & Robertson). Kesselman, M. (1982) ‘Prospects for democratic socialism in advanced capitalism: class struggle and compromise in Sweden and France’, Politics & Society, 11. Kitschelt, H. (2000) ‘The German political economy and the 1998 election’, in D. P. Conradt, G. R. Kleingeld and C
–239 . Arter , D. ( 2015 ) ‘ A “pivotal centre party” calls the shots: the 2015 Finnish general election ’, West European Politics , 38 ( 6 ): 1345–1353 . Bergholm , T. & Bieler , A. ( 2013 ) ‘ Globalization and the erosion of the Nordic model: a Swedish–Finnish comparison ’, European Journal of Industrial Relations , 19 ( 1 ): 55
be, at stake, such as European Political Co-operation (EPC) that was merely codified in a legal text, intergovernmentalism effectively prevailed as the dominant mode of decision-taking. Moreover, no subsequent alteration of the locus of sovereignty emerged as a result of 42 Theory and reform in the European Union the coming into force of the SEA in July 1987, although it did pave the way for higher levels of power-sharing in the Community system. An equally important line of criticism directed against resurgent neofunctionalist aspirations came from a number of
the future of the union, fresh investigation which emphasizes the capacity of actors to cooperate might be welcome. As outlined below, ideas in this book were conceived at a point (2014/15) at which a key problem in European politics was the propensity of certain countries to exploit others. Events have progressed since this time; the most pressing matter now appears to be preservation of the EU itself. Though the issue of core–periphery inequality remains crucial, a priority of future research may be to discover the conditions in which European harmony can be
opinion has been happy to buy the product/story. What ‘Kosovo’ also offers is a template for academics, by which to test and taste a smorgasbord of new, often critical, ideas about European politics and security. Whereas some would label ‘Kosovo’ as politics-cum-war as usual, the vast majority (and certainly not a silent one, this time) seems to share the view that this event stands for ‘something different’. NATO’s war over
together, this wave constitutes the biggest change in the European political landscape at least since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Heinö, 2016 : 4). In the US, because party structures are much more porous and pliable, the populist surge was channelled through a two-party system and, given Trump's primary victories, the pressures were felt most immediately and acutely within the Republican Party. Established conservative currents were brutally disrupted. There were also class divisions that added to the tensions within Republican ranks. The Trump campaign captured