ambiguities within discourses which resist them. Notably, the method of this study was phenomenological. It aims to unpack the range of ‘what it feels like’ – not to quantify Islamophobia, Orientalism, racism or their lack among hiloni millennials.
The first part of the chapter provides context. It analyses how the Jewish-Israeli public reads Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Iran through the lens of the long historical experience of Jews with anti-Semitism in Europe and the Middle East. Stereotypes of Islamic fanaticism emerged in their contemporary form in Israel in
apparent in different regional theatres such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Quartet grievances with Qatar focused on claims of its support for terrorism, unacceptable close relations with Iran and interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries. However, upon examination, the dispute could be viewed through a prism of regional competition. This regional rivalry involves supporting opposite political sides, with Qatar betting on the rise of Islamist groups in the region.
The intra-GCC dispute has a huge political, economic and
Genealogies of Shiʿa humanitarianism in Pakistan, England, and Iraq
cent of the world’s Muslim population. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, much literature on transnational Shiʿism has focused on Shiʿa politics as infused with revolt and protest against Western modernity (e.g., Cole and Keddie, 1985 ; Louer, 2008 , 2012 ). From this vantage point, political action in Shiʿa contexts has been predominantly framed as based on theological principles, thereby constituting a counterforce to the ideal of secular statehood. At the same time, increasingly violent sectarian encounters between Shiʿa and Sunni factions in Pakistan (e
–conditional on granting and realising certain levels of human rights.
Membership of the international family becomes manifest visually and verbally. In recent Iran–US relations, for example, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad
began to communicate directly to US President Bush. Ahmadinejad sent a letter
in 2006 writing as if they were brothers, both men of God trying to uphold moral
communities or nations-as-families. Ahmadinejad admonished Bush personally
for war on terror policies that failed to live up to Christian morality and for letting
victims of Hurricane Katrina suffer
launched statist economic modernisation that laid the foundations of economic independence. He defended Turkish autonomy in foreign policy by playing off the great powers, Bolshevik Russia, Britain, France and Germany while avoiding entanglements in their rivalries (Keyder 1987: 71–115). In Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted to imitate Ataturk as a nationalist modernizer, although Iran was less developed and subject to the rival influences of Russia and Britain which controlled its oil.
In the Arab world, no smooth adaptation to independent statehood
. When a structure is unpalatable, yet reproducing that structure would give the actor in question immediate reward in terms of goals (episodic power-to), the conflict is deep and the sense of frustration palpable. For the less powerful, destructuring social structures that could deliver desirable outcomes elicits justifications of self-sacrifice and even martyrdom. 2-D conflict entails avoiding structural reproduction and, at times, this may include avoiding much-desired goals.
To win or not to win?
Iran has a policy of not recognizing the Y-status of the state
(4) of the Charter proscribes the threat as well as the use of force. They are not therefore limited to actual applications or instances of force – at least not in theory – and it is important that we recognize the actual or potential relevance of these rules well before the ‘launch’ of any ‘air strikes’ (considered by Byers in respect of the United States and Iran). So the Security Council seemed to say in Resolution 487 (1981) when it advised Israel against making any ‘threats’ of force. Yet such threats have become a recurring theme in international politics since
nation-building strategies. By contrast, special prevention
employs specific measures aimed at a specific conflict at a specific
stage (Zellner, 2002 : 18–19). The conflict
over the nature and purpose of the Iranian nuclear power programme is a
case of special prevention. Economic, financial/ technical, and political efforts
can be particularly effective when dealing with security threats such as
Asad escaped the constraints such dependence could have put on his options by balancing between rival Soviet/East European, West European, Arab Gulf and Iranian sources of aid (Clawson 1989; Diab 1994: 87; Waldner 1995). By 1986, Syria had enormous armed forces for a state of its size: 5,000 tanks, 500,000 men under arms, and some 400 ballistic missiles. According to Evron (1987), the result was a mutual deterrence that relatively stabilised the Syrian-Israeli military confrontation.
In Saudi Arabia
States would focus on strengthening its economic and security relations with Europe, while remaining conscious of the threat of Chinese communism to ‘Vietnam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran’. His last speech that remained undelivered due to his assassination that year contained proposals to use these countries on the ‘periphery of the Communist world’ to contain China, ‘infusing 3.5 million allied troops along the Communist frontier at one-tenth the cost of maintaining a comparable number of American soldiers’. 2 Immediately