authorities and the civilian population, while establishing a rationale for its presence and command. The factual veracity of these claims is not as important as what they represent for the capacity to define the problem and the solution. For instance, speaking of the success of the IB that was authorised by the UN Security Council in response to the M-23, a MONUSCO officer indicated that: ‘The UN is claiming that we won, but it is the FARDC that did most of the fighting, the IB was only supporting. The M-23 was defeated because it didn’t have Rwandan support, Western FARDC
humanitarian objectives, and so neo-humanitarians found ready partners for the “new” low-intensity wars of the 1990s. Close cooperation in Somalia ( Maren 1997 ) and Rwanda prompted many humanitarian organizations to call for a military-based humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and a growing sense among some that the classic principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence “have
The election of Barack Obama was a milestone in US history with tremendous symbolic importance for the black community. But was this symbolism backed up by substance? Did ordinary black people really benefit under the first black president?
This is the question that Andra Gillespie sets out to answer in Race and the Obama Administration. Using a variety of methodological techniques—from content analysis of executive orders to comparisons of key indicators, such as homeownership and employment rates under Clinton, Bush, and Obama— the book charts the progress of black causes and provides valuable perspective on the limitations of presidential power in addressing issues of racial inequality. Gillespie uses public opinion data to investigate the purported disconnect between Obama’s performance and his consistently high ratings among black voters, asking how far the symbolic power of the first black family in the White House was able to compensate for the compromises of political office.
Scholarly but accessible, Race and the Obama Administration will be of interest to students and lecturers in US politics and race studies, as well as to general readers who want to better understand the situation of the black community in the US today and the prospects for its improvement.
This book explores the reasons and justifications for the Chinese state’s campaign to erase Uyghur identity, focusing, in particular, on how China’s manipulation of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has facilitated this cultural genocide. It is the first book to address this issue in depth, and serves as an important rebuttal to Chinese state claims that this campaign is a benign effort to combat an existential extremist threat. While the book suggests that the motivation for this state-led campaign is primarily China’s gradual settler colonization of the Uyghur homeland, the text focuses on the narrative of the Uyghur terrorist threat that has provided international cover and justification for the campaign and has shaped its ‘biopolitical’ nature. It describes how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was able to successfully implicate Uyghurs in GWOT and, despite a lack of evidence, brand them internationally as a serious terrorist threat within the first year of the war. In recounting these developments, the book offers a critique of existing literature on the Uyghur terrorist threat and questions the extent of this threat to the PRC. Finding no evidence for the existence of such a threat when the Chinese state first declared its existence in 2001, the book argues that a nominal Uyghur militant threat only emerged after over a decade of PRC suppression of Uyghur dissent in the name of counterterrorism, facilitating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ that has served to justify further state repression and ultimately cultural genocide.
emergence of R2P As demonstrated in Chapter 3 , the international contestation of humanitarian intervention grew increasingly strong during the second half of the 1990s. By 1995 humanitarian intervention was already being heavily criticised in view of the “catastrophic mission failures in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, characterised by the failure of UN [troops] to protect themselves and those under their care” (Bellamy 2011 , 171). The delegation of humanitarian intervention by the UN to regional organisations did not stop the criticism, for
court decision shows that soldiers can be held accountable not only for participating directly in war crimes, but also for facilitating them indirectly. The example of the Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the ill-fated United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda, raises the same questions as the case from Srebrenica. In 1994, the world witnessed the
terrorist incidents Iraq Pakistan Afghanistan Turkey Algeria More than 2,500 terrorist incidents Middle East, North Africa, Near East Table 2.1 Frequency of terrorist events by country (1970–2013)* Nigeria Somalia South Africa Angola Sudan Uganda Kenya Burundi Mozambique Congo (Kinshasa) Rwanda Ethiopia Guatemala Nicaragua Argentina Mexico Bolivia Puerto Rico Honduras Ecuador Venezuela Brazil Sub-Saharan Africa Chile Colombia Peru El Salvador Latin America THE LOGIC OF OUR APPROACH 77 include gaining attention, influencing electoral outcomes, inciting
and humanitarianism top priorities for the office. He assumed office in 1997 but his prior position was that of head of UN peacekeeping, which included overseeing the disastrous missions in Rwanda and Bosnia. As such, he was keenly aware of the human costs of Security Council paralysis and the consequences of failing to take meaningful action to back up strong diplomatic words. He also was aware that the existing “standard operating procedures” of UN diplomacy were contributing to the inability of the UN to confront genocide and gross violations of human rights
Kenyatta on the dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighboring states, and the mission assigned to Congolese President Mobutu in respect to the dispute between Burundi and Rwanda among many others. 7 As the Cold War drew to a close there was a renewed enthusiasm for enhancing the capacity of the OAU to manage conflict in Africa. The July 1990 Report of the OAU Secretary General on the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and Their Implications for Africa acknowledged the changing international landscape, the scourge of conflicts in
crises such as those in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia or during specific periods of the 1990s. Yet they do not analyse France's overall role in the emergence and development of humanitarian intervention – and the rationale behind it – throughout the decade. A review of the literature available on the 2000s and the 2010s demonstrates that this shortfall is not confined to the 1990s, but is in fact both widespread and ongoing. These oversights are problematic for two main reasons. First, they prevent us from fully understanding the development of key