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no introduction, but insofar as it reflects a dynamic process – fluid, intangible – I need to briefly give my account of it. The War on Terror stands at the intersection of two of the greatest ideologies of our time: capitalism and the global military–industrial complex, on the one hand, and nationalism and the management of belonging, on the other.3 I refer to both ideologies as ‘Power’ throughout this chapter. Naturally, Muslims have a special relationship with the War on Terror. On the one hand, obstructing the war industry’s relentless march against evil is
special relationship as part of its broader repositioning of the US ship of state were also evident. Not helped by the indignity of having the traditional Rose Garden press conference relegated to an indoor press availability event on Brown’s inaugural meeting with Obama, as snowstorms swept across the US capital, such concerns were only slightly assuaged by the President’s subsequent description of the transatlantic relationship as ‘special and strong’, and by his affirmation that Britain remained one of the ‘closest and strongest allies’ of the US.4 Anxious to remain
February On 11 February, Housing Minister Richard Crossman contended that Britain had put itself ‘in the hands of American politicians’, because of Wilson’s determination to ‘recreate the Anglo-American axis, the special relationship between Britain and America’. 1 Although Wilson sought close ties with the White House, it is clear that if President Johnson wanted any such close relationship it would be
commitment to East of Suez and to the parity of sterling – both of which were important to the ‘special relationship’. Wilson’s performance delighted Johnson, with the result he used his luncheon toast not only to eulogise the Prime Minister but as a means of bolstering sterling in the eyes of currency speculators. The general election In 1966 Wilson was, as ever, concerned that Britain
Johnson’s part, Wilson’s unrealism, and Rostow’s scepticism as well as the ambivalence of Moscow. 76 It is certainly clear that the affair did strain an already fragile relationship between the Prime Minister and the President. The ‘special relationship’ On 1 January 1967, Cabinet minister Richard Crossman complained that the ‘personal reliance on LBJ’ evident in Britain’s dull, ‘Bevinite’ foreign policy
of ‘quality’ becomes ever more of a priority in high-end television drama, it is perhaps an open question as to whether such programming in the future will have anything to say for or about the nation. Notes 1 Maggie Brown, ‘BBC’s new £20m spy thriller “the most radical ever” le Carré adaptation’, The Guardian (12 February 2016), www.theguardian. com/tv-and-radio/2016/feb/12/bbcs-20m-spy-thriller-le-carre-adaptation. 2 Elke Weissmann, Transnational Television Drama: Special Relationships and Mutual Influence between the US and UK (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
in this book on frame-building only applies to traditional news media, with their formal structures, ownership patterns, business models, regulatory obligations, occupational role perceptions and special relationships with other establishment organisations in the political and economic spheres. These are the media that most framing research has focused on until now and they have so far occupied the centre of theoretical thinking around different media systems. Yet developments in the last years suggest that political communication is changing and that mainstream
-American relations underlying these beliefs. For example, in November 1964 Wilson told the American ambassador that ‘the most important role for Britain for the future would be in the defence of western interests east of Suez’. The ambassador agreed that the President would be of the same opinion. 14 Britain and the US had a longstanding partnership, which some called the ‘special relationship’, and which could be
Britain’s declining significance as a military and political ally to the United States.4 Others have contradicted such arguments, insisting that Wilson’s efforts to revive the ‘special relationship’ with Washington were indeed successful. To support this, these scholars point to the ongoing intelligence and nuclear relationship and also argue that the UK provided support and, more important still, exacted a degree of influence over the United States’ wider Cold War policies.5 Other writers are more sceptical of this interpretation. While they accept that personal
we made . . . I’m pretty proud of being part of it . . . to give the British and Australians much more access up to about 99 per cent of our intelligence . . . they were probably about 92–93 per cent before. . . There were very few secrets, that’s the one thing about the, quote, ‘Special Relationship’ that is true. (Interview: Armitage, 21st July 2009) Anglo-American planning was still difficult. Interviews with Miller and others indicated that insular systems began to be resisted and navigated by individuals, realising occupational demands as best they could