A new analysis of the difficulties in normalising opposition in the Irish Free State, this book analyses the collision of nineteenth-century monolithic nationalist movements with the norms and expectations of multiparty parliamentary democracy. The Irish revolutionaries’ attempts to create a Gaelic, postcolonial state involved resolving tension between these two ideas. Smaller, economically driven parties such as the Labour and Farmers’ Parties attempted to move on from the revolution’s unnatural focus on nationalist political issues, while the larger revolutionary parties descended from Sinn Féin attempt to recreate or restore notions of revolutionary unity. This conflict made democracy and opposition hard to establish in the Irish Free State.
modal outcome was the formation of a ‘de facto state’, entities to varying extents fulfilling the Montevideo criteria for statehood but not recognised as such by other states, least of all by the ‘parent state’ from which they seceded. 3 The NKR framed itself as a successor entity to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO), a territorial autonomy established by the young Bolshevik regime in 1923 inside Soviet Azerbaijan, but featuring an ethnic Armenian majority. Beginning in late 1987, a movement for the unification of the NKAO with Soviet Armenia emerged
, Whitemore decided to revisit the conflict between friendship and patriotic duty in the Portland spy case. As he recalled, “I became increasingly preoccupied with the role of the ordinary citizen in our society” and wondered, was it “risky to allow the state (albeit for well-argued reasons) greater moral license that the individual?” 5 With these concerns in mind, Whitemore reworked Act of Betrayal , expanding the original script into a two-act play that allowed him more freedom to examine the historical incidents that
In the social sciences, recognition is considered a means to de-escalate
conflicts and promote peaceful social interactions. This volume explores the
forms that social recognition and its withholding may take in asymmetric armed
conflicts. It discusses the short- and long-term risks and opportunities which
arise when local, state and transnational actors recognise armed non-state
actors (ANSAs), mis-recognise them or deny them recognition altogether.
The first part of the volume contextualises the politics of recognition in the case of ANSAs. It provides a historical overview of recognition regimes since the Second World War and their diverging impacts on ANSAs’ recognition claims. The second part is dedicated to original case studies, centring on specific conflict phases and covering ANSAs from all over the world. Some examine the politics of recognition during armed conflicts, others in conflict stalemates, and others still in mediation and peace processes. The third part of the volume discusses how the politics of recognition impacts practitioners’ engagement with conflict parties, gives an outlook on policies vis-à-vis ANSAs, and sketches trajectories for future research in the field.
The volume shows that, while non-recognition prevents conflict transformation, the recognition of armed non-state actors may produce counterproductive precedents and new modes of exclusion in intra-state and transnational politics.
2 The home state advantage is dead … long live the home state advantage! The perception of a vice presidential home state advantage remains widespread among a range of important actors – including journalists, campaign insiders, and presidential candidates – who influence or potentially influence the vice presidential selection process. How do we know this is the case? In this chapter, we present content analysis of public commentary from each set of actors that demonstrates the significant role home state considerations play in their evaluations of vice
The military coup of March 1976 in Argentina ruptured the prevailing institutional order, with the greater part of its repressive strategy built on clandestine practices and tactics (death, torture and disappearance) that sowed fear across large swathes of Argentine society. Simultaneously, the terrorist state established a parallel, de facto legal order through which it endeavoured to legitimise its actions. Among other social forces, the judicial branch played a pivotal role in this project of legitimisation. While conscious of the fact that many of those inside the justice system were also targets of oppression, I would like to argue that the dictatorship‘s approach was not to establish a new judicial authority but, rather, to build upon the existing institutional structure, remodelling it to suit its own interests and objectives. Based on an analysis of the criminal and administrative proceedings that together were known as the Case of the judicial morgue, this article aims to examine the ways in which the bodies of the detained-disappeared that entered the morgue during the dictatorship were handled, as well as the rationales and practices of the doctors and other employees who played a part in this process. Finally, it aims to reflect upon the traces left by judicial and administrative bureaucratic structures in relation to the crimes committed by the dictatorship, and on the legal strategies adopted by lawyers and the families of the victims.
Established during the Guatemalan Peace Process, the Oslo Accord contemplates the question of compensating the victims of internal armed conflict. Not only was this accord founded on the principles of victims rights, but it also intends to contribute to the democratic reconstruction of Guatemalan society through a process of recognition of victims status and memory – intended to have a reconciling function. The article focuses on the work of two organisations implementing the Oslo Accord and aims to analyse the discourses and practices of the local actors and their perception of the application of victims rights. Civil society actors and members of the National Compensation Programme demonstrate different approaches both in practical work and in representations of what is right. However, revendication of local cultural values is present in all actors discourse, revealing their ambiguous position in regard to state government.
3 The Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland ministers Prior to direct rule the minister in the British Government responsible for Northern Ireland was the Home Secretary. Until 1968 this had been a less than onerous part of the Home Secretary’s job but the workload increased substantially with the growing intervention by the British Government between 1969 and 1972. With direct rule the transfer of all legislative and executive powers would have imposed too much of an extra burden on a Home Secretary and the wide range of ministerial duties justified a
‘statistics’ reputedly calculated by Stalin. 1 In important ways, this trajectory of relentless upheaval made China’s state different from Charles Tilly’s capital-intensive, coercive European states. 2 Apart from a significant imperialist expansion under the final dynasty – the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911) – in the eighteenth century, China was a case of profound state disintegration. The
4 Racial violence and state intervention in the South African economy The white group in South Africa can say, with Louis XIV of France, “l’état c’est moi”! — R. F. Hoernlé 1 In the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, whites in South Africa pursued two strategies that distinguished state formation from the path followed in the USA. They constructed a centralized state and authorized state ofﬁcials to intervene extensively into the economy. With the American Civil War foremost in mind, British and Afrikaner representatives at the negotiations leading to post